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Extraterritoriality at the ECtHR appears to create a paradox. On the one hand, it is 
limited in space, time, purpose and remedies, through its state membership, individual 
application process, the terms of the ECHR, and restricted enforcement and influence 
on general international policy. On the other, it appears to be an indispensable refuge 
for individuals who are victim to the most flagrant denials of justice happening on a 
global scale. The ECtHR finds itself an avenue for redress in historical events of global 
significance such as the NATO bombing and UN administration of Kosovo, the US-
UK occupation in Iraq, extraordinary rendition procedures and the interception of 
migrant boats at sea.  
This thesis embraces the paradox of extraterritoriality at the ECtHR. Putting forward 
a normative framework, the thesis clarifies the nature of extraterritoriality at the 
ECtHR and investigates the extent to which the ECtHR adopts a single normative 
frame. Existing theories fail to capture the nature of extraterritoriality in the ECtHR’s 
operation. This thesis offers a global constitutionalist approach to deduce a model for 
extraterritoriality. Using a normative global constitutionalist frame, in particular 
democratic accountability and the rule of law, the thesis examines the extent to which 
the ECtHR adopts such an approach. Translating the requirements of normative global 
constitutionalism into doctrinal indicators, it examines whether the ECtHR operates 
within a global constitutionalist frame in extraterritoriality decisions. Alongside this 
examination, the thesis queries the function and purpose of extraterritoriality and its 
relationship with other international legal concepts. It questions models that rely on 
state jurisdiction and attribution to determine their extraterritorial reach, exposing 
ii 
 
extraterritoriality as performing a separate function. It ultimately unravels the paradox 
of extraterritoriality through a global constitutionalist explanation. 
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1.  Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
The complexity of the doctrinal and normative challenges arising from the 
extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) at 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cannot be understated. Since the 
decisions of Al Skeini v United Kingdom and Hassan v United Kingdom, the debate on 
when and how the ECtHR should protect rights extraterritorially has intensified and 
dramatically polarised opinion.1 The extraterritoriality test proposed by Al Skeini is 
considered a victory for accountability in some quarters,2 and equally an illustration 
of why extraterritoriality should be precluded in others.3 Similarly, Hassan is praised 
for situating the ECHR within a global legal system and taking account of competing 
norms,4 while others accuse the ECHR of overreach.5 While discourse on whether 
those decisions represent improvements or regressions is plentiful, a theoretical and 
normative analysis of extraterritoriality at the ECtHR is lacking, in comparison. This 
thesis aims to provide a new global constitutionalist framework to answer what 
approach the ECtHR should take to extraterritoriality and why.  
                                                 
1 Al Skeini v UK (2011) 53 EHRR 18; Hassan v UK App No 29750/09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014). 
See e.g. Marko Milanovic, ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ (2012) 23(1) EJIL 121, 121; 
Samantha Miko, ‘Al Skeini v United Kingdom and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2013) 35(3) Boston College I Comp L Rev 63, 79; See e.g. Cedric De 
Koker, ‘Hassan v United Kingdom: The Interaction of Human Rights Law and International 
Humanitarian Law with regard to the Deprivation of Liberty in Armed Conflicts’ (2015) 31(81) Utrecht 
J I Eur L 90. 
2 Milanovic, ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ (n 1) 48. 
3 Richard Ekins et al, ‘Clearing the Fog of Law: Saving our armed forces from defeat by judicial diktat’ 
(Policy Exchange 2015) 14. 
4 Françoise Hampson, ‘Using International Human Rights Machinery to Enforce the International Law 
of Armed Conflicts’ (1992) 31 Mil L & L War Rev 117. 
5 Kenneth Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary 
Conflict (OUP 2016) 125. 
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Al Skeini confirms two tests of extraterritoriality: when states exercise ‘effective 
control over an area’6 such as in situations of military occupation,7  or when a state 
agent exercises ‘authority and control’ over an individual8 such as when individuals 
are ‘physical[ly] force[d]’ onto a plane or held in custody.9  Hassan is the most recent 
significant decision on norm conflicts that arise when the ECHR is applied outside of 
a state’s territory. In Hassan, the ECtHR took into account international humanitarian 
law (IHL) for deciding the rules on detention in armed conflict.10 In Al Skeini, the 
ECtHR is praised for having ‘learnt lessons’ from its previous position in Banković, 
which held that the ECHR would apply extraterritoriality only in ‘exceptional’ 
circumstances.11 Conversely, the ECtHR’s approach is criticised as still too restrictive, 
with suggestions for alternative models. Some suggest that if a state is capable of 
protecting rights abroad it should,12 or that accountability should be coextensive with 
control, rather than bifurcated between effective control and state agent authority and 
control.13 Al Skeini is confronted with considerable backlash from Member States. UK 
courts and a government-funded think-tank have criticised the decision as too far-
                                                 
6 Al Skeini (n 1) para 138. 
7 See e.g. Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) (1995) Series A No 122. 
8 Ibid para 133.  
9 Öcalan v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 45 para 93; Al Skeini  (n 1) para 138.  
10 Hassan (n 1).  
11 Banković v Belgium (2007) 44 EHRR SE5; Milanovic, ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ (n 1) 
48; Judge Loucaides, ‘Determining the Extraterritorial Effect of the ECHR: Facts, Jurisprudence and 
the Banković case’ (2006) 4 EHRLR 391; Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of 
Human Rights Treaties in the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 14 
EJIL 529. For the argument that Al Skeini is correctly decided on the grounds that it conforms with the 
correct meaning of domestic jurisdiction, see Samantha Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: why human rights depend on jurisdiction and what jurisdiction amounts 
to’ (2012) 25(4) LJIL 857.  
12 Al Skeini (n 1) Separate Opinion of Judge Bonello, paras 10-11; Yuval Shany, ‘Taking Universality 
Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights Law’ (2013) 7(1) 
LEHR 47. 
13 Rick Lawson, ‘Life After Banković: On the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, in Fons Coomans and Menno T Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (2004), 84, 86; Michal Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising 
World: Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2009) 375-77.  
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reaching.14 There is no consensus on the reach of Al Skeini, nor on recommendations 
for a better approach to extraterritoriality.  
The reception of Hassan has similarly provoked divergent responses. Some argue that 
the ECHR system is undermined when Article 5 right to liberty and security is watered 
down through consideration of IHL.15 IHL should only be taken into account when 
states derogate from the ECHR in order to preserve the sanctity of the ECHR system.16 
Others argue that only IHL should apply in cases concerning armed conflict at the 
ECtHR because it strikes the correct balance between humanitarianism and the 
practical reality of war. 17  Alternatively, there are those that propose that cases 
concerning armed conflict should be inadmissible to the ECtHR.18 While still others 
argue the ECtHR is an indispensable mechanism for enforcement of IHL, even when 
IHL is interpreted through the lens of the ECHR.19  The relationship between the 
question of extraterritoriality, presented in Al Skeini, and of competing international 
legal norms, confronted in Hassan, is also contested.20  
                                                 
14 Richard Ekins et al, ‘Clearing the Fog of Law’ (n 3) 14; Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for 
Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843, 96.  
15 William Schabas, ‘Lex specialis? Belts and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights 
Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’ (2007) 40 Isr L Rev 592.  
16 Silvia Borelli, ‘Jaloud v Netherlands and Hassan v United Kingdom: Time for a principled approach 
in the application of the ECHR to military action abroad’ (2015) 16 QIL 25, 27. 
17 Marco Sassòli, ‘The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of 
Armed Conflicts’ in Orna Ben-Naftali, International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law (OUP 2011) 92.  
18 Ziv Bohrer, ‘Human Rights vs Humanitarian Law or rights vs obligations: Reflections following the 
rulings in Hassan and Jaloud’ (2015) 16 QIL 5. 
19 Hampson, ‘Using International Human Rights Machinery to Enforce the International Law of Armed 
Conflicts’ (n 4); Françoise Hampson and Daragh Murray, ‘ “Operationalising” the Relationship 
Between the Law of Armed Conflict and International Human Rights Law’ (EJIL : talk ! 11 February 
2016) available at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/author/francoisehampsonanddaraghmurray/> last accessed 
2 April 2016.  
20 For the argument that they are interconnected see, Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (OUP 2011) 209-22. For theories that address 
extraterritoriality without considering the effect of norm conflicts see: Shany, ‘Taking Universality 
Seriously’ (n 12); Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (n 
11). 
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A normative framework is required to recommend and justify an approach to 
extraterritoriality against which the decisions of Al Skeini and Hassan can be appraised. 
The normative framework adopted for this thesis is constitutionalism. A 
constitutionalist framework is used to (re)conceptualise different issues relating to the 
Council of Europe system by other commentators. For example, Fiona de Londras 
proposes that a constitutionalist frame requires the harmonisation of the ECHR with 
domestic law of Member States,21 as well as an evolutive interpretation of human 
rights so that those standards are in keeping with contemporaneous developments.22 
Sadurski Wojciech argues that a constitutionalist approach addresses systemic ECHR 
violations,23 while for Luzius Wildhaber and Steven Greer constitutionalisation of the 
Council of Europe means ensuring efficiency at the ECtHR.24 This thesis adopts a 
constitutionalist frame for addressing extraterritoriality at the ECtHR. Unlike the 
examples above, this thesis transitions discussions of constitutionalism at the ECtHR 
beyond the domestic and regional level, to the global.  A theory of global normative 
constitutionalism is put forward. Constitutionalism has gained traction in global 
governance literature as a rich, normative and theoretical discourse, with both 
explanatory and normative power and potential. 25  As a normative framework it 
advocates models of governance ranging from the most idealistic to pragmatic, 
enabling a theory that engages with existing institutions of global governance and 
recommending ways of moving forward. A global constitutionalist frame can thereby 
potentially capture the ECtHR’s approach to extraterritoriality while providing 
reasons for a preferred model.  
                                                 
21  Fiona de Londras, ‘International Human Rights Law and Constitutional Rights: In Favour of 
Synergy’ (2009) 9(2) ICON 307. 
22 Fiona de Londras, ‘Dual Functionality and the persistent frailty of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2013) EHRLR 38, 40. 
23  Sadurski Wojciech, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: constitutionalism of 
the European Court of Human Rights, the accession of Central and East European states to the Council 
of Europe, and the idea of pilot judgments’ (2009) 9(3) HRLR 397, 398. 
24 Luzius Wildhaber and Steven Greer, ‘Revisiting the Debate about ‘Constitutionalising’ the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 12(4) HRLR 655. 
25 See e.g. Klabbers et al, The Constiutionalization of International Law (OUP 2011); Jeffrey L Dunoff 
and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (CUP 2009). 
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The global constitutionalist frame must capture the reality that those who are victims 
to some of the most flagrant denials of justice on a global scale in recent times seek 
admissibility to a regional human rights court, despite its limited capacities and 
potential for remedial justice. A constitutionalist frame should help explain why this 
paradox arises and recommend a model of extraterritoriality based upon our deeper 
understanding of the ECtHR’s operation. Without a convincing normative 
underpinning, extraterritoriality hangs in the balance. Powerful actors who seek to 
benefit from accountability vacuums traditionally created by territory could exploit 
the normativity gap for their own ends, leaving weaker actors who rely on 
extraterritoriality without a voice and without an avenue to seek justice. 
  
6 
 
1.2. The Paradox of Extraterritoriality 
A framework that simultaneously recognises the significance and insignificance of 
extraterritoriality at the ECtHR requires a global perspective. Victims of atrocities 
happening on a global scale and of global significance seek admissibility to the ECtHR. 
When the UK tortured detainees during its occupation of Iraq, or when it failed to 
carry out effective investigations into alleged illegal killings by British soldiers, the 
ECtHR provided a forum for contestation and remediation. 26  The ECtHR has 
considered events concerning the UN Administration of Kosovo,27 CIA extraordinary 
rendition procedures, interdictions on the high seas of Libyan and Somalian migrants 
making their way by boat to Italy, and the enforcement of United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) for individual targeted sanctions. 28  The ECtHR 
therefore appears to be significant within the global governance system, as it is chosen 
by victims of some of the worst, globally significant atrocities as a forum to hold the 
perpetrators of injustice accountable.  
Its significance to victims of global atrocities can be contrasted with its relative 
insignificance as an institution of global governance. The ECtHR is just one permanent 
court, with a membership of only 47 contracting parties, all based in Europe. It has 
restricted capacity to enforce judgments or change global law and policy.29 Its limited 
mandate is only to enforce the terms of its constitutive treaty: the ECHR. It can merely 
declare state action illegal according to the ECHR, ensure monetary compensation or 
further investigation, or failing that, ensure that victims have a voice without finding 
their cases successful on the merits. Inadequate resources mean that the backlog of 
cases is increasingly growing, evidencing its inability to deal with accountability 
demands and questioning its efficiency. 30  The ECtHR mostly hears cases on an 
                                                 
26 Al Skeini (n 1). See also Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 EHRR 29.  
27 Behrami v France (2007) 45 EHRR SE10.  
28 See e.g. El-Masri v Macedonia (2013) 57 EHRR 25 (extraordinary renditions); Hirsi Jamaa v Italy 
(2012) 55 EHRR 21(interdictions at sea); Nada v Switzerland (2013) 56 EHRR 18  (enforcement of 
UNSCRs).  
29 Elisabeth L Abdelgawad, ‘The Execution of Judgements of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(Council of Europe Publishing 2008) 62.  
30 The number of pending cases at the ECtHR at the end of 2015 was 65,000: Press conference, Press 
room, 28 January 2016 Guido Raimondi, President of the European Court of Human Rights, available 
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individual basis, meaning that justice will only be directly afforded to one victim 
despite the fact there may be many others who are in the same position and merit 
compensation or mandated action by the state.   
This thesis adopts a global constitutionalist frame as it may have the potential to 
account for the ECtHR’s significance to victims of global atrocity whilst 
simultaneously recognising its limited institutional value in global governance. A 
global constitutionalist frame may help to articulate and justify the continuance of the 
connection between victims of global atrocities and the ECtHR. It may be successful 
in explaining why the ECtHR is a popular avenue for justice, despite its limitations, 
whilst answering to those who are sceptical about the link between extraterritorial 
applicants and the Council of Europe.  
The paradox highlights the complexity in articulating the political and legal 
(in)significance of extraterritoriality at the ECtHR in global governance. The legal 
(in)significance of the ECHR needs to be addressed. International law regulates the 
interactions between states and extraterritoriality questions one state’s actions on 
another state’s territory thus inevitably triggering the application of international law. 
External international law may not point to the same legal solution as the ECHR in 
extraterritoriality decisions. An analysis of how to negotiate competing solutions to 
the regulation of extraterritorial situations needs to be undertaken. The ECtHR must 
decide how to interpret the ECHR against competing international legal norms. The 
ECtHR has interpreted ECHR norms against the peace and security obligations 
enshrined under Article 24 of the UN Charter,31  the law of the sea,32 IHL,33 and 
diplomatic assurances.34 The ECtHR needs to decide whether to ignore or to take into 
account external international law, and how to manage the relationship between 
different norms. A global constitutionalist frame should capture and provide guidance 
                                                 
at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20160128_Raimondi_JY_PC_ENG.pdf> last 
accessed 4 July 2016. 
31 Behrami (n 27) paras 148-9. 
32 Hirsi (n 28) paras 76-82. 
33 Hassan (n 1) paras 96-107. 
34 Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK (2012) 55 EHRR 1  paras 186-9. 
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on how the ECHR is interpreted against external international law in extraterritoriality 
decisions.  
 
  
9 
 
1.3. Methodology 
This thesis is desk and library based research, involving both doctrinal and theoretical 
inquiries. Placing equal emphasis on the theoretical and doctrinal questions is central 
to the novelty of this thesis. Previous important attempts to clarify extraterritoriality 
at the ECtHR exist on account of the ECtHR’s complex and conflicting 
jurisprudence,35 but an emerging clarification in Al Skeini and Hassan means that the 
investigation must move beyond mere doctrinal analysis. Instead, there must be a 
focus on the backlash against extraterritoriality, providing strong, theoretically 
informed justifications for its expansion or limitation. Existing frameworks do not 
engage in any real inquiry of who relies on extraterritoriality and does not go beyond 
human rights discourse for conceptualising its worth.36 Prejudice towards or against 
the human rights rhetoric more often than not directly correlates with the model of 
extraterritoriality ultimately presented.  
This thesis devotes space to developing an innovative theoretical framework, which 
cannot so easily be undermined. It responds to the need for greater consideration of 
the wider normative implications of territorially defined obligations. The innovation 
is in translating global constitutionalist norms into doctrinal indicators to stipulate 
what approach the ECtHR should take to extraterritoriality in its jurisprudence. While 
the analysis does not purport to have developed an entirely original conception of 
global constitutionalism, the resulting frame against which the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
is analysed is unique, arrived at through a critical examination of existing global 
constitutionalist theories. As a result of the focus on normative considerations and the 
challenge of translating norms into doctrinal indicators, this analysis relies on existing 
literature on global constitutionalism. There is a critical examination of which global 
constitutionalist frame is best suited to justify a model of extraterritoriality. The global 
constitutionalist model adopted in this thesis should take legitimacy and normativity 
                                                 
35Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World (n 13); Milanovic, Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 20); Karen Da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of 
Selected Human Rights Treaties (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff  2013). 
36 Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights (11); Nehal Bhuta, 
‘The Frontiers of Extraterritoriality – Human Rights Law as Global Law’ in Nehal Bhuta (ed), The 
Frontiers of Human Rights (OUP 2016). 
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seriously. 37  Authoritative and contemporary literature on global constitutionalism 
abounds, and the main contribution made to that literature in this thesis is the 
translation of those norms into doctrinal indicators for extraterritoriality at the ECtHR.  
The development of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence needs investigation in order to 
appraise the relative significance of the ECtHR’s emerging approach against previous 
models of extraterritoriality. A contemporary practice of the ECtHR is to adjudicate 
upon cases concerning state action in other states’ territories, without explicitly 
acknowledging there is an extraterritoriality issue. This leads to omissions in doctrinal 
inquiries which skew the reality of extraterritoriality at the ECtHR. This thesis 
includes an analysis of all significant extraterritoriality decisions against the doctrinal 
indicators derived from normative global constitutionalism.  
The management of norm conflicts is crucial to a conceptualisation of 
extraterritoriality. An appraisal of one of the most developed lines of jurisprudence in 
this area, detention in armed conflict, is best for the application of doctrinal indicators 
to determine whether the ECtHR is converging towards a global constitutionalist 
frame. This is in contrast to other norm conflicts that arise from extraterritoriality, in 
relation to which the ECtHR’s approach is not developed, is non-existent or has so 
many various aspects that a comprehensive analysis of all of the norm conflicts arising 
in relation to that human right is beyond the scope of this thesis.  For example, Article 
2 cases relating to the obligation to carry out effective investigations into alleged 
killings,  non-refoulement and the use of force. They all pose complex norm conflict 
problems between the ECHR and various international law instruments. Furthermore, 
they have either not been addressed by the ECtHR or not developed so as to constitute 
a line of jurisprudence against which doctrinal indicators can be applied.38  
                                                 
37 Samantha Besson, ‘Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and Democracy’ 
in  in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International 
Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 381; Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Klabbers et al (eds) 
The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2011) 263-342; Aoife O’Donoghue, 
Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (CUP 2014) 200-242. 
38 See e.g. Michael Schmitt, ‘Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed Conflict’ (2011) 
2 Harvard National Security J 31; Gloria Gaggioli and Robert Kolb, ‘A Right to Life in Armed Conflict? 
The Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 37 Israel YBHR; Aurel Sari, ‘The 
Juridification of the British Armed Forces and the European Convention on Human Rights: ‘Because 
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The relationship between Article 5 and UNSCRs for their regulation of detention in 
armed conflict is not addressed here.39 The interpretation of UNSCRs against ECHR 
rights arises in many different contexts. 40  The ECtHR puts forward the general 
solution of a strong presumption that UNSCRs are in conformity with ECHR 
protection.41  The relationship between IHL and the ECHR is different. It confronts 
profound issues relating to the ethos of different special regimes. It mitigates against 
a one-size-fits-all solution. While norm conflicts between UNSCRs and the ECHR 
often arise in the domestic context, the IHL/ECHR norm conflict is quintessentially 
an extraterritorial problem at the ECtHR. The complexity of the relationship between 
IHL and ECHR has even been put forward as a reason for ceasing extraterritoriality.42 
An evaluation of the relationship between IHL and the ECHR is most suitable for 
exploring the interconnection between both extraterritoriality and norm conflicts. 
Constitutionalism is preferred to other potential frameworks of global governance, 
including legal pluralism, global administrative law (GAL) and cosmopolitanism. 
Legal pluralism describes the legal autonomy of institutions, sectoral regimes and 
states, and supports their autonomy on the grounds that they are best placed to regulate 
their own specialist regime or governance order.43 However, it denies the inevitable 
overlapping of many legal orders, and that there may be abuse of power within those 
                                                 
It’s Judgment that Defeats Us’ available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411070> last accessed 4 July 2016; Al-Saadoon 
v UK (2010) 51 EHRR 9; Dominic McGoldrick and Sarah Williams, ‘Between the Devil and the Deep 
Blue Sea: Conflicted Thinking in the Al-Saadoon Affair’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 689. 
39 See e.g. Al Jedda v UK (2011) 53 EHRR 23  para 101. 
40 For scholarship on the ECtHR’s approach to interpreting norm conflicts between the ECHR and 
UNSCR see, for example: Fiona De Londras and Suzanne Kingston, ‘Rights, Security, and Conflicting 
International Obligations: Exploring Inter-Jurisdictional Judicial Dialogues in Europe’ (2010) 58 Am J 
Comp L 359; Erika de Wet, ‘From Kadi to Nada: Judicial Techniques Favouring Human Rights over 
United Nations Security Council Sanctions’ (2013) 12(4) Chinese JIL 787; Katja S Ziegler, 
‘Strengthening the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting International Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ 
from the Perspective of Human Rights’ (2009) 9(2) HRLR 288; Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The European Court 
of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’ (2010) 51(1) Harvard ILJ. 
41 Al Jedda (n 39) para 102.  
42 Serdar Mohammed (n 14) para 96.  
43 Colleen Shephard, ‘Equality Through the Prism of Legal Pluralism’ in René Provost and Colleen 
Sheppard (eds), Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (Springer 2013) 135. 
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governance systems that can only be addressed from outside. In the words of Martti 
Koskenniemi, legal pluralism’s focus on heterogeneity and diversity and an 
acceptance of their autonomy ceases to pose demands on the world, which runs 
contrary to the normative intentions of this thesis.44 Cosmopolitanism strives towards 
a universalist conception of humanity, based in universal law. Despite the fact that it 
aims to promote greater accountability of actors, 45  it is a veiled imposition of a 
hegemonic or imperialist ideology, as it presumes the universality of particular values 
to which all global actors should subscribe.46 Normative constitutionalism strikes a 
balance between heterogeneity and homogeneity by taking seriously the normative 
claims of different sites of governance, determining who is attached to those sites and 
accommodating their overlap. GAL seeks accountability but does not place emphasis 
on legitimacy, arguing that it cannot be achieved at the global level due to the 
complexity of global governance networks. Instead, procedures and mechanisms 
should be put in place to enhance accountability of existing institutions that exert law-
making or enforcement powers. 47 Constitutionalism is more normatively ambitious 
than global administrative discourse in its quest for legitimacy and democratic 
accountability. GAL does not ask why procedural obligations are owed between 
different actors which is indispensable for even limited accountability to be 
meaningful.48 If an institution is accountable to a body of actors upon which that 
institution’s actions has no bearing, the accountability mechanisms are meaningless.  
                                                 
44 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 
70(1) MLR 1, 23-4.  
45 Stephen J Toope, ‘Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law’ in M Byers (ed), The 
Role of Law in International Relations and International Law (OUP 2000) 91, 92. 
46 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP 
2005) 45.  
47 Daniel Esty believes that ‘global governance is doomed to illegitimacy’ in Daniel C Esty, ‘Good 
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalising Administrative Law’ (2006) 115 Yale L J 1490, 
1562; see, Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global 
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 (1) EJIL 1. 
48 Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: on the Accountability of States to Foreign 
Stakeholders’ (2013) 107(2) AJIL 295, 300.   
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Constitutionalism is a framework that can capture both political and legal aspects of 
governance simultaneously and in connection with one another.49 The constitutionalist 
norms of democratic accountability and the rule of law are chosen because they 
address both the political and legal issues arising from the paradox of extraterritoriality. 
Analysing democratic accountability in global governance may help in understanding 
whether the Council of Europe holds any real significance in securing legitimacy in 
global governance and the extent of that significance. It will also help determine to 
whom the Council of Europe holds significance whether it be individuals situated in 
territories of Member States, or outside of the Council of Europe, thus linking to 
discussions on extraterritoriality. Democratic accountability is potentially a vehicle 
through which the significance of the Council of Europe to creating a more legitimate 
global governance system can be explored. This is because democratic accountability 
is a constitutionalist norm which aims to provide legitimate governance: governance 
wherein those who are subject to power have some degree of control over the way in 
which they are governed. An analysis of the requirements of the rule of law in a global 
context can improve understanding of the ramifications on the international legal 
environment of the ECtHR’s approach to norm conflicts. Considerations of the rule of 
law can help determine what approach the ECtHR should take to resolving norm 
conflicts, whether it be ignoring competing international law norms or letting external 
norms trump the ECHR, or another solution. Whether the resolution of norm conflicts 
has a bearing on political questions relating to global governance can also be answered 
through the lens of the rule of law.  
The separation of powers embodies the important constitutionalist principle of 
constraint of powers. The challenges of translating democratic accountability and the 
rule of law to the international level have been given significant attention in the 
literature.50 The complexity of translating the separation of powers to the international 
                                                 
49 See e.g. Adam Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (2002) 22(1) OJLS 157; Martin 
Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003); O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global 
Constitutionalisation (n 37). 
50  See e.g. Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: Compensatory Constitutionalism: The 
Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 LJIL 579; 
Andreas Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P 
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level has faced less scrutiny.51 The aim of the thesis is to provide a normatively rich 
appraisal of extraterritoriality based on existing global constitutionalist literature, from 
which doctrinal indicators can be derived. Therefore, it focuses on two core norms 
upon which there is existing, extensive theorisation, rather than a norm which could 
benefit from further exploration for its application in the global sphere. Arguably, the 
separation of powers encapsulates and presupposes the existence of the norms of 
democratic accountability and the rule of law, building upon an analysis of their 
normative functions and balancing them with executive power. This thesis does not 
engage in an analysis of what this balance may entail. Instead, what are considered 
here are the more rudimentary norms of constitutionalism. This is due to space and 
emphasis on both legitimacy, defined as ensuring that those governed have some 
control over the way in which they are governed for which the norm of democratic 
accountability is particularly apt; and significance of the ECHR in an international 
legal system, which can be addressed by appraising the rule of law. An additional 
reason for not focusing on the separation of powers is that it may involve looking 
beyond the ECtHR to the institutions within the Council of Europe which help to 
balance executive, judicial, and legislative powers. As the focus of this thesis is on 
translating constitutionalist norms into doctrinal indicators for appraising 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence, an analysis of other institutions within the Council of 
Europe would fall outside the purview of the aim of this thesis.  
While the International Court of Justice, International American Court of Human 
Rights and Human Rights Committee all have made substantial contributions to the 
case law on the extraterritorial application of human rights, the ECtHR is considered 
to be the most prolific on this topic, and its jurisprudence the ‘richest and most 
developed’.52 This analysis may be useful as a starting point for asking what approach 
                                                 
Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance 
(CUP 2009) 69. 
51 For an interesting analysis of the division of powers in global constitutionalism see O’Donoghue, 
Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 39) 171-182. 
52  Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 20) 4. For interesting 
scholarship on extraterritoriality at the International Court of Justice see, Ralph Wilde, ‘Human Rights 
Beyond Borders at the World Court: The Significance of the International Court of Justice’s 
Jurisprudence on the Extraterritorial Application of International Human Rights Law Treaties’ (2013) 
12(4) Chinese JIL 639.  For an analysis of extraterritoriality at the Inter-American Court of Human 
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other international human rights courts should take to extraterritoriality from a global 
constitutionalist perspective. This thesis confines itself to an analysis of the ECtHR’s 
approach, and presumes that the global constitutionalist approach may suggest 
something else for other courts, depending upon the criteria it suggests. Many 
domestic courts have engaged in the extraterritorial application of constitutional rights, 
such as Canada, the US, and Israel.53 Those courts take into account the jurisprudence 
of international human rights courts. While the relationship between constitutional 
rights, IHRL and the extraterritorial enforcement of those rights is important, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather than taking advantage of the benefits of a 
comparative analysis, this thesis prioritises a detailed analysis of the ECHR, taking a 
holistic look at the ECtHR’s approach from a perspective that has most potential for 
unravelling the paradox recognised in this thesis. The global constitutionalist frame 
developed here could potentially be applied to other IHRLs but their own unique 
institutional apparatus would need to be considered separately. Furthermore, the 
global constitutionalist frame may consider other factors in relation to the 
extraterritorial enforcement of domestic constitutional rights. The analysis is confined 
to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR because of its significance and the need to devote 
attention to the development of a new normative framework and model of 
extraterritoriality that unravels the paradox at the centre of inquiry in this thesis.  
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
The first half of the thesis aims to provide a normative frame from which to deduce a 
model of extraterritoriality at the ECtHR. The second half engages in a doctrinal 
                                                 
Rights see, Christina M Cerna, ‘Out of Bounds? The Approach of the Inter-American system for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law 
(2006) 6 CHRGJ Working Paper available at 
<http://chrgj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/WPS_NYU_CHRGJ_Cerna_Final.pdf> last accessed 4 
July 2016. For extraterritoriality of economic and social rights see, Olivier De Schutter et al, 
‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) 34 HRQ 1084. 
53 See further Fiona de Londras, ‘What Human Rights Law Could Do: Lamenting the Lack of an 
International Human Rights Law Approach in Boumediene and Al Odah’ (2008) 41(3) Isr L Rev 562; 
Sarah H Cleveland, ‘Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad’ (2010) 110 Colum L 
Rev 101. 
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analysis of the ECtHR’s approach to extraterritoriality to answer whether it can be 
captured by the proposed frame. The doctrinal analysis takes place after the theoretical 
inquiry in order to ensure that the indicators derive from the frame rather than the 
frame deriving from the jurisprudence, ensuring the authenticity of the inquiry. This 
structure also prioritises filling the normative gap. The equal emphasis on theory and 
doctrine enables a thorough theoretical analysis of existing theories as well as a 
detailed justification for the normative framework put forward, whilst providing a 
satisfactory appraisal of the complex jurisprudence relating to extraterritoriality and 
detention in armed conflict.  
Chapter 2 evaluates existing normative frameworks at the ECtHR to illustrate the need 
for a frame that provides a sound theoretical appraisal of political and legal 
implications of extraterritoriality. It considers whether they are in fact normative, 
whether they shed light on why individuals outside of the Council of Europe seek 
admissibility to the ECtHR, and explain the operation of the ECHR within an 
international legal system. It further asks whether Article 1 of the ECHR can be relied 
upon to contrive a legitimate model of extraterritoriality. A normative framework that 
responds to a Post-Westphalian world of increased, unaccounted for transnational 
activity and a proliferation of actors and institutions, needs to be adopted. 
Having established a normative gap, a global constitutionalist model is put forward. 
Normative global constitutionalism is examined as a legitimate model of global 
governance in a Post-Westphalian world, which considers both political and legal 
aspects of extraterritoriality. This chapter focuses on the translation of the norm of 
democratic accountability into doctrinal indicators of global constitutionalism. It 
considers whether the Council of Europe system is a nexus for the process of global 
constitutionalism, whether the ECtHR is a mechanism of democratic accountability, 
and who participates. The doctrinal indicators of democratic accountability aim to 
assess whether the ECtHR is moving towards a presumption of extraterritoriality. 
They are applied to the ECtHR’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence in Chapter 5 in order 
to determine whether global constitutionalism captures the ECtHR’s emerging 
approach. 
Following from establishing the doctrinal indicators of democratic accountability, 
Chapter 4 considers the other core norm constitutionalism under investigation, the rule 
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of law, its role and function in legitimate governance, and its implications for the 
management of norm conflicts arising from the extraterritorial application of the 
ECHR. The function of the rule of law in enhancing accountability of constituted 
powers by their constituents is examined. The potential role of international courts in 
both securing and undermining the rule of law is evaluated through the lens of 
fragmentation. The principle of systemic integration is considered as a global 
constitutionalist tool for improving clarity and consistency in a fragmented global 
governance system. As well as the principle of systemic integration, other doctrinal 
indicators of the rule of law are considered for enhancing the consistency and 
coherency of the international legal system. Those doctrinal indicators are applied in 
Chapter 6 to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on detention in extraterritorial armed conflict. 
While Chapters 3 and 4 translate the norms of global constitutionalism into doctrinal 
indicators to provide tangible recommendations for the ECtHR moving forward, 
Chapters 5 and 6 establish the extent to which those indicators are present in the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence in order to assess the extent to which the ECtHR’s approach 
to extraterritoriality and norm conflicts conforms with the global constitutionalist 
frame.  An investigation of the ECtHR’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence tests for the 
presence of indicators of a presumption of extraterritoriality, translated from the norm 
of democratic accountability. This analysis is split into three different time periods: 
pre-Banković, post-Banković and post-Al Skeini. Banković and Al Skeini are 
considered milestone decisions.54 Post-Al Skeini represents the ECtHR’s emerging 
approach, as it is the most recent decision to provide a comprehensive appraisal of the 
ECtHR’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence. The chapter includes an analysis of the 
ECtHR’s significant cases from its inception to contemporary times, against which to 
apply the doctrinal indicators. This is in order to assess and critique responses to the 
ECtHR’s emerging approach, and whether and how it has changed. Ultimately, it will 
help answer whether the ECtHR’s present approach can be justified as more in 
conformity with the global constitutionalist frame. 
Chapter 6 then assesses whether the ECtHR’s approach is in conformity with the 
second norm of global constitutionalism under investigation: the rule of law. Doctrinal 
                                                 
54 See e.g. Anna Cowan, ‘A New Watershed? Re-evaluating Banković in Light of Al-Skeini’ (2012) 
1(1) CJICL 213.   
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indicators deriving from that norm are applied to jurisprudence relating to detention 
in extraterritorial armed conflict. The adoption of the principle of systemic integration, 
an explicit, clear and consistent narrative, and reasonable interpretation of the law. 
First, it clarifies the relationship between systemic integration, lex specialis and 
extraterritorial derogations. Then an analysis of the presence of the doctrinal indicators 
of the rule of law in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on detention in armed conflict is 
undertaken, comparing the two most prominent cases in this area: Al Jedda v UK and 
Hassan. Hassan represents the ECtHR’s emerging approach as the most recent 
significant decision on this subject. This chapter aims to answer whether the global 
constitutionalist model best captures the evolution of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
concerning detention in armed conflict, and more broadly, the management of norm 
conflicts arising from extraterritoriality.  
Whether the ECtHR conceptualises the function of extraterritoriality in accordance 
with a global constitutionalist frame needs to be addressed at the end of the analysis. 
This is because it poses the most challenging questions in relation to extraterritoriality 
and the translation of the global constitutionalist frame. Extraterritoriality is 
considered in this thesis as a set of rules that delimit admissibility of individuals from 
territories outside the respondent state. Chapter 7 contextualises this understanding of 
extraterritoriality within the global legal system, comparing and contrasting it with 
other public international law concepts of jurisdiction and attribution. It then examines 
the ECtHR’s understanding of the function of extraterritoriality in relation to 
jurisdiction and attribution. While a conception of extraterritoriality based upon 
jurisdiction gives rise to incoherency in the global legal system, concerns that 
conflating extraterritoriality and attribution also create inconsistency are abated. This 
is in order to support the argument that a presumption of extraterritoriality which is 
required for the operation of the norm of democratic accountability, would not be in 
violation of the rule of law. Purported norm conflicts between extraterritoriality tests 
and IHL tests of control are challenged. A connection between increasing 
extraterritoriality and managing norm conflicts in conformity with both the norm of 
democratic accountability and rule of law is made. Ultimately, the two strands of the 
global constitutionalist model are brought together in synergy to elucidate the very 
nature of extraterritoriality, and provide recommendations to ensure the ECtHR’s 
conformity with this model. 
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1.5. Conclusion 
Extraterritoriality’s attractiveness and contentiousness as a subject of inquiry arises 
from its status as the epitome of the legal loophole, which is much more long standing 
than other contemporary manufactured examples such as the increasing privatisation 
of state conduct. The exploitation of this legal vacuum undermines the legitimacy of 
global governance. The global constitutionalist frame should capture the role that the 
ECtHR plays in incrementally exposing illegitimate behaviour, and suggest criteria 
for moving forward. This may lead to an understanding of why some of the most 
flagrant, widespread and systemic denials of justice on a global scale arrive at 
Strasbourg.  Global constitutionalism may help unravel the paradox of why victims of 
global atrocity seek admissibility to the ECtHR despite its relative inability to the 
change the state of affairs or even to hold states accountable within the global 
governance system. This frame may point to the relevance of the question of 
conflicting norms for legitimate global governance and provide solutions for 
evaluating the relationship between the ECHR and external international norms. 
Existing theories have left the paradox of extraterritoriality unnoticed and under-
theorised, leaving extraterritoriality hanging in the balance, and at the whims of those 
who have something to lose from its operation. There needs to be a theory that not 
only speaks to powerful state actors who have enough resources and political influence 
to exercise power beyond their domestic territories, but also speaks for individuals 
who turn to the ECtHR for their voices to be heard.  
This thesis seeks to conceptualise the Council of Europe and the ECHR within a global 
governance and international legal system in order to balance the price that powerful 
actors pay for extraterritoriality against the benefits it provides to those who seek 
admissibility to the ECtHR. Once the paradox of extraterritoriality is unravelled, and 
the connection or lack of connection between victims of global atrocities and the 
Council of Europe understood, a recommendation as to the reach of extraterritoriality 
can be provided. If extraterritoriality at the ECtHR does not serve the norms of global 
constitutionalism, then there may be no justification for the connection between the 
ECtHR and applicants from outside of the Council of Europe. But if extraterritoriality 
does perform a constitutionalist function, then there may be a reason for sustaining or 
extending it. Equally, once the relevance of the question of conflicting norms at the 
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ECtHR to legitimate global governance is articulated, an evaluation of the ECtHR’s 
approach can be undertaken. Whether or not the ECtHR should ignore external law, 
take it into account, ensure that ECHR prevails or external international law prevails, 
will be considered in this analysis. This thesis seeks to expose the political and legal 
(in)significance of extraterritoriality at the ECtHR through a global constitutionalist 
lens, providing a frame which can then capture its value and recommend ways for 
moving forward. 
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2.  Normative Frameworks of 
Extraterritoriality 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter asks whether existing normative theories conceptualise extraterritoriality 
at the ECtHR within a global governance context, taking account of both political and 
legal aspects. It asks whether they capture the paradox of the popularity of a relatively 
limited court in situations of global atrocity, and whether they consider norm conflicts 
that arise upon extraterritorial application of the ECHR. Existing accounts that rely on 
Article 1 of the ECHR for their legitimacy are also questioned in order to ascertain 
whether there needs to be a move away from reliance on this provision for a model of 
extraterritoriality.  
An examination of existing proposals ascertains whether there is a need for a new 
normative frame for extraterritoriality. A comparison between Marko Milanovic and 
Yuval Shany’s ‘universality’ models of extraterritoriality establishes whether they are 
internally coherent, whether their normative claims are well-founded, and the resulting 
models of extraterritoriality are arbitrary. 1  Samantha Besson and Nehal Bhuta’s 
human rights theories of extraterritoriality are also analysed.2 The analysis determines 
whether they are coherent, whether they consider norm conflicts that arise upon 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR, and whether they provide a normative 
framework that sheds light on the (in)significance of extraterritoriality at the ECtHR. 
A critical analysis of the normative frames determines whether there is a need for an 
alternative.  
Whether or not a new normative frame is required can also be analysed by asking 
whether a model of extraterritoriality should flow from an interpretation of Article 1 
                                                 
1 Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy 
(OUP 2010); Yuval Shany, ‘Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to 
Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights Law’ (2013) 7(1) LEHR 47. 
2  Samantha Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why 
Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to’ (2012) 25(4) LJIL 857; Nehal 
Bhuta, ‘The Frontiers of Extraterritoriality – Human Rights Law as Global Law’ in Nehal Bhuta (ed), 
The Frontiers of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and its Challenges (OUP 2016) 1.  
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of the ECHR, a provision upon which all of the above accounts under consideration 
rely. In order to answer this question, the normative premise for why extraterritoriality 
should be based on the wording of a treaty’s jurisdiction clause needs to be examined.3 
In this regard, the models of extraterritoriality put forward by Michal Gondek and 
Milanovic which rely for their legitimacy on an interpretation of the words, ‘within 
their jurisdiction’ are evaluated.4  This is in order to decide whether Gondek and 
Milanovic’s invocation of Article 1 as a justification for their models of 
extraterritoriality are genuine or contrived. Second, the basis of the legitimacy of a 
model based upon an interpretation of Article 1 in accordance with the rules of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT) is exposed and questioned.5 
In particular, this section asks whether the normative premise upon which the VCLT 
operates - a modern secular system of sovereign and equal states wherein the 
legitimacy of international law depends upon state consent 6 - still accounts for the 
state of affairs.7 The deterioration of the order upon which the rules of the VCLT are 
premised, through globalisation, fragmentation and institutionalisation, is analysed.8 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Banković v Belgium ECHR 2001-XII 333; Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of Human Rights’ 
(n 2). See also, Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the 
recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR’ (2003) 14 EJIL 529; Rick Lawson, ‘Life After Bankovic: On the 
Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Fons Coomans and 
Menno T Kamminga (eds) Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2004) 85. 
4 Michal Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2009) 29-46; Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties (n 1) 10, 30-3, 212-5. 
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
1155 UNTS 331, 8ILM 679. 
6 Bardo Fassbender, ‘Peace of Westphalia (1648)’ Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law (OUP 2011) para 18; Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 7, 1120.  
7 Fassbender, ‘Peace of Westphalia’ (n 6) para 18; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace (4th ed Knopf New York 1967) 264; Richard Falk, ‘The Interplay of 
Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of the International Legal Order’ in Richard Falk and Cyril E 
Black (eds), The Future of the International Legal Order Vol 1 Trends and Patterns (PUP 1969) 43.  
8 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ 
(2004) 15(5) EJIL 907; Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of 
Fundamental International Norms and Structures (2006) 19 LJIL 579; Samantha Besson, ‘Theorising 
the Sources of International Law’, in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of 
International Law (2010) 166, 175.  
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An attempt is made to portray a more accurate picture of global governance in light of 
these developments. If the international setting can no longer be exclusively explained 
through the principle of sovereign and equal states, then a model of extraterritoriality 
based upon an interpretation of Article 1 in conformity with the rules of the VCLT 
will not be legitimate. An alternative normative premise and doctrinal solution to 
extraterritoriality will be required.   
2.2. Existing Normative Frameworks 
Whether or not a new normative frame is required can only be assessed by asking 
whether existing frames have proved unsatisfactory. This section examines whether 
‘universality’ models or human rights theories conceptualise extraterritoriality within 
a satisfactory normative framework. In relation to the universality theories, the focus 
of analysis will be on whether they are internally coherent, whether universality 
provides an appropriate normative framework, and whether the resulting models of 
extraterritoriality are arbitrary. While human rights theories of extraterritoriality are 
examined for their coherency, greater consideration is given to whether they look at 
both political and legal aspects of extraterritoriality: the paradox of extraterritoriality 
and norm conflicts that arise from the extraterritorial application of the ECHR. This 
section seeks to ascertain whether existing normative frameworks are satisfactory for 
considering the role of the ECtHR within a global governance system or whether a 
new normative frame is required.  
2.2.1. ‘Universality versus effectiveness’ and ‘Special power and legal 
relationship’ 
Milanovic’s ‘universality versus effectiveness’ framework proposes that we should 
aspire towards securing human rights protection universally, but temper our 
aspirations by considerations of practicality. He posits that universality provides a 
suitable baseline for the extraterritorial application of the ECHR. This is because 
‘[e]very single applicant who demands protection against extraterritorial state actors 
makes an appeal to universality’. 9  Universality encapsulates the indispensable 
normative idea that there is ‘no reason why [an] individual should be completely 
                                                 
 
9 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 55. 
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unprotected against the arbitrary exercise of that power, solely on the basis of his or 
her location’. 10  Moreover, courts ‘act[…] out of universalist aspirations that are 
deeply embedded in the structure of human rights law’. 11  He concedes that 
universality is ‘hopelessly utopian’ and therefore must be balanced against practical 
considerations.12 In light of this, he weighs considerations of effectiveness against the 
universality baseline: flexibility, impact, regime integrity, clarity and predictability.13 
The requirements of effectiveness all pertain to determining the scope and content of 
rights abroad. Flexibility requires that international law external to the ECHR is taken 
into account when the ECHR is applied abroad.14 Impact and regime integrity require 
that including consideration of external international law does not dilute the 
requirements of the ECHR.15 The ECtHR should clarify and ensure predictability of 
the rules on extraterritoriality and clarify the relationship between ECHR norms and 
external law.16  
The reliance on universality may be considered to undermine the internal coherency 
of Milanovic’s theory in four ways. First, despite labelling it as ‘hopelessly utopian’17 
and ‘unrealistic’, universality forms one branch of his principled framework.18 Second, 
he qualifies ‘universality’ with practical considerations, despite the fact that 
universality, by its very definition, does not submit to such qualifications.19 Third, the 
‘effectiveness’ branch is meant to act as a constraint on universality. However, ‘impact’ 
and ‘regime integrity’ require that ECHR norms are not diluted by external 
international law norms. Those criteria appear to be complimentary to, rather than at 
odds with, universality. This is because universality presupposes the full application 
                                                 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid 55. 
12 Ibid 56. 
13 Ibid 109-110.  
14 Ibid 112.  
15 Ibid 113-5. 
16 Ibid 115-6.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid 56. 
19 Samantha Besson, ‘LJIL Symposium: A Response by Samantha Besson’ (Opinio Juris 21st December 
2012) available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2012/12/21/ljil-symposium-a-response-by-samantha-
besson/> last accessed 2nd April 2016. 
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of a relevant ECHR norm, rather than a weakened version of that right. In this context, 
they do not act as constraints on the ‘unrealistic’ expectations of universality. Fourth, 
Milanovic’s justification for relying on universalism, that universalist aspirations are 
not necessarily embedded in the structure of human rights law, could be challenged.20 
For some, human rights are custom made and dependent for their operation upon 
application within the state, and have no place outside of it. 21  If universalism is 
understood as unlimited geographical application of the ECHR then, from a human 
rights theory perspective, they do not have universalist aspirations. 
The normativity of Milanovic’s framework appears uncertain. For him, the 
‘effectiveness’ branch of his framework represents non-normative concerns, ensuring 
that the realities of international relations are taken into account. 22  He therefore 
implies that normative frameworks are necessarily at odds with practical reality. He 
argues that Besson’s normative framework for the extraterritorial application of the 
ECHR is too ‘abstract’:23 ‘[y]es, there are the obligatory references to Dworkin and 
Habermas …but they do not make Besson’s argument any more “normative” or 
“theoretical”….[I]t is qualitatively no different than what came before’.24 Arguably, 
normative frameworks are not necessarily at odds with practical reality, but ideally 
point to the correct practical solution in a given instance. The empty and amorphous 
nature of universality coupled with effectiveness, amounts to a handful of practical 
suggestions for courts in implementing human rights standards and not a normative 
framework, as Milanovic suggests, leaving it ‘exposed to criticisms of arbitrariness 
and sub-optimal coverage, similar to those Milanovic himself levels against the current 
                                                 
20 For the argument that the universality of human rights calls for unlimited extraterritorial application 
see: Theodor Meron, ‘Extraterrioriality of Human Rights Treaties’ (1995) 89 AJIL 78, 82. 
21 See e.g. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) 291-4; Mira Siegelberg, The Question 
of Questions: The Problem of Statelessness in International History, 1921-1961 (Doctoral dissertation, 
Harvard University 2014).   
22 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 55. 
23  Marko Milanovic, ‘LJIL Symposium: A Comment on Samantha Besson’s Article on the 
Extraterritorial Application of the ECHR’ (Opinio Juris 21st December 2012) available at 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2012/12/21/ljil-symposium-a-comment-on-samantha-bessons-article-on-the-
extraterritorial-application-of-the-echr/> last accessed 2nd April 2016. 
24 Ibid.  
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ECtHR case law’.25 Considering the lack of consistency and normativity arising from 
its reliance on universality and a general ambivalence towards normativity in the first 
place, Milanovic’s framework does not appear to be suitable for clarifying the role of 
the ECtHR within a global governance system.  
The resulting model of extraterritoriality Milanovic derives from this normative frame 
relies on a distinction between positive and negative obligations. 26  In relation to 
negative obligations, the ECHR should have universal application, with considerations 
of effectiveness shaping the scope and content of the ECHR abroad.27 Therefore, 
negative obligations to respect human rights are not territorially defined.28 Positive 
obligations are divided into two categories: procedural or prophylactic, and positive 
obligations to secure or ensure human rights protection.29 Procedural and prophylactic 
obligations ensure a state’s compliance with its negative obligation to respect rights. 
No jurisdictional threshold applies for procedural and prophylactic obligations 
according to Milanovic.30 A jurisdiction threshold is required for substantive positive 
obligations which require states to take measures to secure the entire ECHR system of 
human rights protection. Those positive obligations are not divisible meaning that 
either none of them apply or all substantive positive obligations under the ECHR apply 
together.31 De facto effective overall control of areas triggers jurisdiction and requires 
Member States to secure all positive obligations under the ECHR. 
Milanovic’s model of extraterritoriality is both counterintuitive and presumes that 
negative obligations need wider protection than positive obligations. First, it is 
counterintuitive insofar as it imposes negative obligations on a case-by-case basis but 
imposes the full range of positive obligations simultaneously, regardless of the 
circumstances, and regardless of the fact that it may be more difficult, or less expedient, 
                                                 
25 Shany, ‘Taking Universality Seriously’ (n 1) 61-2. 
26 For further analysis of positive and negative obligations see: Dinah Shelton and Ariel Gould, ‘Positive 
and Negative Obligations’ in Dinah Shelton (ed) The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights 
Law (OUP 2013).  
27 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 211.  
28 Ibid 209-210. 
29 Ibid 212. 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid. 
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to secure rights protection than to abstain from violating rights. Shany argues that the 
high threshold of the effective overall control test, and the indivisibility of substantive 
positive obligations, enables states to escape liability altogether: the high threshold 
‘releas[es] states from complying with obligations they can carry out just because there 
are other obligations which they cannot fulfil under certain circumstances’.32  
Second, the distinction Milanovic makes between negative and positive obligations 
presumes that one necessarily has a different moral significance to the other. Shany 
argues that the distinction ‘cuts against the increased acceptance of interdependence 
(and moral equivalence) of these two sets of obligations’.33 He critiques Milanovic’s 
discussion of the Herbicide judgment concerning Ecuador and Columbia on the basis 
of the moral equivalence of positive and negative obligations.34 Milanovic finds that 
while Columbia was responsible for spraying operations by its own state agents on 
Columbian territory that had extraterritorial effect in Ecuador, it was not responsible 
for the same affects by private actors operating within its territory.35 Shany asks why, 
considering that there is a moral equivalence between direct and indirect harm, 
Milanovic makes a distinction between public and private acts.36 Columbia is capable 
of stopping the private actors on its own territory and therefore they should. 37 
Milanovic’s model does not take into account the accepted moral equivalence of 
negative and positive obligations, and private and public acts. 
Shany puts forward an alternative model of extraterritoriality that takes universality 
seriously but that attempts to move away from Milanovic’s reliance on the distinctions 
above. Shany seeks to compose a non-arbitrary model of extraterritoriality based upon 
                                                 
32 Ibid 64. 
33 Ibid 62. See e.g. Ida Elizabeth Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: The Protection of Socio-
Economic Demands under the European Convention on Human Rights (Brill 2009) 14. 
34 Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia), General List No 138 [2008] ICJ 28. See Alan 
Boyle who argues that ‘victims of transboundary pollution fall within the “jurisdiction” of the polluting 
state’: Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’  (2012) 23(3) EJIL 613, 638. 
35 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 1) 218.  
36 Shany, ‘Taking Universality Seriously’ (n 1) 63. For a critique of distinctions made between private 
and public acts in international law see Hillary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of 
International Law: A Feminist Analysis (2000) 56-9.  
37 Ibid 63. 
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normative considerations. He argues that jurisdiction is about whether states have a 
functional capacity to protect or secure rights. 38  For him, ‘functionalism is 
universalism’ and ‘states should protect human rights wherever in the world they may 
operate, whenever they may reasonably do so’.39 He provides two restraining notions 
when implementing the functional approach. When there is a lack of special power or 
legal relationship, jurisdiction is not established. 40  He argues that adopting an 
unabated functionalist approach may lead to untenable results: ‘just because the US 
can feed the starving population of North Korea doesn’t mean it should’.41 Therefore, 
the potential impact of the act or omission must be direct, significant and foreseeable.42 
Shany introduces his own concept of ‘special legal relations’ that requires the state 
agent to have a relationship with the individual that renders them ‘particularly well-
suited’ to protect that individual.43 This sounds more like a test of attribution and 
provides little actual guidance on when a state agent is ‘particularly well-suited’, 
except that ‘directness, significance and foreseeability’ can help to identify that 
relationship.  
Shany’s model of extraterritoriality can be challenged for its reliance on universality 
and its lack of clarity. Similar to Milanovic, Shany’s reliance on universality as the 
normative cornerstone of his theory can be criticised on three grounds. First, he 
contradicts himself by placing constraints on universality. Second, the amorphous 
nature of the concept makes it an insubstantial component of his normative theory. 
Third, universality is not necessarily a fundamental normative precept of human rights.  
While Milanovic’s model leads to predictable results when applied to factual 
circumstances, the application of Shany’s test is less certain. Let us consider whether 
the US is liable according to Shany’s model, for the extraterritorial activity of the 
corporation, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) for which the US is home state,44 in 
                                                 
38 Ibid 66. 
39 Ibid 67. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid 68. 
42 Ibid 69 citing Oren Ben-Naftali and Yuval Shany, ‘Living in Denial: The Application of Human 
Rights in the Occupied Territories’ (2003-2004) 37 Isr L Rev 17, 64.  
43 Ibid 69. 
44 The home state is where the headquarters are physically located. 
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the Bhopal gas leak disaster.45 5,200 people died in the Bhopal gas leak disaster in 
India as a result of deadly gases released from Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), 
UCC’s Indian subsidiary. It is not certain whether the US is accountable under Shany’s 
model. Presuming the gas leak is attributable to UCC,46 the test of whether the US’ 
involvement was direct, significant and foreseeable is inconclusive. If the actions are 
attributable to the US company (and it appears there are reasons to believe they are), 
then surely they are direct, and the accident caused significant hardship. Shany argues 
foreseeability is met in the Herbicide case, and presumably the same foreseeability 
exists in relation to a toxic gas leak as it does with spreading toxic herbicides. It is 
unclear where extraterritoriality ends between the North Korean and Bhopal examples. 
Shany propounds that the model does not allow the example of the US feeding starving 
people in North Korea, but does admit of the extraterritorial activities of a home 
corporation operating through subsidiaries abroad and causing environmental harm 
that continues to poison water and air supplies in Bhopal today. The application of 
Milanovic’s model to this case is clear: the US would not be liable in either instances. 
The same clarity is not provided in Shany’s model.  
 Another hypothetical situation, closely linked to the North Korean example, is if the 
activity of a subsidiary of the Coca-Cola Company prevented a population from 
having access to a basic amenity, like water. 47  This is significant as it involves 
deprivation of a basic amenity to a population. It is direct, (presuming actions are 
attributable to the Coca-Cola Company) as the Coca-Cola Company is headquartered 
in the US. Deprivation of water appears to be foreseeable, especially considering 
                                                 
45  See further, ‘Bhopal Gas Tragedy Disaster’ (Union Carbide Corporation) available at 
<http://www.bhopal.com/> last accessed 20 July 2016.  
46 The UCC built a subsidiary company in India to run a gas plant there. It owned majority shares in 
that corporation and provided basic designs for the operation of the gas plant. However, it failed to take 
any responsibility for the gas leak that took place in its subsidiary; it did not contribute to the clean up 
of the poisonous gas which was undertaken only by its subsidiary and the Indian Government; and it 
allegedly continues to withhold valuable information on the poisonous gas compounds which could 
potentially save lives in the future in areas still affected by the gas leak. See further ‘Union Carbide’s 
Disaster’ (Bhopal Medical Appeal) available at <http://bhopal.org/what-happened/union-carbides-
disaster/> last accessed 20 July 2016.  
47  The Coca-Cola Company headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia owns its anchor bottler in North 
America, Coca-Cola Refreshments.  
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Shany’s belief that the Columbian government should have foreseen that spraying 
pesticides close to the Ecuadorian border would lead to pollution in Ecuador.48 The 
application of his test is unclear and distinguishing the North Korean example from 
real examples of extraterritorial corporate activity is difficult. 
Milanovic, unlike Shany, may consider the significance of the interconnection 
between extraterritoriality and norm conflicts, but neither framework is satisfactory 
for conceptualising extraterritoriality at the ECtHR. A frame prefaced upon 
‘universality’ creates problems of consistency. The resulting models of 
extraterritoriality lead to arbitrary results or are unclear. There needs to be greater 
normative and theoretical consideration, in order to derive a clear and consistent model 
of extraterritoriality. 
2.2.2. Human Rights Theories of Extraterritoriality 
Samantha Besson and Nehal Bhuta have both provided normative frameworks for the 
extraterritoriality based on human rights theory.49 According to Bhuta, human rights 
should not apply abroad. For Besson, human rights should apply extraterritorially 
exceptionally, in conformity with the domestic conception of jurisdiction defined by 
effective power, overall control and a normative element – reasons for actions. This 
section asks whether Besson and Bhuta’s theories are coherent, whether they address 
the paradox of extraterritoriality, and whether they consider norm conflicts resulting 
from extraterritoriality. This is in order to ascertain whether a human rights theory 
based frame is satisfactory or whether there needs to be a new normative frame. 
Bhuta’s examination of extraterritoriality is premised on a theory of international legal 
human rights that takes the legal structure of the system seriously: one which works 
                                                 
48 This situation is not as hypothetical as it seems. For an example of a court decision from a regional 
human rights court on the right to water and sanitisation see e.g. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Xákmok Kásek v Paraguay (2010) Series C No 214. Second, there are allegations of the Coca-Cola 
Company’s direct involvement in systemic deprivation of water. See further, AFP, ‘Indian officials 
order Coca-Cola plant to close for using too much water’ (The Guardian, 18 June 2014) available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/18/indian-officals-coca-cola-plant-water-
mehdiganj> last accessed 1 August 2016.  
49 Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (n 2); Bhuta, ‘The 
Frontiers of Extraterritoriality’ (n 2).  
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through and on the effective legal order of the state.50 For him, a legal framework for 
the realisation of human rights depends upon, and is expected to act through, 
functioning political communities organised as sovereign states.51 The human rights 
regime should focus on buttressing state sovereignty through effective international 
institutions that provide a focal point for developing consensual norms over time.52 
The ECtHR is best understood as constitution-enhancing in respect of the specific 
political and judicial system of each Member State.53 The context presupposed by 
human rights law is the normal relationship between government and governed.54 
Therefore, Bhuta relies on human rights theory for a normative framework of 
extraterritoriality which entirely precludes extraterritoriality.  
He then explains the dangers of applying human rights extraterritorially. He begins by 
asking what happens when human rights are ‘extended beyond the Westphalian frame 
– the presupposition of the concrete state legal order – upon which it rests’?55 Bhuta 
states there are two options: ‘either the abnormal be transformed to correspond with 
the presuppositions of the normal type, or that a norm predicated on the normal be 
made effective by relativizing it to the concrete circumstances of the abnormal’.56 In 
other words, there is a choice. On the one hand, one can apply human rights standards 
as though the state were sovereign and regulate the behaviour of individuals only 
within the sovereign territory. On the other hand, one can change human rights 
standards so as to fit the factual circumstances. He provides the example of military 
occupation abroad ‘where the concrete state order does not obtain but rather a 
horizontal relationship between a party to a conflict and the population’.57  
                                                 
50 Bhuta, ‘The Frontiers of Extraterritoriality’ (n 2) 2 citing Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human 
Rights (OUP 2013).  
51 Ibid citing Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (n 21) 291-4.  
52 Ibid citing Siegelberg, The Question of Questions: The Problem of Statelessness (21). 
53 Ibid 7 citing Richard Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Rights Conventions: 
Political Constitutionalism and the European Convention on Human Rights (2014) 25 EJIL 1019. 
54 Ibid 9.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid 13. 
57 Ibid. 
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In relation to the first option, he argues that enforcing human rights in occupied 
territories would require occupying states to exercise more intensive forms of 
governance, because it would require essentially a policing of the territory.58 More 
intensive forms of governance would include the ‘creation and management of a 
system of courts and prisons, which themselves must comply with human rights 
norms’.59 He explains that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate how difficult 
it is to make institutional changes and highlights the dangers in attempting to do so.60 
‘Intensif[ying] intervention’ by ensuring the enforcement of the ECHR may bring the 
‘idea of human rights into disrepute as mere alibi for continued conflict; it also risks 
leading to an exaggerated belief in the potential of human rights law to enhance the 
effectiveness of state-building and nation-building interventions’. 61  He cites a 
paragraph from Modirzadeh against imposing human rights in an occupied territory:  
I do not want an occupying power that has invaded my State to be recognised 
by the international community as having a “rights-based” relationship with 
my population. I do not want that State to be in a position to argue that it has 
to engage in certain institutional changes in order to be able to comply with its 
human rights obligations back home. I do not want a State that has no 
relationship to civil society in my country, has no long-term understanding of 
my population, its history, its religious values, etc., to have a hand in shaping 
its human rights framework simply by virtue of its choice to invade.62  
Three main arguments against extraterritoriality of the ECHR are put forward by 
Bhuta. First, human rights language can be susceptible to manipulation to serve 
Western state motives. Second, extraterritoriality has the effect of decreasing human 
rights protection and throws human rights language into disrepute. Third, ECHR 
norms are diluted when the law on armed conflict is taken into account, leading to a 
                                                 
58 Ibid 14. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.  
62  Ibid citing Naz Modirzadeh ‘The Dark Sides of Convergence: A Pro-Civilian Critique of the 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict’ in Raul A “Pete” Pedrozo (ed), 
International Law Studies (Blue Book) Series, Vol. 86 (US Naval War College, 2010) 349, 375.   
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mere bare right of admissibility to the ECtHR, with no successful outcomes for 
applicants. He questions the utility of a bare right of admissibility.  
Bhuta’s concern that the language of human rights is susceptible to manipulation is 
justified. Human rights discourse in armed conflict has been criticised as being 
susceptible to weaponisation, serving as a means to justify waging wars in other 
territories.63 The protection of human rights in foreign territories is used to justify 
humanitarian intervention abroad, often obscuring the fact that the international 
community has itself to blame for the humanitarian crisis.64 Human rights have also 
been criticised as being part of a hegemonic discourse, enforcing a Western moral 
code and not taking account of cultural relativism.65 The human rights discourse is 
therefore susceptible to manipulation and distortion in a number of ways. Accusations 
of human rights serving Western imperialism or regime change, which is of particular 
concern to Bhuta and Modirzadeh, should not be dismissed off hand.  
However, there must be consideration of the counter-hegemonic narrative. The 
counter-hegemonic viewpoint recognises human rights’ susceptibility to abuse by 
powerful actors to legitimise hegemonic practices, but nevertheless insists that human 
rights are worth preserving and can effectively protect weak actors from powerful 
actors.66  The extraterritorial application of human rights at the ECtHR is not an 
inevitably hegemonic act. The counter-hegemonic role of the ECtHR is evidenced in 
the ECtHR’s extraterritoriality practice in four ways. First of all, individuals 
voluntarily apply to the ECtHR or to a domestic court under the auspices of the ECHR. 
This is despite the fact that applications take a long time and do not admit of great 
                                                 
63 See e.g. Chase Madar, ‘Samantha Power and The Weaponisation of Human Rights’ (Counterpunch, 
6 June 2013) available at <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/06/samantha-power-and-the-
weaponization-of-human-rights-2/> last accessed 2 June 2016.  
64 Anne Orford, ‘Locating the international: Military and Monetary interventions after the Cold War’ 
(1997) 38 Harvard ILJ 443, 444.  
65 See e.g. José-Manuel Barreto (ed), Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History 
and International Law (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014). 
66  Joe Wills, ‘The World Turned Upside Down? Neo-Liberalism, Socioeconomic Rights, and 
Hegemony’ (2014) 27(1) LJIL 11. See further: Joe Wills, The World Turned Upside Down? A Critical 
Enquiry into the Counter-Hegemonic Potential of Socioeconomic Rights Praxis in Global Civil Society 
(Doctoral Dissertation, Leicester University 2014).  
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financial rewards for either the individuals that bring applications or their lawyers.67 
Second, those applications are met with resistance by states who actively engage in 
justifying their activities abroad, but are nevertheless often held accountable for, 
amongst other things, not carrying out effective investigations into allegedly illegal 
killings68 and investigations into torture.69 Third, the ECtHR decides against Member 
States in extraterritoriality decisions, which evidences that the ECtHR restricts 
Council of Europe Member State action rather than facilitating Western imperialism 
abroad. Fourth, the threat of an occupying power slipping into the position of 
legitimate government in an occupying state would be as much concern to the ECtHR 
as to those who demand that human rights should not apply abroad on those grounds.70 
The ECtHR adjudicates upon cases where the occupying state has made institutional 
changes that are not in conformity with the ECHR and citizens of that foreign state 
seek protection from the negative effects that those institutional changes have on 
them.71 While it was outside the ECtHR’s power to stop those institutional changes, it 
answers to individuals that have suffered from human rights abuses as a result of those 
changes. Therefore, while human rights are susceptible to manipulation, there is much 
evidence to suggest that the ECtHR plays a counter-hegemonic role in human rights 
protection.  
There needs to be an examination of the justifications of the concern that 
extraterritoriality tarnishes the reputation of human rights. Although Bhuta claims that 
extraterritoriality decreases rights enjoyment of Iraqis, he does not provide a full 
explanation and references Naz Modirzadeh instead. 72  Modirzadeh argues that 
extraterritoriality will not increase rights enjoyment for two reasons: human rights 
raise expectations that cannot be met73 and applying human rights in armed conflict 
                                                 
67 See e.g. Nada v Switzerland (2013) 56 EHRR 18.   
68 See e.g. Al Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) EHRR 18. 
69 See e.g. R (on the application of Al Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2004] EWHC 
2911 (ADMIN), [2004] All ER (D) 197 (Dec). 
70 See e.g. Al Jedda v UK (2011) 53 EHRR 23 paras 42-3. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Modirzadeh, ‘The Dark Sides of Convergence’ (n 62) 373.  
73 Ibid 362. 
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damages the reputation of human rights language.74 She argues that the overlap of IHL 
and IHRL raises expectations that cannot be met:  
A civilian who is made aware of the basic (and rather minimal) obligations of 
the armed forces of an enemy State for her protection clearly understands the 
purpose of IHL: to ensure that in the very worst imaginable context, she is 
guaranteed a basic level of protection – not to be directly targeted if she does 
not participate in hostilities, not to be tortured if she is detained, to have access 
to basic lifesaving humanitarian relief etc. Not a long-term relationship…The 
addition of human rights law to this clear and honest (albeit stark) framing of 
roles and relationships runs the risk of confusing all actors and (more important) 
raising expectations that can never be met.75 
Modirzadeh presumes that the civilian has knowledge of the parameters of IHL and 
IHRL, and the differences of their fundamental premises, and cares about those 
parameters for the purposes of their own well-being. The truth of this knowledge or 
consciousness by citizens of the differences between the two regimes may be 
contestable. It does not logically flow from the disappointment of being protected by 
IHL rather than IHRL, that IHRL should not be applied. 
Modirzadeh also argues that the reputation of human rights is damaged by 
extraterritoriality because it cannot live up to the promises of human rights in the ‘very 
ugly business of control by an enemy military…[c]an this be expressed to the civilian 
population in a way that does not permanently pervert that population’s appreciation 
for human rights law? […] Will human rights and human rights discourse suffer lasting 
damage?’76 She adds that ‘tremendous resources’ have been spent by the international 
community on increasing awareness of human rights that may be wasted if human 
rights language is tarnished.77 However, it could be argued that the resources spent on 
advertisement and education in human rights are not so much cancelled out by the 
disappointed expectations of their actual enforcement by occupying powers, as by the 
                                                 
74 Ibid 374.  
75 Ibid 363-4. 
76 Ibid 374. 
77 Ibid.  
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wars that eviscerated the promise of any of those rights.78 She continues describing 
the ‘culture problem’ of human rights enforcement in the Middle East, and that IHL 
does not experience a ‘culture problem’.79 This jars with her general concern that 
‘human rights law asks that the State with obligations to an individual takes real steps 
to permanently transform institutions that structurally violate rights’.80 If this was not 
the purpose of the ‘tremendous resources’ provided by the international community to 
states who resisted human rights reform because of cultural differences, then perhaps 
those resources were wasted before war and before occupation.  
Bhuta’s third argument against extraterritoriality, the dilution of the ECHR in armed 
conflict and individuals left with a bare right of admissibility, also needs to be 
challenged.81 If human rights are diluted to the extent that they offer individuals no 
protection abroad, applicants will be left with a mere ‘bare right’ of admissibility. He 
questions how important a bare right is: ‘a day in court will be had by very few, and 
the possibilities of such ‘accountability’ should not be exaggerated’.82 There is no 
further investigation as to why a bare right may be considered important to applicants. 
Again there is evidence to suggest that a bare right is important. Individuals voluntarily 
bring applications to the ECtHR, despite the fact that cases take years to process and 
the limited financial reward if a case is successful on the merits. Bhuta does not engage 
in any analysis of whether ECHR right are or should be diluted in all circumstances. 
We need to think of real norm conflicts that arise, and how best to handle them in the 
circumstances.  
                                                 
78 Philip Alston, ‘The Security Council and Human Rights: Lessons to be Learned from the Iraq-Kuwait 
Crisis and its Aftermath’ (1992) 13 Australian YBIL 107. 
79 Modirzadeh, ‘The Dark Sides of Convergence’ (n 62) 374. While she considers that there may be a 
cultural problem in enforcing human rights standards in the Middle East, she does not consider that 
similar problems exist within the territory of the Council of Europe. See e.g. SAS v France App No 
43835/11 (ECtHR, 1 July 2014). For criticism of this judgment see: Jill Marshall ‘SAS v France: burqa 
bans and the control of empowerment of identities’ (2015) 15(2) HRLR 377. For an alternative critique 
of human rights discourse in relation to religious freedoms see Matthew Nicholson, ‘Majority rule and 
human rights: identity and non-identity in SAS v France’ (2016) Northern Ireland L Q (forthcoming).  
80 Ibid 375. 
81 Bhuta, ‘The Frontiers of Extraterritoriality’ (n 2) 17. 
82 Ibid 18 citing Modirzadeh ‘The Dark Sides of Convergence’ (n 62) 349. 
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An analysis of Bhuta’s theory of extraterritoriality evidences that there is a need for 
innovative ways of looking at human rights as his historical conception of human 
rights cannot articulate or understand why human rights accountability may be 
important.  Extraterritoriality can be, and is used, as a counter-hegemonic mechanism. 
There is no evidence to suggest that civilians have the expertise to distinguish between 
IHL and IHRL. Nor is there evidence that they harbour some kind of loyalty toward 
the latter, which is thwarted when they are protected by an alternative legal regime. 
The bare right of admissibility appears to be significant, despite Bhuta’s reservations. 
Individuals, who have suffered much worse grievances than can be covered under the 
remit of the ECHR, wait years to bring to account state actors in the Council of Europe 
system. Often the financial reward is minimal and with decisions such as Banković 
and Hassan, prominent cases which represent unsuccessful applications, there is every 
reason to believe that their case will not be successful. And yet applicants keep coming 
to the ECtHR. A new normative frame should attempt to grasp why this happens and 
conceptualise it within a theory of governance. The significance of the bare right 
should not be overlooked as it obviously is valuable for applicants who spend years at 
the ECtHR with new cases on extraterritoriality and risk not winning their case.  
Besson uses a domestic conception of jurisdiction to construct a normative frame for 
extraterritoriality. She argues that states have duties towards right-holders within their 
jurisdiction, in line with the wording of Article 1 of the ECHR: ‘“Jurisdiction”  qua 
normative relationships between subjects and authorities actually captures the case of 
what human rights are about qua normative relationships between right-holders and 
institutions as duty-bearers’.83 Without state jurisdiction over individuals, the latter do 
not have human rights and states have no human rights duties: individuals do not have 
a “right to have rights”.84 Jurisdiction amounts to both a normative threshold and a 
practical condition for human rights. 85  Jurisdiction is de facto political and legal 
authority that is not yet legitimate or justified, but claims to be or is held to be by its 
subjects. 86  De facto jurisdiction is the effective, overall and normative control, 
                                                 
83 Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (n 2) 860.  
84 Ibid 863 citing Hannah Arendt, ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man’, 
in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) 147. 
85 Ibid 863. 
86 Ibid 865. 
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whether it be prescriptive, executive or adjudicative.87 The normative dimension of 
jurisdiction are the ‘reasons for action on its subjects and the corresponding appeal for 
compliance’.88 Any appeals for compliance by an institutional act or omission may be 
regarded as legal acts or omissions under state jurisdiction. Jurisdiction requires 
lawfully organised institutions and a constitutional framework in domestic law (and 
therefore has nothing to do with the legal grounds for the grounds of jurisdiction 
permitted in international law), 89 whether those institutions then act ultra vires or 
not.90 State agents exercise some kind of normative power with a claim to legitimacy, 
even if that claim ends up not being justified. It does not mean that all state agents 
necessarily exercise jurisdiction: some are merely using coercion and their acts lack 
the required normative dimension.91  
Besson’s analysis is unclear, may give rise to unjust results, and claims that the ECHR 
will only apply to interdependent stakeholders. It is not clear what in practice 
distinguishes evidence of ‘reason for action and appeal for compliance’ from mere 
coercive force.92 Besson states that the requirement of exercising ‘public powers’ is 
an indication of ‘reason for action and appeal for compliance’ but does not provide 
examples of when a state agent does not have a reason for its action and appeal for 
compliance. This needs further elaboration. She states that military occupation with 
effective control over a territory need not imply jurisdiction, because it lacks, for 
instance, the normative element of reason-giving and appeal for compliance, however, 
                                                 
87 Ibid citing Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 
(Clarendon 1995) 215. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Chapters 4 and 6 include a further analysis of the public international law conception of jurisdiction 
in ECtHR judgments and literature.   
90 Ibid.  
91 For a thinner version of Besson’s ‘reason for action and appeal for compliance’ normative dimension, 
see Lea Raible, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the ECHR: Why Jaloud and Pisari should be read as game 
changers’ (2016) 2 EHRLR 161.  
92 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘LJIL Symposium: Response to Samantha Besson’ (Opinio Juris 21st December 
2012) available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2012/12/21/ljil-symposium-response-to-samantha-besson/> 
last accessed 4 April 2016.  
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no clear example is provided.93 Cedric Ryngaert highlights how Besson’s theory could 
give rise to unjust results: ‘presumably normativity is not present when the State 
carries out extraterritorial targeted killings, as it is raw power, and not accompanied 
by an appeal for compliance on the part of the targeted individual’.94  It is also unjust 
that the effective personal control by troops without any normative appeal besides the 
use of coercion, fails to trigger the ECHR, according to Besson’s theory. According 
to Besson, aside from situations taking place within the domestic territory and cases 
of lawful territorial control beyond the state’s borders, jurisdiction has to be 
established in each concrete case by reference to its circumstances. Furthermore, 
Besson argues that Jurisdiction only covers the control over interdependent 
stakeholders and not single matters only. However, the ECtHR stated in Al Skeini that 
what was ‘decisive’ in decisions concerning detention, boats, using ‘physical force’ 
on an individual to pull them onto a plain was the personal control over the individual 
and not the control over a particular space. This appears to undermine Besson’s 
assertion that her normative frame explains the ECtHR’s approach to date. 
In addition to the above concerns, Besson does not provide any normative guidance 
on dealing with norm conflicts that arise extraterritorially. She also asserts that 
‘jurisdiction’ in Article 1 of the ECHR means domestic jurisdiction, without engaging 
in any analysis of the rules of interpretation of the VCLT, and without normatively 
justifying her reliance on the wording of Article 1. While Besson proposes a less 
restrictive test of extraterritoriality than Bhuta, its contours are hard to define, and the 
test is still tied to the territorial state by its reliance on a restricted and unclear 
conception of domestic jurisdiction.  
The universality and human rights normative frameworks do not appear to provide 
clear, consistent and normatively sound frameworks for extraterritoriality. Milanovic 
and Shany rely on the amorphous concept of universality. They do not provide 
theoretical support for their assertion that universality is a fundamental precept of 
human rights, and many believe that the operation of human rights is bound to the 
state. They also impose practical constraints on universality, contradicting the 
                                                 
93 Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of Human Rights’ (n 2) 876 citing Al Skeini (n 68) para 149; Max 
Schaefer, ‘Al-Skeini and the Elusive Parameters of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (2011) 16 EHRLR 579. 
94 Ryngaert, ‘LJIL Symposium: Response to Samantha Besson’ (n 92).  
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meaning of universal application of human rights. While Milanovic’s resulting model 
of extraterritoriality makes arbitrary distinctions between positive and negative 
obligations as well as private and public actors, Shany’s model is vague and difficult 
to apply to factual circumstances.  The inconsistency and lack of normativity in the 
‘universalist’ models make them unsuitable for providing understanding of the 
ECtHR’s significance to both states and individuals in a global governance system. 
Bhuta and Besson’s reliance on human rights theory leads to restrictive models of 
extraterritoriality. Bhuta insists that the ECHR is either damaging or disappointing to 
extraterritorial applicants, without surmising why individuals may have an incentive 
to use the ECtHR. He does not consider the potential counter-hegemonic role of 
human rights, nor does he consider why a bare right of admissibility may be valuable. 
Bhuta does, however, acknowledge that extraterritoriality and norm conflicts are 
inextricably linked.  Besson, similar to Bhuta, ties human rights to the domestic state, 
through the concept of jurisdiction. Human rights theories do not provide the level of 
abstraction required to understand why individuals apply to the ECHR despite its 
limitations nor how to conceive of the ECHR in the international legal system. 
Looking at extraterritoriality from a global perspective may be the level of abstraction 
required to evaluate the realities of extraterritoriality.  
2.3. Article 1: Jurisdiction Clause 
Article 1 of the ECHR states that High Contracting parties shall secure to everyone 
‘within their jurisdiction’ rights enshrined in the ECHR. The ECtHR, Gondek and 
Milanovic are amongst those who expressly invoke Article 1 to provide a legitimate 
model of extraterritoriality, interpreting that provision in accordance with the rules on 
treaty interpretation set out in the VCLT. Drawing upon the VCLT is a positive step 
as it contextualises the ECHR within an international legal setting, going beyond the 
four corners of the ECHR to provide answers on the question of extraterritoriality.  
This section examines whether a model of extraterritoriality flowing from an 
interpretation of the VCLT is legitimate. If the normative frame is not sound, it is an 
indication that an alternative frame is required. First, the section undertakes an 
examination of whether Gondek and Milanovic’s reliance on an interpretation of 
Article 1 in conformity with the rules of the VCLT is doctrinally sound, genuine or 
contrived. Second, the legitimacy of a VCLT-based model of extraterritoriality is 
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challenged. Relying on the VCLT for legitimacy rests on a ‘Westphalian’ 
understanding of the global legal order. In the wake of the deterioration of the 
Westphalian model of global governance, state consent alone can no longer provide a 
legitimate model for extraterritoriality.  
Article 31 contains the ‘general rule of interpretation’ and Article 32 provides 
‘supplementary means of interpretation’. Article 31(1) states that ‘[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.95 The 
requirements of ‘good faith’, interpreting the terms according to their ‘ordinary 
meaning’, in their ‘context’ and in light of their ‘object and purpose’ are generally 
understood as applying cumulatively to form one single general rule of interpretation. 
96  The ‘good faith’ requirement requires that the treaty be interpreted in a way that 
avoids manifestly absurd or unreasonable results. It precludes an interpretation that 
would follow the maxim ‘in dubio pro mitius’, a maxim which obliges an 
interpretation that places fewer curtailments on state sovereignty.97  The ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of terms is only the starting point for interpretation and the other elements 
of Article 31 should be used in conjunction with it, including the object and purpose 
of the treaty.98 Article 31(4) provides an exception to the rule that terms of a treaty 
should be given their ordinary meaning: ‘a special meaning shall be given to a term if 
it is established that the parties so intended’. Article 31 requires an analysis of the 
object and purpose of the treaty as a whole and not just one provision.99  
                                                 
95 [emphasis added].  
96 Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989’ (1991) 
BYBIL 16-17; Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn CUP 2007) 231; Taslim 
Olawale Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties (Oceana Publications, 1974) 74. 
97  Rudolf Bernhardt, ‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (1999) 42 German YBIL 11, 14. 
98  Richard Gardner states that it is a ‘very fleeting starting point’ in Richard Gardner, Treaty 
interpretation (2nd edn OUP 2015) 181. Others argue that the ordinary meaning of the text takes primacy 
over the context, object and purpose of the treaty. See e.g. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (n 
96) 234.  
99 Jan Klabbers, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties’ (1997) 8 Finnish YBIL 
138, 151-55.  
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Whether or not the treaty should be interpreted in accordance with the agreement made 
at the time of drafting the treaty or in line with contemporary developments is a matter 
of much debate.100 Article 32 states that recourse should be had to secondary material 
when the methods used in Article 31 leave the meaning ‘ambiguous and obscure’101 
or when they lead to a result which is ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. 102 
Preparatory work is listed as only a supplementary means of interpretation.103 This is 
significant for whether treaty provisions should be given an interpretation in line with 
the original intention of the drafters or contemporary interpretation as the weight 
assigned to the preparatory work is indicative of the weight assigned to the original 
intentions of the parties in the interpretative process.104 Anthony Aust argues that the 
travaux préparatoires is considered only supplementary as it is inconclusive, 
incomplete and not as reliable as elements which have been incorporated into the treaty 
itself or into the instruments related to it. 105  Furthermore, Article 31(3) VCLT 
indicates that the interpretation of a treaty can be modified by the will of all its parties 
thereby placing importance on the contemporaneous interpretation of treaty 
provisions.106 Article 31(3) states that the materials to be ‘taken into account’ include 
                                                 
100 For example, Aust argues that treaties should not be interpreted in line with historical intentions in 
Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (96) 234. 
101 Article 32(a) VCLT. 
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subsequent agreements, subsequent practice107 and relevant rules of international law 
applicable in relations between parties.108  
Although human rights treaties follow the rules of interpretation set out in the VCLT, 
human rights treaties also have their own rules of interpretation. The VCLT is ‘content 
neutral’ and the subject matter of a treaty is generally not important therefore rules of 
interpretation established therein are in principle applicable also to human rights 
treaties.109 Direct application of the VCLT to most existing human rights treaties is 
precluded by the rule of non-retroactivity contained in Article 4 VCLT: ‘…the 
Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by States after the entry into 
force of the present Convention with regard to such States’. However, the ICJ has fully 
recognised the customary law nature of VCLT provisions regarding treaty 
interpretation and the VCLT rules provide general guidance for human rights 
treaties.110  
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem state that the object and purpose of a treaty assumes 
particular importance in treaties of a humanitarian nature. 111  They cite the ICJ’s 
statement on the Genocide Convention that since the latter:  
safeguards the very existence of certain groups […and] ‘endorses the most 
elementary principles of morality…contracting States do not have any interests 
of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the 
accomplishment of those higher purposes which are the raison d’être of the 
convention.112  
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In Wemhoff, the ECtHR used the interpretation that was most appropriate in order to 
realise the aim and object of the treaty, rather than to restrict to the greatest possible 
degree the obligations undertaken by Member States.113 Bernhardt argues that placing 
emphasis on the object and purpose of human rights treaties often leads to a broader 
interpretation of individual rights on the one hand and restrictions on State activities 
on the other.114 The ECtHR has adopted specific interpretation techniques including 
an ‘evolutive’ interpretation, which aims to keep abreast of changing attitudes amongst 
Member States.115  It balances considerations of domestic, regional and international 
consensus in its interpretation.116 It also employs the margin of appreciation, whereby 
the respondent state is given a degree of discretion in interpreting the terms of the 
ECHR.117 The margin of appreciation can be decisive, for example, in ascertaining 
whether there is a public emergency, justifying a derogation from the ECHR.118  
Gondek states that ‘[t]he rules set out in Articles 31 to 33 VCLT are…binding rules, 
which have a normative character, and which any entity interpreting a treaty must 
comply with if the process of interpretation is to produce legitimate results’.119 He asks 
what model of extraterritoriality flows from Article 1, using the VCLT rules of 
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interpretation.120 Three issues arise in relation to Gondek’s use of the VCLT. He does 
not consider the impact that human rights regimes have on rules of treaty interpretation; 
he ultimately finds the VCLT rules not of any use in interpreting Article 1; and the 
final model he suggests is not connected with his analysis of the VCLT.  
 First, although Gondek recognises that human rights treaties can have an effect on the 
general rules of treaty interpretation of the VCLT, he chooses to focus on the effect 
that the VCLT has on human rights treaties.121 However, this avoids the complexity 
of the reciprocal relationship between the two regimes. Second, there are no clear 
results when he applies the rules of treaty interpretation in his analysis. He states that 
the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole is the ‘protection of inherent human 
rights stemming from the dignity of every individual’. 122  But that a dynamic 
interpretation, that takes account of changing attitudes on the content of human rights, 
does not make such changes so as to justify departure from the text of the treaty.123 In 
his textual analysis of ‘within their jurisdiction’, he finds that public international law 
jurisdiction and Article 1 jurisdiction carry out different functions. So for him, the 
‘ordinary meaning’ of the text has only limited value.124 In this way, he finds the object 
and purpose, as well as the text of the treaty, unhelpful in establishing the meaning of 
Article 1. He further considers the travaux préparatoires as unhelpful because it lacks 
clarity and a comprehensive analysis of the concept of jurisdiction in human rights 
treaties.125 His analysis of subsequent practice is also unsuccessful at providing a 
meaning for ‘within their jurisdiction’. In order to establish whether subsequent 
practice of states can provide guidance on the interpretation of human rights treaties 
he investigates whether a coherent pattern arises in relation to decisions of regional 
and international human rights bodies as well as domestic decisions. He finds no 
pattern, apart from the fact that domestic courts generally follow decisions of their 
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regional counterparts.126 Despite the fact that he embeds his analysis in the rules of the 
VCLT, he finds them unhelpful for determining the extraterritorial reach of human 
rights treaties.   
Third, Gondek in the end derives a model of extraterritoriality without relying on the 
rules of the VCLT. He does not use rules of treaty interpretation to justify his model. 
The test of jurisdiction he proposes has two parts. First, the person who claims to be 
within the jurisdiction of a High Contracting Party to the ECHR, must show in respect 
of a particular act, ‘that the act in question was the result of the exercise of authority 
by the state concerned’.127 Second, the obligation to secure ECHR rights to a person 
applies proportionately to the actions of the state, applying a ‘cause-and-effect’ 
method.128  
Milanovic also explicitly relies on Article 1 and the rules of treaty interpretation to 
establish a legitimate model of extraterritoriality. Milanovic argues that jurisdiction 
clauses of human rights treaties delineate the territorial scope of application of most 
human rights treaties.129 He argues that Article 1 prescribes the framework he puts 
forward. For him, the text, object and purpose of jurisdiction clauses determine their 
scope.130 In ascertaining the meaning of jurisdiction, Milanovic proposes that state 
practice, especially state treaty-making practice, shows that more than one ordinary 
meaning of the word ‘jurisdiction’ exists in international law.131 The treaty practice of 
states shows that they employ two concepts of jurisdiction: general international law 
uses this term to delineate municipal legal orders of states and international human 
rights treaties use the term to refer to a certain kind of power a state exercises over a 
territory and its inhabitants.132 Textually, therefore, the jurisdiction clauses of most 
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human rights treaties are ‘primarily territorial’. 133  He uses this textual reading to 
justify the ‘control over the territory’ test in Loizidou v Turkey which provides that the 
entire system of ECHR protection applies when a state has control over a territory.134 
Milanovic also reads into Article 1 jurisdiction that the ECHR applies to negative 
obligations all over the world i.e. that there is no jurisdictional threshold on the 
application of negative obligations.135 The positive obligation to secure human rights 
is contingent on state jurisdiction, but this clause says nothing about negative 
obligations. The fact that Article 1 says nothing about negative obligations implies 
there must be a duty to abstain from rights violations all over the world. The obligation 
to respect human rights (negative obligations) is explicit in individual provisions (for 
example, Article 3 or Article 2) or can be read into article 1 jurisdiction.136 He argues 
there is no inherent contradiction in implying when necessary the negative obligation 
to respect human rights into relevant treaties.137  
It is not clear which rules of treaty interpretation Milanovic is employing in arguing 
that Article 1 jurisdiction is intended to mean that the full panoply of ECHR rights 
apply when a state has control over a territory. He purports to rely on a textual reading 
despite stating that the object and purpose of the treaty are also important. In 
discussing his normative framework he finds that the universal application of human 
rights is the object and purpose of the ECHR but this does not feature in his 
interpretation of this aspect of Article 1 jurisdiction. He finds the positive obligation 
to secure human rights is contingent on state jurisdiction, but that this clause says 
nothing about negative obligations. 138  For him, the fact that Article 1 says nothing 
about negative obligations implies there must be a duty to abstain from rights 
violations all over the world. However, this implication is not obvious. One would 
expect that a jurisdiction clause would expressly state that a human rights treaty was 
to apply without any restrictions all over the world in relation to negative obligations. 
One would also not expect the wording of an obligation ‘to secure within their 
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jurisdiction’ to be interpreted as permitting universal application of human rights in 
relation to negative obligations. Furthermore, the distinction between positive and 
negative obligations is not sealed, as explained above. This is not a convincing 
interpretation of Article 1 and it is not founded upon the VCLT’s rules of interpretation 
of the VCLT which are not mentioned in Milanovic’s claims about the universal 
application of negative obligations under the ECHR. 
Although Gondek and Milanovic purport to rely on the VCLT to derive a model for 
extraterritoriality from Article 1, their doctrinal analyses are unsound. Gondek should 
have considered whether there were special rules of interpretation attached to human 
rights treaties. The ECtHR often finds its own tools of interpretation, such as 
consensus and the margin of appreciation, decisive in its decision-making. The object 
and purpose are given greater importance in human rights treaties than in other treaties. 
Gondek identifies the inability for each and every one of the rules of treaty 
interpretation to help provide a clear answer to the question of extraterritoriality, and 
ultimately abandons those rules. His model of extraterritoriality is not justified 
according to the rules of the VCLT. Milanovic does not justify why ‘within their 
jurisdiction’ should be read as indicating that the ECHR is to apply everywhere in the 
world in relation to negative obligations. The relationship between state practice and 
Article 1 is not clearly enunciated, and no literature on subsequent practice has been 
cited. Aside from perfunctorily stating that Article 1 must be given its ordinary 
meaning, the VCLT rules appear to have no bearing on his model of extraterritoriality.   
2.4.  Legitimacy and State Consent 
This section considers whether the normative foundation of a reliance on an 
interpretation of Article 1 jurisdiction in accordance with the rules of the VCLT is 
sound. The governance order that it presupposes is described: a Westphalian global 
governance system. The connection between this conception of global governance and 
a reliance on the VCLT for a legitimate approach to extraterritoriality is evaluated. 
Phenomenon that undermine that conceptualisation are then explored, and an 
assessment of whether the Westphalian order can account for the state of affairs is 
undertaken. Ultimately the section aims to discern whether an interpretation of Article 
1 in conformity with the VCLT can provide a legitimate model of extraterritoriality or 
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whether an alternative normative frame that registers a new global governance order 
needs to be adopted. 
The term ‘Peace of Westphalia’ principally denotes the Treaty of Peace between 
France and the Holy Roman Empire and the Treaty of Peace between the Holy Roman 
Empire and Sweden, signed on 24 October 1648 in the town of Münster in Westphalia, 
a territory in the north-west of Germany. 139   ‘Westphalia’ is used by many 
international lawyers as a shorthand for the modern secular system of sovereign and 
equal states.140 This connection is seen as problematic from an historical point of 
view.141 However, the ‘common terminology is used here because the Westphalian 
model has so much entered into common usage, even if it is historically inaccurate’.142 
Furthermore, the model has been criticised as being misrepresentative of the state of 
affairs as while the legitimacy of the framework theoretically relies on the idea that all 
states are equal to each other, some states are more equal than others.143 At the very 
least, the Westphalian model emphasises that sovereign states are the subjects and 
objects of the international governance system which they inhabit. Westphalian 
sovereignty is an ‘institutional arrangement for organising political life that is based 
on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic 
authority structures’. 144  While the Westphalian model focuses on the exclusive 
‘internal’ power of the state, it also simultaneously has an ‘external’ aspect.145 The 
relationship which emerged was one of reciprocity. States agreed to form a society of 
states with no governing authority other than themselves under the pretext that they 
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would respect each other’s claim to govern their own individual territories. 146 
International law’s authority and legitimacy were based upon the premise of pacta 
sunt servanda: states are only bound by the laws they have consented to.147 Part of the 
outside dimension of the Westphalian model was that sovereigns made treaties with 
other sovereigns as a legitimate approach to governing their relationship with one 
another.148  
A Westphalian model of the international legal system thereby underpins the idea that 
the legitimacy of international law derives from state consent. The rules of 
interpretation founded in the VCLT are based on securing the ‘principles of free 
consent, and of good faith, and the pacta sunt servanda rule’.149 The VCLT clearly 
adopts a ‘consensualist model, as befits a body of doctrine whose roots lie in 
consensualist conceptions of international law in general’.150 Milanovic and Gondek 
sought to secure the legitimacy of their normative and doctrinal frameworks of 
extraterritoriality by basing them upon a Westphalian conception of an international 
legal order where the rules of interpretation provided in the VCLT attempt to discover 
the intentions of states in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda and 
finding state consent. However, ‘the idea…that traditional international law is 
necessarily legitimate and democratically accountable, because it is based on state 
consent, can no longer be accepted blindly’.151 In other words, ‘state consent can no 
longer be deemed as the most important source of normativity and legitimacy in 
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international law’.152 This is because the Westphalian model of the international legal 
order no longer accounts for the state of affairs:  
The “Keynesian-Westphalian frame,” which supposed that questions of the 
just ordering of social relations— matters of fair representation, fair 
distribution, fair recognition, and fair treatment — were properly asked and 
answered only within and, to a lesser extent, between sovereign states with 
mutually exclusive territories, populations, and governing arrangements, is far 
less dominant than once it was.153 
While the Westphalian conception of the international legal order ensured that each 
state had exclusive control over their domestic affairs, and that international law 
established a coordinative rather than cooperative regulatory framework, international 
actors and norms gradually grew to have increasing influence on the regulation of 
domestic affairs. James Rosenau recounts that under the Westphalian model, 
‘legitimate authority was concentrated in the policy-making institutions of states, 
which interacted with each other on the basis of equality and accepted principles of 
diplomacy and international law’.154 Krasner states that ‘[r]egardless of the motivation 
or the perspicacity of rules, invitations violate Westphalian sovereignty by subjecting 
internal authority structures to external constraint’.155 This includes when they make 
treaties with each other, particularly treaties which encourage internal review by 
international bodies of domestic activity such as human rights conventions and 
adjudicatory bodies.156 Other examples of infringement of Westphalian sovereignty 
are the directly effective decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of the 
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European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality 
agreements.157 
Mattias Kumm connects the deterioration of the Westphalian model of the 
international legal order with growing legitimacy gaps. 158  He explains that the 
legitimacy of international law came under scrutiny as the consensual model of the 
international legal order could no longer account for the state of affairs of the 
international legal system.159 Broadly, three phenomena appear to have contributed to 
a change in the ordering of a global legal order from one based upon the equality and 
sovereignty of states, to one which recognises the substantive nature of international 
law and diversity of actors in the global sphere: globalisation, fragmentation and 
institutionalisation. Globalisation refers to the ‘umbrella term used to capture the 
enormous increase in the flow of people, capital, goods, services, and ideas across 
national borders’;160 Fragmentation refers to the ‘expansion and diversification of 
international law’;161 and institutionalisation refers to states handing over legislative 
and executive functions to international organisations.162  
Although not using this terminology, globalisation, fragmentation and 
institutionalisation are visible in the examples that Krasner provides for the violation 
of the Westphalian sovereignty of a state. The proliferation of treaties and adjudicatory 
mechanisms for enforcing those treaties are explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
For Krasner, this diversification and expansion of law resulting from an invitation by 
the state to subject themselves to further constraint in the governing of their domestic 
affairs, is a violation of Westphalian sovereignty. The role that the IMF plays in 
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regulating domestic economies is evidence of the institutionalisation and globalisation 
of international law.163 Globalisation, fragmentation and institutionalisation represent 
a pull back from ‘state-centrism’.164  They represent a move towards other actors 
playing a considerable role in a transnational world of activity wherein international 
legal obligations influence states relations not only with other states, but with other 
actors and individuals, globally and within their own territories. Parallel observations 
on the ECJ’s effect on the consensual paradigm of treaty-making has been noted by 
Lowe:  
[t]he [ECJ’s] decision in Van Gend en Loos[165] that a provision of the treaty 
concluded between the member States of the European Economic Community 
(‘EEC’)166 created rights for individuals that are directly effective within the 
national legal orders of member States is a decision that, for all the 
commonplace status that it has since achieved, was about as radical a departure 
as can be imagined from the traditional ‘treaty-as-contract’ analysis that the 
questions would have received had they been put before the [ICJ] at that 
time.167 
Globalisation, institutionalisation and fragmentation have resulted in the 
diversification of the subjects and objects of international law beyond states to non-
state actors including individuals, corporations and international organisations. There 
is a diminishing ability of legitimate authority to reside within the domestic state 
alone.168 A ‘legitimacy gap’ arises because there is little correlation between those 
who makes laws and those who are affected.169 Benvenisti argues that the ‘technology’ 
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of global governance, which operates through discrete sovereign entities, no longer 
fits.170 He recognises that: 
[S]ome states regularly shape the life opportunities of persons in faraway states 
by their daily decisions on economic development, conservation, or health 
regulation, whereas the foreign citizens thereby affected are unable to 
participate meaningfully in shaping such measures either directly or by relying 
on their own governments to effectively protect them. […T]he global space 
makes it difficult for disparate sovereign states to overcome their differences 
and to collectively resist powerful third parties. […T]he postcolonial promise 
of national self-determination remains for them partly, if not largely, 
unfulfilled.171  
The VCLT has not proven useful for providing the unequivocal interpretation of 
Article 1. The exact content and emphasis to be placed on each rule of treaty 
interpretation can lead to various interpretations. From the examples of Milanovic and 
Gondek, it appears that the rules can be used (or abandoned) to justify a particular 
model of extraterritoriality, working backwards, rather than from the VCLT. Neither 
model appears to derive from a genuine interpretation of Article 1. Gondek abandons 
the rules and Milanovic asserts, without justification, that ‘within their jurisdiction’ 
means that negative obligations should be protected all over the world, according to 
the ordinary meaning of the text. Legitimate governance can no longer exclusively be 
created within the state. This is because of the unquestionable influence of 
transnational activity and diversification of actors who exercise power within domestic 
states. The legitimacy of global governance is no longer a question of state consent. 
In this context, the authority of pacta sunt servanda should be questioned. It is not 
enough to ask what states intended at the time of drafting, or intend today, and rely 
solely on the wording of a treaty provision for guidance on a legitimate approach to 
extraterritoriality. Maybe the Council of Europe, or the people who want to have 
access to the ECtHR, should have a say in deciding the extraterritorial reach of the 
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ECHR. Existing theories of extraterritoriality do not provide a satisfactory normative 
framework to take into account these developments. A new normative framework for 
extraterritoriality is required. 
2.5. Conclusion 
Existing frameworks fail to provide the clarity, consistency, normative underpinning 
and global perspective required to capture the paradox of extraterritoriality at the 
ECtHR. Universality models are inconsistent, unclear and lack normativity.  They 
place practical constraints on the protection of human rights, undermining universality. 
Furthermore, universality has not been justified as a precept of human rights. Human 
rights theories do have a normative grounding. However, it is based upon an 
essentially territorial conception of human rights. While Bhuta thinks that human 
rights are dangerous or disappointing when applied outside of the territory, Besson 
advocates that unauthorised, coercive force by state agents should not fall under the 
ambit of the ECHR. This appears arbitrarily unjust, and could be used as a scapegoat 
defence of state action in reality. Human rights theories do not provide the level of 
abstraction required to understand why individuals from outside the Council of Europe, 
seek admissibility to the ECtHR. The Strasbourg system is taken seriously by both 
Member States and applicants as a forum where decisions on extraterritorial situations 
of war, extraordinary rendition and migrants at sea can be made. Bhuta and Milanovic 
recognise that the questions of extraterritoriality and the interpretation of human rights 
in armed conflict are interlinked. Shany and Besson may understand that they are 
connected but do not attempt to offer any guidance. There needs to be an analysis that 
goes beyond human rights, beyond the ECHR, to help conceptualise a better approach 
to extraterritoriality. 
Using the VCLT to interpret Article 1 of the ECHR does not provide a legitimate 
approach to extraterritoriality. Milanovic and Gondek’s models of extraterritoriality 
do not genuinely flow from an interpretation of Article 1 in conformity with the VCLT 
rules on treaty interpretation. More importantly, even if their models did, this would 
not constitute a legitimate approach to extraterritoriality. A normative frame premised 
upon Article 1 and the VCLT, relies on a Westphalian understanding of the global 
governance system. However, in the wake of the phenomena of globalisation, 
institutionalisation and fragmentation, state consent can no longer provide a legitimate 
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approach to governance. A model of extraterritoriality based upon Article 1 and the 
VCLT is not normatively sound, because the Westphalian order which it presupposes 
no longer exists. A new normative framework which is cognisant of the Post-
Westphalian system needs to be adopted. The new framework needs to provide a 
global perspective, so that it can conceptualise the ECtHR as a mechanism to which 
individuals retreat in the midst of global atrocities. It needs to provide a normative 
approach to deciding the relationship between the ECHR and other international legal 
norms. Both the political and legal questions need to be connected in one holistic 
theory and complement each other. The existing frameworks examined in this chapter 
are not satisfactory. A new normative framework that captures the (in)significance of 
the ECtHR in the face of global atrocity is examined in the next chapter.  
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3.  A Global Constitutionalist 
Approach 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to derive a new normative framework that can conceptualise 
extraterritoriality at the ECtHR within a Post-Westphalian global governance system. 
A doctrinal model for extraterritoriality is derived through a normative global 
constitutionalist frame. The first part of the paradox is unravelled. This chapter 
attempts to discover why victims to global atrocities seek admissibility to the ECtHR 
despite its limitations and relatively minor role in global governance, through an 
analysis of the norm of democratic accountability. 
Constitutionalism, as developed in the domestic sphere, is examined as a vehicle 
through which both political and legal aspects of governance may be addressed.1  This 
is the first step in assessing whether constitutionalism has the potential to address both 
the significance of the ECtHR to applicants versus its insignificance in the global 
setting (political significance of extraterritoriality); as well as the position of ECHR 
norms when confronted with conflicting external international law standards (legal 
significance of extraterritoriality). A quest for global constitutionalist theories, that 
acknowledge and provide reasons for why the interplay between the political and legal 
is important, is undertaken through an examination of three broad categories: 
international value systems, 2  societal constitutionalism, 3  and normative 
                                                 
1 Adam Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (2002) 22(1) OJLS 157; Martin Loughlin, 
Swords and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and Politics (Hart 2000) 232-3. 
2 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or Against Their Will’ (1993-IV) 241 
Rec Des Cours 195; Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ 
250 Rec Des Cours (1994-VI) 245; Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of 
the International Community’ (1998) 36 Colum J Transnation’l L 573; Bardo Fassbender, The UN 
Charter as the Constitution of the International Community (Brill: Nijhoff, 1998); Erika de Wet, ‘The 
International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55(1) ICLQ 51. 
3 Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalisation (OUP 
2012).  
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constitutionalism. 4   Which theory takes legitimacy seriously from a critical 
perspective is also decided, legitimate governance entailing that those who are subjects 
have some degree of control over the way in which they are governed. Normative 
global constitutionalism is explored more fully as a theory considered as taking 
legitimate governance seriously from a critical, political and legal perspective. The 
challenges and importance of securing the norm of democratic accountability in a 
multifarious global governance system are addressed in order to evaluate who should 
benefit from constitutionalism and set the scene for asking whether this norm could be 
relevant to the Council of Europe. 
In investigating how to secure democratic accountability, the chapter examines ways 
of identifying governance systems in a multifarious global system.5  The concept of 
constituency, which captures processes of constitutionalisation through the operation 
of the norms of constitutionalism, is considered.6 Extraterritoriality at the ECtHR is 
conceptualised within the global constitutionalist frame by asking whether the norm 
of democratic accountability is in operation and who participates in that process. This 
is assessed by asking whether the Council of Europe forms a nexus for processes of 
constitutionalism; whether the ECtHR is a mechanism of democratic accountability; 7 
and who is participating in the constitutionalist norm’s operation. A model of 
extraterritoriality at the ECtHR is deduced from the global constitutionalist frame. 
                                                 
4 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ 
(2004) 15(5) EJIL 907; Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of 
Fundamental International Norms and Structures (2006) 19 LJIL 579; Andreas L Paulus, ‘The 
International Legal System as a Constitution’ in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the 
World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 69; Aoife 
O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (CUP 2014). 
5 Samantha Besson, ‘Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and Democracy’ in 
in Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, 
and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 381; Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Klabbers et al (eds) The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2011) 263-342; O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in 
Global Constitutionalisation (n 4) 200-42.  
6 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How we use it (OUP 1995) 8; Terry 
MacDonald and Kate MacDonald ‘Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics: Strengthening 
Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry’ (2006) 17(1) EJIL 89; O’Donoghue, 
Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 4) 225-42. 
7 MacDonald and MacDonald, ‘Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics’ (n 6).  
59 
 
Doctrinal indicators are established for the analysis in Chapter 5 of whether the global 
constitutionalist frame captures the ECtHR’s emerging approach.  
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3.2. A Global Constitutionalist Approach 
While other theoretical frameworks of a Post-Westphalian governance system exist, 
constitutionalism is analysed here as a rich normative and theoretical framework 
through which to explore complex questions of governance, which draws upon 
existing institutional structures to provide aspirational goals for governance.8 This 
section investigates theories of legal and political constitutionalism, international 
value based conceptions of global constitutionalism, as well as societal and normative 
constitutionalism.  Drawing upon criticism of those models, which one best helps to 
solve the legitimacy deficit in a Post-Westphalian system, whilst providing guidance 
for situating the ECHR within an international legal system, is decided.  
3.2.1. Constitutionalism  
Domestic constitutionalism attempts to create a legitimate framework of governance 
through placing constraints on the ruling power within a state. There are two 
conceptions of how constitutionalism achieves this: through political means and by 
legal means. Political constitutionalism provides that the limits on governmental 
power should be political through structural constraints and electoral accountability.9 
Legal constitutionalism stipulates that the limits on government should be 
predominantly legal and enforced through courts.10 While generally each conception 
is construed as conflicting, others see them as complementary but simply 
paradoxical.11 
                                                 
8  For further information on the reasons for choosing global constitutionalism as a theoretical 
framework see Chapter 1, Section 1.2. 
9  See e.g. Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart 2005); Richard Bellamy, Political 
Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (CUP 2007). 
10 See e.g. Mattius Kumm, ‘Institutionalising Socratic Contestation: The Rationalist Human Rights 
Paradigm, Legitimate Authority and the Point of Judicial Review’ (2007) 1(2) Eur J L Studies 153; 
Mattius Kumm, ‘Democracy is not Enough: Rights, Proportionality and the Point of Judicial Review’ 
in Matthias Klatt (ed) Institutionalised Reasoning: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (OUP 2009). 
For arguments against the idea of that courts should be able to enforce a ‘higher law’ than that provided 
by democratic accountability see Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ 
(2006) 115 Yale L J 1348; Mark Tushnet, ‘How different are Waldron’s and Fallon’s Core Cases for 
and Against Judicial Review’ (2010) 30 OJLS 49.  
11 Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constitutent Power and 
Constitutional Form (OUP 2007). 
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Adam Tomkins advocates political constitutionalism which calls for rights to be 
protected by law and legislation as long as they are politically changeable and 
controllable through ordinary, politically accountable decision-making in the 
legislature.12 Legal constitutionalism proposes that some rights are enforceable by the 
courts as higher, not ordinary, law and therefore are not changeable by normal political 
means.13  Two predominant tensions can be identified between political and legal 
constitutionalism. First, there is a tension between law - ‘an objective framework of 
rational principles’14 on the one hand, and politics - ‘government which seeks to 
conciliate our disagreements’ – on the other.15 Second, there is a tension between the 
judiciary versus democratic legitimacy.16 Sir John Laws argues that we need a ‘higher-
order law’ to be created and enforced by the judiciary to secure democracy and 
inalienable rights, to protect minority interests against the majority.17 Laws’ theory of 
constitutionalism has been criticised on the grounds that it places politics in a legal 
‘straitjacket’18 and has a ‘blithely complacent attitude towards law’.19 John Griffith is 
‘ very doubtful about the value of the exercise of telling judges or other legislators that 
they should look towards the ideals of justice, truth and beauty in their search for the 
right solution to difficult cases or problems’. 20  He instead opts for a form of 
                                                 
12 Adam Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (n 1). Examples of political constitutions 
include the UK, New Zealand and Israel.  
13 Ibid. An example of legal constitutionalism is in the US.  
14 Martin Loughlin, Swords and Scales (n 1) 232-3.  
15 Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics (London: Continuum, 5th edn, 2000) 17-8. See further, Jeremy 
Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999). 
16 For a more graduated version of versions of political and legal constitutionalism see the red, green 
and amber light theory in Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (CUP, 2rd edn 
1999) 1-4, Chs 2-4. 
17 Sir John Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ (1995) PL 72, 85. Mark Elliott also argues for a modified ultra 
vires theory of legal constitutionalism: Mark Elliott, ‘The Ultra Vires Theory in a Constitutional Setting: 
Still the Central Principle of Administrative Law’ (1999) 58(1) CLJ 129. 
18 Loughlin, Swords and Scales (n 1) 5.  
19 Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (n 1) 162.  
20 John Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1, 12. 
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governance that can capture the ‘considerable disagreement about the controversial 
issues of the day’.21 
 
Martin Loughlin challenges the assumption that law and politics should be viewed as 
competing values in opposition to one another, instead proposing that we see them as 
complementary or mutually reinforcing. He argues that law can be used to help to 
rekindle and to nurture a sense of trust in politics.22 Philip Pettit advocates a republican 
constitutionalism. He suggests that the freedom which politics invest in us is not a 
freedom from interference but a freedom from domination.23 Political freedom is a 
plural freedom that is to be experienced and enjoyed by others, not despite others. It 
is not threatened by the political state but one which is constituted by it. Republican 
constitutionalism does not seek to exclude law or courts from constitutional concerns. 
Instead, it seeks merely to locate the role of law in a way that facilitates this political 
relationship.24 Therefore, a conception of constitutionalism as higher, untouchable law 
enforced by courts, fails to encapsulate the important fact there are no definitive or 
divine answers to good governance. There must be a system that can take account of 
the considerable disagreement on what values should be prioritised and a compromise 
reached on its varying conceptions. Law and courts are indispensable in moderating 
this relationship of disagreement and compromise. The fundamental link between 
democracy and the law must be acknowledged. Law enables stability, foreseeability 
and a framework by which the people who are governed can judge the standards of 
those who govern.  
 
                                                 
21 Ibid.  
22 Loughlin, Swords and Scales (n 1) 194. 
23 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997). Pettit develops a republican conception of freedom as non-domination, in contrast to the negative 
liberal conception of freedom as non-interference. For an analysis of different conceptions of 
republicanism see further Paul A Rahe, Republicans Ancient and Modern (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1994).  
24 Ibid.  
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3.2.2. Global Constitutionalism  
This section seeks to determine how the domestic constitutionalist debate on political 
and legal constitutionalism has influenced discourse on global governance.25 A brief 
overview of three conceptions of global constitutionalism aims to ascertain which has 
been influenced by domestic theory emphasising the political and legal components 
of constitutionalism. A global constitutionalist frame that can potentially account for 
the political and legal (in)significance of extraterritoriality at ECtHR may have the 
explanatory and normative power to unravel the paradox and recommend ways for 
moving forward in a way that acknowledges the tensions at the ECtHR in global 
governance.  While institutional26 and sectoral constitutionalisation27 form part of the 
global constitutionalist debate, this analysis focuses upon theories that are not limited 
in such a specific way, but rather identify these phenomena alongside other global 
processes and actors, formulating a more inclusive, abstract and complex framework 
of global constitutionalism. 
3.2.3. An International Value System 
Legal rules enshrined in the UN Charter and jus cogens are amongst those values 
considered to have a constitutional status. For Bardo Fassbender, the fact that the UN 
                                                 
25 Global constitutionalism should not be recognised as entirely unrelated from earlier conceptions of 
international constitutionalism. However, in understanding the contemporary development of 
constitutionalist thought at the global level this analysis will begin from late 20th century 
constitutionalist thought, which responded to the phenomena of globalisation, fragmentation and 
institutionalisation. See e.g. Alfred Verdross, ‘Forbidden Treaties in International Law, Comments on 
Professor Garner’s Report on “The Law of Treaties”’ (1937) 31 AJIL 571; Alfred Verdross, ‘General 
International Law and the United Nations Charter’ (1954) 30(3) Intl Affairs 342; Bruno Simma, ‘The 
Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the Theory of International Law’ (1995) 6 EJIL 33. 
26 See e.g. Geir Ulfstein, ‘Institutions and Competences’ in Klabbers et al, The Constitutionalization of 
International Law (OUP 2009) 45-80; Jeffrey L Dunoff, ‘The Politics of International Constitutions: 
The Curious Case of the World Trade Organisation’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Tracthman (eds), 
Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 178-205.  
27 See e.g. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, ‘The Constitutionalisation of Children’s Rights: Incorporating 
Emerging Human rights into Constitutional Doctrine’ (1999) 2(1) J Constitutional L 1; Marise Cremona 
et al (eds), Reflections on the Constitutionalisation of International Economic Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
2014). 
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Charter is written, is in itself evidence of its constitutional status. 28 This is before 
considering the substance of the norms it enshrines or membership to the UN Charter. 
He argues that the UN Charter is the Constitution of the international community29 
and a written constitution is central to constitutionalism as it provides the means of 
limiting state intrusion on the liberty of individuals and ensures political participation 
of citizens.30 The UN Charter should not be considered as a constitution by virtue of 
the fact that it is written. There are many examples of constitutions that are unwritten 
such as those in the UK, New Zealand and Israel. Furthermore, Tomuschat argues that 
written constitutions are particular to the era in which they are created and not a 
precondition to a constitutionalist order. 31  Others argue that the UN Charter is 
constitution by virtue of its ‘universal’ membership and agreement to the values it 
enshrines. Thomas Franck states that the UN Charter is a key connecting factor 
between different state communities because of its universal State membership and its 
status as a sectoral constitutional regime for peace and security.32  Erika De Wet points 
out that the UN Charter only has state membership, leaving out a number of actors that 
should be considered as part of the international community.33  
Christian Tomuschat and De Wet focus on values that are non-contingent and 
necessarily independent from state or any other actor’s consent. Tomuschat argues that 
states exist within a system of law that has a fixed set of underlying rules which 
‘determines their basic rights and obligations with or without their will.’34 Tomuschat 
focuses upon core principles, generally human rights and principles contained within 
                                                 
28 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution’ (n 2) 573. See also, Fassbender, The 
UN Charter as the Constitution (n 1). A precursor is Blaine Sloane, ‘The United Nations Charter as a 
Constitution’ (1989) 1 Pace YBIL 61-126.  
29 Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution’ (n 2) 529.  
30 Ibid 573. 
31 Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States’ (n 2) 217. The US, France and South Africa are examples 
of states with constitutions that were put in place after historical revolutions. 
32  Thomas Franck, ‘The Political and Judicial Empires: Must there be Conflict over Conflict-
Resolution?’ in Najeeb Al-Naumi and Richard Meese (eds) International Legal Issues Arising under 
the United Nations Decade of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1995) 627.  
33 De Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (n 2) 54. 
34 Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States’ (n 2) 211. 
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peremptory norms.35 Law may be the binding force holding the values together, but 
he rejects the idea that an international community could ever be held together simply 
by law, as community remains central. Similarly, Bruno Simma argues that Barcelona 
Traction36 and Tehran Hostages,37 as well as peremptory norms under the VCLT 
evidence a community that puts higher interests at its heart.38 De Wet propounds that 
constitutitonalism not only requires the existence of a core value system but its 
effective enforcement also  through national, regional and functional (sectoral) 
constitutional regimes forming building blocks of the international community.39 Her 
universal value system is composed of ius cogens norms40 and other erga omnes 
obligations, with the UN Charter enshrining both standards. 41  Proposing a 
constitutionalist system based upon unassailable fixed values can be met with the 
charge of legal neo-imperialism and critiqued on the grounds of peremptory norms’ 
very limited and contested nature making them unsuitable for constitutional law.42 
Furthermore, fixed values are bound to fail because they are deeply political, and will 
inevitably be met with resistance from some of those who are governed under those 
norms.43  Therefore, a global governance system based upon fixed values can be 
critiqued on the grounds that written legal rules alone are not evidence of the existence 
of a constitution; peremptory norms are limited and contested; and the imposition of 
fixed values is imperialist, deeply political and bound to fail. 
3.2.4. Societal Constitutionalism 
Gunther Teubner provides a theory of societal constitutionalism, where private actors 
in many social spheres including art, economics and science, are seen to self-
                                                 
35 Ibid 10; Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from 
Germany’ (2006) 47 Harvard ILJ 223, 225. 
36 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, (1970) ICJ Reports 32. 
37 United States, Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1980) ICJ Reports 43. 
38 Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest’ (n 2) 259. 
39 De Wet, ‘The International Constitutionalist Order’ (n 2) 53. 
40 On jus cogens generally see Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International law (OUP 
2006). 
41 De Wet, ‘The International Constitutionalist Order’ (n 2) 54-64.  
42 Martti Koskenniemi ‘International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal’, Florence, 14 
June 2004 (Keynote at the Inauguration of the European Society of Law) 
43 Jan Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’ (2004) Intl Org L Rev 31, 55.  
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constitutionalise unfettered by the requirements of political constitutionalism. The 
branching out of regimes is evidence of this self-constitutionalisation process.44 Niklas 
Luhmann's general theory of autopoietic social systems 45  is used to construct a 
sociological theory of societal constitutionalism overcoming ‘the obstinate state-and-
politics-centricity’ of constitutional lawyers and political philosophers. 46  The 
constitution of society consists of its differentiation, not its political integration. 
Global societal constitutionalism actually involves the non-political 
constitutionalisation of global governance in which ‘private actors not only participate 
in the political power processes of global governance, but also establish their own 
regimes outside of institutionalized politics’.47 This pluralistic process of global, yet 
fragmented, self-constitutionalisations makes it theoretically possible to think of 
constitutionalism as the general societal processes of self-reference of non-state 
subjects unlimited by concepts of collective identity and shared political destiny.48  
Teubner reduces the problem of the modern democratic constitutional subject, to ‘the 
area of perturbation where individual consciousness encounters social 
communication’. 49  This interface of individual consciousness and social 
communication does not indicate any constitution of the people as a collective with 
political identity or inter-subjective communicative power. 50  Teubner provides a 
purely functional definition of the term constitution and understands functionality in 
its non-political contexts, reducing the constitution to a mere hierarchy of norms and 
structural coupling between different function systems.51 The role of law is to regulate 
                                                 
44 Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 3). 
45 Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System (OUP 2004) 404-12. 
46 Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 3) 3. For an earlier articulation of the autopoetic conception of 
a global governance system see Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘Regime Collisions 
Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25(4) 
Michigan JIL 999.  
47 Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 3) 9.  
48  Jiří Přibáň, ‘Constitutionalism as Fear of the Political? A Comparative Analysis of Teubner's 
Constitutional Fragments and Thornhill's A Sociology of Constitutions’ (2012) 39(3) J L and Society 
441. 
49 Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 3) 63. 
50 Přibáň, ‘Constitutionalism as Fear of the Political?’ (n 48) 449. 
51 Ibid.  
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how conflicts between those normative systems can be resolved. 52  Individuals 
exercising some conscious will in the way that they wish to operate, or more precisely 
in the way they wish not to be compelled to operate, resonates with ideas of 
fragmentation of the international legal order providing the first signs of 
constitutionalism.53 However, it is the arrangements that result from this fragmenting 
process, the formation of separate systems and political identities, that enable a global 
governance structure entailing more than just the coordination of different regimes. If 
legitimacy is taken seriously, a global governance structure should aim to identify who 
is subscribing to competing sites of authority. There needs to be recognition that no 
matter how liberated actors are by subscribing to sectoral regimes that have broken off 
from a central international legal or political regime, the creation of new regimes will 
always result in a dynamic between those who are governing and those who are 
governed wherein legitimacy is at stake. In these circumstances, the resulting regimes 
that form need to be moderated by norms which have legitimacy as their core concern.  
3.2.5. Normative Constitutionalism 
Although translating normative constitutionalism from the domestic to the 
international level is complex, the question of why and how constitutionalism is an 
effective method of governance in the domestic state must be taken seriously. 54 
Recognising the normative content of constitutionalism, means recognising its 
political and legal aspects. The political aspect is that a constitutionalist governance 
system is governed by and for the benefit of a constituent body, while the rule of law 
                                                 
52  Although constitutional pluralists do not differentiate according to functions but according to 
subsystems, they follow a similar course to Teubner’s approach by suggesting that legitimate authority 
can come from a variety of sources and that there is an ‘incommensurability of authority claims’. 
Similar to a law that manages conflicts between the different functional regimes, Neil Walker proposes 
a ‘metaconstitutionalism’ which consists of dialogue between constitutional authorities not in order to 
reach a particular result but in order to familiarise each system with each other and promote cross-
fertilisation. See further, Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 MLR 317, 338, 
358. See also Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2. 
53 Aoife O’Donoghue and Colin Murray, ‘From Fragmentation to Constitutionalisation in the Global 
Legal Order’ (Working Paper 2016). 
54 Neil Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in Joseph Weiler and 
Marlene Wind (eds) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CUP 2003) 27; O’Donoghue, 
Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 4) 6. 
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still forms an important part of the operation of that political system.55 Loughlin argues 
that the rule of law, within constitutionalism, is an aspect of a ‘political right’ where 
the ‘sovereign authority of the state can be recognised’ 56  and also observes the 
importance of the political to the rule of law’s operation. 57  Constitutionalisation 
changes a governance structure ‘from one where the holders of power are self-
regulated to a system encompassing scrutiny at its core’.58 This is in line with Pettit, 
when he states that political freedom is a plural freedom that can be experienced and 
enjoyed by others, not despite others, and is not threatened by the political state but 
constituted by it.59 Law and the courts should not be excluded from constitutionalist 
concerns, but should be located in a way that facilitates political relationships, through 
providing stability, foreseeability and a framework that the governed can point to in 
holding governing powers accountable. 
Democratic accountability and the rule of law are central in theories of global 
constitutionalism that take normative constitutionalism seriously. Anne Peters and 
Mattias Kumm recognise that constitutional norms need to be translated to the 
international level in order to compensate for the de-constitutionalisation of domestic 
states.60 Kumm notes that domestic accountability mechanisms can no longer provide 
oversight in international law-making, calling into question the legitimacy of 
international law in the name of democracy and self-government, and requiring 
adequate participation and accountability in the international legal order.61 Peters finds 
that the rule of law is important for the subversion of power in an international 
governance system that suffers from severe democratic accountability deficits and 
                                                 
55 Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ (n 4); Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism’ (n 
4); Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (n 52); O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global 
Constitutionalisation (n 4); Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as Constitution’ (n 4). 
56 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003) 43.  
57 Ibid 99-113. 
58 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 4) referencing Dario Castiglione, 
‘The Political Theory of the Constitution’ 1996 44 Political Studies 417. 
59 Tomkins, In Defence of Political Constitutionalism (n 1).  
60 Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism’ (n 4); Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ (n 
4).  
61 Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ (n 4) 195. 
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which is at the behest of powerful actors.62 Similarly, Paulus argues that the rule of 
law is important for constraining the state and due process of law, in a world where 
states have a monopoly on force. 63  All those who consider the norms of 
constitutionalism as crucial to a theory of global constitutionalism express the 
difficulties of translating democratic accountability to the international level. However, 
they do not provide any satisfactory answers as to how to conceptualise the complex 
of legal orders and sites of governance at the global level, the first step towards 
securing democratic accountability. Theories that are most successful in addressing 
the challenge of securing democratic accountability in global governance system are 
those inspired by the political constitution, which aim to provide criteria for 
identifying the objects and subjects of numerous sites of governance simultaneously.  
3.3. Democratic Accountability 
3.3.1. The Complexity of the Global Governance System. 
Within the global legal order there are problems in identifying to whom 
constitutionalism should apply and to whom it does apply. Besson argues that: 
 [w]ithout a clear conception of the nature, boundaries, and constituency of the 
community or communities concerned by international law-making and of the 
ways in which to link their interests and decisions back to national political 
communities, however, efforts made to institutionalise global democracy, or at 
least to develop mechanisms of international accountability are seriously 
hindered.64  
Therefore, she acknowledges a problem with institutionalising global democracy for 
the purposes of law-making when a variety of constituencies are not easily identifiable. 
Distinguishing constituencies in order to ensure effective instantiation of democratic 
accountability has been of central significance in discourse on securing global 
democracy.  Some construe individuals in states as the relevant constituent powers and 
                                                 
62 Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism’ (n 4) 586-7.  
63 Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as Constitution’ (n 4) 97-8. See further Sir Arthur Watts, 
‘The International rule of Law’ (1993) 36 German YBIL 15, 21.  
64 Besson, ‘Whose Constitution(s)?’ (n 5) 394. 
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their own domestic states are ‘democratic mediators’.65 Under this theory, there is an 
analogy between natural persons and states; the idea of ‘transitive, delegated 
legitimacy of global governance with states as democratic mediators’.66 Domestic 
state governments are the constituted power in a global governance system where 
states are the main actors, and state consent secures the legitimacy of decisions of 
international organisations of which they form part.67 Therefore, global democracy 
can be achieved through securing democratic accountability at the domestic level.68 
Simply, however, decisions affect a great number of people without regard to the 
boundaries of nation states, and many tasks cannot be realised at the national level 
only, such as free trade, climate change and global poverty, and domestic democratic 
processes do not represent those outside interests. 69  When global decisions are 
concerned, the democracy of domestic decisions alone is undemocratic when seen 
from the perspective of the outsider. 70  Besson argues furthermore that the 
democratisation of states for democratic global governance does not pay sufficient 
attention to interests of national polities themselves, and does not pay heed to the 
distinct interest of states.71 While attempts are made to equate the global constituency 
with the ‘international community’, 72  this has been subject to much criticism. 73 
Conversely, there are those who argue that the global constituent is made up of the 
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individual free from the state apparatus.74 However, this proposition fails to recognise 
that states are and should be subjects of international law.75  
The world cannot be constituted as one world constitution with a world human 
community as a single polity. There must be recognition of the fact that there exists a 
multitude of constitutional or constitutionalising sites of governance. Many 
international organisations, like the WTO, EU and the Council of Europe, are 
purported to have undergone or are undergoing a process of constitutionalisation.76 
Translating a constitutionalist approach to fit the multi-layered international political 
structure is necessary. There must be a model of constitutionalism which can 
accommodate multiple and overlapping constituencies, so that the concept of 
constitutionalism can apply ‘within all legal orders at once so as to produce an 
encompassing constitutional theory that can explain all of those uses together’.77 In 
order to achieve such a concept, there must be consideration of the requirements of 
democratic accountability, what it wishes to achieve, and how to identify it. 
Constitutionalist governance systems are man-made and part of the process of 
identifying them is through seeing constitutionalist norms, such as democratic 
accountability, in operation, and calling it out for what it is. 78  The concept of 
                                                 
74 See e.g. Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds) Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New 
World Order (Polity Press 1995).  
75 See e.g. Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (n 52); Neil Walker, ‘Postnational 
Constitutionalism’ (n 54) 27; Emmanuelle Jouannet, ‘L’idée de communauté humaine à la croisée des 
la communauté des États et de la communauté mondiale, (2003) 47 Archives de Philosophie du droit 
191.  
76 In relation to the WTO see e.g. Deborah Z Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade 
Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System (2005); 
Anne Peters et al, ‘The Constitutionalisation of International Trade Law’ in Thomas Cottier and 
Panagiotis Delimatsis, (eds) The Prospects of International Trade Regulation: From Fragmentation to 
Coherence (CUP 2011) 69; For the EU see e.g. Joseph Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds) European 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CUP 2003); Steven Greer, The European Convention on Human 
Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (CUP 2006); Steven Greer, Lucius Wildhaber, L, 
‘Revisiting the debate about ‘constitutionalizing’ the European Court of Human Rights’ 2012 (12) 
HRLR 655; Fiona de Londras, 'International Human Rights Law and Constitutional Rights: In Favour 
of Synergy' (2009) 9(2) Intl Rev Constitutionalism 307. 
77 Besson, ‘Whose Constitution(s)?’ (n 5) 389.  
78 Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (n 52) 334. 
72 
 
constituency is useful for constructing a global constitutionalist framework that can 
explain constitutionalism in overlapping and cross-cutting sites of governance, and for 
exploring further who decides who forms part of a governance system. 
3.3.2. Constituency 
Theories of constitutionalism which focus on identifying governance systems, ask 
who should be accountable to whom. There is an understanding that 
constitutionalisation is a process enabling for a legal order to move away from an ad 
hoc, decentralised and consent-based system of states, ‘where the holders of power are 
entirely self-regulated’ to one where the actions of those who exercise power is 
curtailed through the operation of the constitutionalist norms of the rule of law and 
democratic accountability. 79   Constituent power holders ‘choose the form and 
substantive character of the governance system under which they wish to be governed 
and live co-operatively’.80 The constituted powers are then granted the authority to 
make rules and govern according to the chosen governance system. Constituent power 
is the force that ‘drives constitutional development’.81 Democratic accountability and 
the rule of law are norms which sustain the constituent and constituted powers.  
O’Donoghue argues that ‘part of the purchase that constitutionalism possesses and an 
aspect that must be explored is who within global governance ought to gain from its 
operation’.82 The requirement of constitutionalist norms to be in operation between a 
constituency of actors, helps to identify who should be part of the process of 
constitutionalism. O’Donoghue argues that the constituent power should be identified 
through a process.83 She takes her definition from Higgins who states that a ‘process 
is a series of interconnected actions/functions interacting to establish an ever-evolving 
definition of a group associated with the operation of governance’.84 The combination 
of norms of the rule of law, democracy and separation of powers helps delineate the 
parameters of the constituency. The underlying rationales for the norms of 
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constitutionalism’s existence are linked to an identifiable group whose relations are 
moderated by those norms.85  
In her discussion of republican constitutionalism, Hannah Arendt states that 
constitutionalism can ‘exist only in public’ as a ‘tangible, worldly reality, something 
created by [people] rather than a gift or a capacity’.86 In the same way, the process of 
constituency involves identifying a group of actors participating with one another in 
‘interconnected actions/functions interacting’ which evolve into a ‘group associated 
with the operation of governance’. This takes place alongside the idea that they ought 
to regulate the relationship according to these constitutionalist norms which set the 
parameters of that relationship.  
Three main potential criticisms can be posited against the idea of constituency: that it 
is vague; it suffers from the same binary as international community; and the idea of 
constituency is circular. Identifying the constituency through identifying the operation 
of norms of constitutionalism could be considered vague.87 However, the ‘process 
functions as the hinge around which the identification of constituent power holder rests, 
as such constitutional norms are objective and establish the certainty necessary for its 
operation’.88 In order to delineate the constituency, one asks whether there is a process 
of global constitutionalism underway and who is engaging in that process, enabling 
identification of the constituent power holders. 89  O’Donoghue recognises that 
constituency maintains some of the binary aspects of international community. 90 
Potentially there are subjects within the international legal order that are both outside 
and within a particular international constituency. But parameters of constituency are 
fluid and do not have entrenched values or interests like community.91 Constituency 
through constitutionalism may be exclusionary to the extent that they do not operate 
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properly; however it does not force values upon holders of constituent power. 
Identifying the constituency could be seen as circular: to be involved in the process, 
one has to be recognised as such but to be recognised one has to be in the process. 
However, the process itself is defined by the law, not by the participants. Therefore, 
in the area of constitutionalisation, the space in which it is operating is defined by 
constitutionalism’s operation.   
The complex matter of determining to whom constitutionalism should apply is the first 
step in providing some form of democratic accountability, a core norm of global 
constitutionalism. Attempting to find solutions within and through the state 
underestimates the extent to which individuals situated outside of the state are affected 
by their decision-making. Furthermore, there are many overlapping interests and 
governance systems that need to be taken into account so that, while some decisions 
affect those situated extraterritorially the most, others will affect the inhabitants of the 
territorial state. There needs to be a way of delineating to whom constitutionalism 
applies in order to capture the varying sites of governance at once. Constituency is 
seen as an appropriate alternative to international community, as it does not fall prey 
to the criticism of creating a binary system where individuals are discriminated against 
according to whether they believe in the value system propounded by the international 
community, or want to take measures to ensure that other values are protected or held 
in higher regard. Constituencies are more flexible and create discursive and political 
environments rather than a society of fixed rules. The constituent power choses the 
form and substance of the governance and where they govern cooperatively, through 
a process. The operation of constitutionalist norms sustains and defines the 
constituency. The next section asks whether the constitutionalist norm of democratic 
accountability is in operation at the Council of Europe, and considers how this helps 
to conceptualise extraterritoriality within a global constitutionalist frame. 
3.3.3. Democratic Accountability and the Council of Europe 
This section explores the idea of values upon which the operation of the norm of 
democratic accountability is contingent. The nature of those values and why they 
necessitate democratic accountability mechanisms is explained. Whether values of this 
nature are at stake in the Council of Europe is considered in order to answer whether 
democratic accountability and a constitutionalist frame is relevant to this international 
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organisation. In addition to discovering when mechanisms of democratic 
accountability are required, this section ascertains what constitutes the operation of 
constitutionalist norms and the kinds of spaces in which it can take place. Whether or 
not the Council of Europe can provide mechanisms of democratic accountability and 
whether or not it is relevant to the question of extraterritoriality will be addressed. 
3.3.4. Democratic Entitlements and the ECHR 
Terry and Kate MacDonald demonstrate how a particular relationship between actors 
can help to identify where the underlying rationale of the norm of democratic 
accountability is operational.92 The democratic entitlements of autonomy and equality 
provide the pivot around which a system of power-holders and affected individuals 
can be identified. In order for the entitlements of autonomy and equality to give rise 
to a relationship requiring democratic accountability mechanisms there must be a ‘thin 
consensus’ on the content of the autonomy and equality from within that constituency. 
Similarly to the outlook of global constitutionalists, MacDonald and MacDonald state 
that ‘democratic principles create an imperative for instituting democratic control of 
any agents of power (state or non-state) that affect a population of individuals to a 
degree that potentially jeopardises their democratic entitlements’.93  
Legitimate forms of governance or constituencies need to be delineated in a way that 
facilitates the normative purpose and function of democratic accountability.94 In order 
to determine the constituted power or ‘which political agents must be institutionally 
required to uphold the autonomy and equality of which populations’ they ask what 
forms of ‘political impact’ implicate ‘the autonomy and equality of affected 
individuals’ in such a way that democratic accountability is required.95 The agents 
carrying out the political impact form the constituted power whose legitimacy derives 
from the presence of democratic accountability mechanisms. In order to identify the 
constituency, it needs to be asked which populations are ‘affected in ways that 
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implicate their democratic entitlements to autonomy and equality.96 The democratic 
entitlements are determined by a ‘thin consensus’ on those constitutive values. 97 
MacDonald and MacDonald concede that much contestation exists on the form of the 
‘thin consensus’.98  However, in their analysis of the ‘thin consensus’ existing in 
relation to the global garment industry, they conclude that ‘economic rights’ or ‘human 
rights’ are the values agreed upon the northern corporate entities and global south 
workers.99 They do not refer to a specific framework which would be more indicative 
of a consensus, particularly if both constituted and constituent powers were actively 
participating in that framework. In sum, the norm of democratic accountability is 
contingent upon the existence of values that are agreed upon within a constituency and 
significant enough to be labelled democratic entitlements. When those values are 
implicated in the exercise of power vis-à-vis a victim of that power, those entitlements 
have the potential to give rise to the operation of the norm of democratic accountability. 
The norm of democratic accountability is in operation when both the acting power and 
victim of the violation of democratic entitlements participate in the constituency to 
ensure democratic accountability. 
Rights enshrined under the ECHR are significant enough to be labelled democratic 
entitlements to autonomy and equality according to MacDonald and MacDonald’s 
theory. MacDonald and MacDonald  consider that ‘economic rights’ or ‘human rights’ 
are values worthy of having the status of democratic entitlements within the global 
garment context. The ECHR, as a human rights instrument, and one that holds states 
accountable for some of the gravest, systemic violations of human rights in the 
extraterritorial context, should be considered from this perspective as democratic 
entitlements in relation to their significance.  
There is evidence of a thin consensus that the democratic entitlements propounded and 
protected within the Council of Europe is the ECHR. The ECHR is the constitutive 
treaty of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe has 47 Member States as 
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signatories and is made up of executive, legislative and judicial organs whose 
functions and powers, set out primarily in the Statute for the Council of Europe, are 
focused on the implementation and execution of the ECHR. 100  The ECtHR is a 
permanent judicial body within the Council of Europe, an international organisation 
which administers the ECHR. The Council of Europe includes a Committee of 
Ministers consisting of foreign ministers and diplomatic representatives from Member 
State countries and decides upon Council of Europe policy, which includes additional 
laws that can be used to keep track of the rules that develop under the ECHR.  The 
Parliamentary Assembly consisting of representatives from all over the world 
including Jordan, Palestine and Morocco, carries out functions such as monitoring the 
implementation of ECHR compliance across the Council of Europe member states, 
improving cooperation with other international legal regimes such as the International 
Criminal Court, and electing judges to the ECtHR. The Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities encourages democratic local government, including the 
provision of elections in Council of Europe states. There is also a Secretary General 
which forms the head of the international organisation and a Commissioner of Human 
Rights which brings attention to specific human rights violations. The ECtHR ‘is open 
to states and individuals regardless of nationality’101 and aims to interpret and enforce 
the rights enshrined under the ECHR. The Council of Europe therefore appears to 
provide a nexus for the operation of a constituency which is concerned with upholding 
the democratic entitlements promised in the ECHR. Anyone participating in the 
constituency of the Council of Europe would agree that the ECHR forms the thin 
consensus on the democratic entitlements for those engaging in that process. 
‘Affectedness’, defined by ECHR standards, simultaneously defines and necessitates 
the norm of democratic accountability. It is left to discover whether there is evidence 
of participation in the operation of the norm of democratic accountability through the 
ECtHR.  
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3.3.5. The ECtHR: A Mechanism of Democratic Accountability 
This section asks whether there is evidence of participation in the operation of the 
norm of democratic accountability within the Council of Europe through the ECtHR. 
Section 3.3.4 confirmed that the Council of Europe provides a nexus where democratic 
entitlements enshrined in the ECHR are at stake. The next question is whether the 
ECtHR secures some form of democratic accountability. The model of constituency 
put forward here is one of process. The constituted power is identified by the ‘political 
impact’ and the constituents are those that are directly affected by political impacts 
that implicate their ECHR rights. This is not a static conception of constituency. Its 
fact-based underpinning, means that constituency is concerned with what is happening 
to people on a case-by-case basis, and democratic accountability must be secured in 
relation to factual encounters. The ECtHR appears to be a mechanism through which 
a process of political impacts directly affecting the ECHR rights of people can be 
examined: it caters for the process of constituency. This section focuses on asking 
whether the ECtHR can be considered a mechanism that secures the purposes and 
functions of democratic accountability so as to articulate the relationship between the 
issue of extraterritoriality and the operation of this constitutionalist norm.  
Whether a court, and in particular an international human rights court, can function as 
a mechanism of democratic accountability, is a controversial issue. This section calls 
into question the idea that elections are essential to democratic accountability, 
examining whether the latter   can be achieved through alternative mechanisms whose 
core purpose and functions mirror those of elections. 102  Ultimately this section 
assesses whether the ECtHR can be characterised as an institutional mechanism which 
carries out some of the purposes and functions of elections when it finds constituents 
admissible, thus establishing it as a forum which secures democratic accountability. 
3.3.5.1. Courts and Democratic Accountability 
First, it is important to distinguish from judicial review the question of whether the 
ECtHR can function as a mechanism of democratic accountability. Judicial review is 
‘an accountability mechanism, to ensure that the executive power implements 
legislation loyally, and to protect those affected by relevant decisions’.103  At the 
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domestic level, the question of the extent to which courts should carry out judicial 
review of executive action and legislation is subject to debate. Jeremy Waldron for 
example argues that courts should be limited in their judicial review functions because 
they are democratically unaccountable.104 On the other hand Annabelle Lever and 
Aileen Kavanagh argue that judicial review facilitates democratic accountability 
because it protects individuals from majority rule.105  In the literature, judicial review 
carried out by international courts is given consideration in relation to different 
international organisations, for example the UNSC, including the ICJ and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. 106  The broader issues of judicial review or lack thereof 
in international law is beyond the scope of this study. The limited ability of courts to 
review law and law-making procedures supports the notion that they are relatively 
insignificant compared to those powerful actors creating treaties or agreeing the terms 
of a UNSCR, or constructing customary international law through their own actions 
in a belief that what they are doing is legal. In a discussion of the ICJ, Gleider 
Hernández argues that judicial decisions can have a law-creative effect because of 
their powerful normative role.107 By applying concretely a legal rule or norm to a 
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factual situation in an authoritative fashion, judicial institutions can contribute to the 
normative content of a legal rule, foreclosing competing interpretations, and 
influencing future practice. However, those decisions are ultimately non-binding.108 
Therefore, the law-making ability of courts is also contested. If courts were construed 
as having a significant law-making function then their own democratic legitimacy 
would need to be addressed, and their relationship with the actors who are affected by 
their law-making defined and defended. 109  The ECtHR’s ability to function as a 
mechanism of democratic accountability should also, therefore, be distinguished from 
questions relating to whether international courts should be democratically 
accountable because of a contended law-developing or law-creating function. This 
section aims to assess whether international courts can play a role in enabling 
constituent power participation within a global governance system in which systemic 
democratic accountability gaps arise. 
3.3.5.2. Elections 
Elections are considered an ‘effective means of instituting democratic accountability 
within states’ because of the ‘centralised structure’ of state’s public power and unified 
democratic ‘public’. 110  The prospects of electoral accountability within the 
decentralised domain of the international legal order is very different. 111  The 
complexity of an electoral framework required to meet these demands would create 
serious impediments at a practical level. It would produce a costly and confusing 
network of electoral processes.112 Electoral mechanisms do not provide a promising 
path to achieving democratic accountability in global political spheres.113 In contrast 
to assertions made by Robert Dahl, elections are not recognised as having any intrinsic 
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value.114 Non-electoral alternatives that have more viability are devised in the form of 
existing mechanisms wherein stakeholders can exert forms of control over public 
decision-makers.115  
MacDonald and MacDonald argue that the ‘legitimacy conferred by democratic 
institutions is derived from their capacity to achieve democratic purposes and perform 
democratic functions, rather than from any intrinsic value embodied in particular 
institutional mechanisms themselves’.116  In order to secure a form of democratic 
accountability an innovative range of institutional forms is required– often 
decentralised and non-electoral. The central normative function of electoral 
accountability is that it ‘gives democratic “publics” a certain degree of political control 
over actions of constituted powers’.117 That is, to give ‘members of the public some 
active political role in defining their own interests, and in dictating by whom and 
within what constraints public decisions affecting these interests may be made’.118 The 
mechanisms through which elections deliver political control to stakeholders can be 
characterised as instruments of democratic accountability. Democratic accountability 
is the institutional means of regulating the power relationship between rulers and ruled.  
[It is] the institutional process for distributing power between ‘publics’ and 
those who wield “public power” over them, in such a way as to ensure that the 
power exercised by public political agents remain subordinate in some 
significant respects to the power wielded collectively by the “publics”.119  
Besson corroborates the idea that democratic accountability should be construed as 
giving some control to constituents: ‘democratic rule…implies endowing those 
affected by that decision with the most voice; but it also implies listening to them’.120 
Kumm states that ‘the relevant question is not whether a majority has determined the 
law, but whether there are sufficiently transparent and participatory accountability 
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mechanisms which are responsive to the constituents concerned. 121  The limited 
control aspired to is ‘potential disempowerment’,122 which entails questioning the 
legitimacy of action rather than taking that action for granted as legitimate; a potential 
for imposing sanctions; and potential for further mandatory action on the part of the 
authorities.123  
Mark Boven’s definition of accountability is in conformity with an understanding of 
‘potential disempowerment’. Boven explains that accountability requires that a 
mechanism be available to enable all relevant participants to be present and explain 
and justify conduct. 124  Explaining and justifying conduct should include the 
possibility of debate, of questions by the forum and answers by the actor, for the actor 
to explain and justify conduct, and eventually of judgment of the actor by the forum.125 
Victims of rights violations should have a platform to voice their grievances and for 
the real and reputed perpetrators to account for themselves and to justify or excuse 
their conduct.126 Corruption should be detected and prevented, with the potential for 
appropriate sanctions.127 
3.3.5.3. International Courts as Mechanisms of Democratic 
Accountability 
International courts have been identified as venues of democratic accountability.128 
All accounts understand the legitimacy gaps that exist in the global governance system 
and against this background attempt to explain how international courts do or 
potentially can act (albeit in a limited capacity) as mechanisms of democratic 
                                                 
121 Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’ (n 4) citing Richard B Stewart, ‘Administrative Law 
in the 21st Century’ (2013) 78 NYU L Rev 437. 
122 Ibid 104.  
123 Mark Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as Virtue and as a Mechanism’ 
(2010) 33(5) West Eur Politics 946. 
124 Ibid 951.  
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid 954.  
127 Ibid 952. 
128 Tomkins in the domestic context also stated that courts can serve as mechanisms of democratic 
accountability: ‘courts [can] offer a vehicle for effective political participation’ in Tomkins, ‘In Defence 
of the Political Constitution’ (n 1) 174.  
83 
 
accountability. All provide varying and different accounts of how courts should be 
construed as promoting the democratic values of participation, transparency and 
accountability. 129 The ECtHR may have potential to provide to constituents political 
control over constituted actors and the potential for public disempowerment in the 
form of justifying action as legitimate and providing sanctions or mandatory action in 
the case of illegitimate action. Bovens states that: ‘[a]ccountability to legal and 
administrative forums, such as courts, is an important mechanism to prevent and detect 
corruption and the abuse of public powers’.130 The ECtHR can provide a forum where 
constituent actors can exercise political control in the form of compelling justifications 
for constituted power action in accordance with the legal framework of the Council of 
Europe, and with the potential for sanctions and mandatory action when the action is 
found to be illegitimate under the ECHR system.  
Anne Peters argues that the type of accountability created by courts and tribunals 
differs in three respects from democratic accountability. 131  First, she argues that 
accountability through complaints –as opposed to accountability through elections – 
functions only ex post, not ex ante. Benvenisti appears to presume the same without 
expressly stating that democratic accountability needs to be ex ante. He speaks of the 
obligation to provide ‘notice’ providing examples in international law where 
international courts have imposed an obligation on states to provide notice of their 
future actions in order to provide opportunities for relevant stakeholders to respond 
before any action is taken.132 Second, claims in judicial proceedings are necessarily 
rights-based and cannot take into account interests without a legal basis. Third, court 
hearings concern individual cases and not general policies. For Peters, judicial review 
is best understood not as an element of democracy but rather as a complement to 
democratisation.133 In relation to the argument that democratic accountability should 
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130 Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability’ (n 123) 955.  
131 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 5) 340. 
132 Benvenisti, ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity’ (n 129) 318-320.  
133 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 5) 340. 
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function ex ante and not ex post, Hanna Pitkin and Terry MacDonald argue that forms 
of public control for the purposes of democratic representation can take place prior to 
execution of a political decision and also subsequent to decisions.134 MacDonald and 
MacDonald argue that the exercise of public decision-making power does not need to 
be conceptualised in terms of discrete decisions taken at specified points in time.135 
Rather, the public decision-making power and process of democratic public control 
can be conceptualised as a ‘dynamic ongoing process’ and therefore the distinction 
between prospective and retrospective forms of control is unnecessary.136  
The second point, namely that claims in judicial proceedings are necessarily rights-
based and cannot take into account interests without a legal basis, can be contested on 
two grounds. First, interests with a legal basis still matter and any attempt to create 
democratic accountability in a global governance system replete with legitimacy gaps 
should be exploited. Second, democratic accountability entails having political control 
over constituted action and where that opportunity is available, whether it be in 
relation to an institution that invites applications from individuals whose justiciable 
ECHR rights have allegedly been violated or in a different institution where the 
interest is not justiciable, it still counts as acting as a mechanism of democratic 
accountability when it enables constituent powers to exercise public disempowerment 
in some capacity.  In relation to the argument that court hearings concern individual 
cases and not general policies, the ‘catalyst’ effect of court decisions can mean that 
they have much broader implications for what constituted actors will do in the future 
on a systemic level towards a general population.137 More importantly, an individual 
case can have broader ramifications for those who are not party to proceedings who 
see that the legitimacy of systemic state action is contested on the grounds of its 
legitimacy. Although they may not be constituents of the Council of Europe, the 
                                                 
134 Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (University of California Press 1967) Chapters 2 and 
3; MacDonald Global Stakeholder Democracy (n 93).  
135 MacDonald and MacDonald, ‘Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics’ (n 6) 103. 
136 Ibid.  
137 Scott and Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts’ (n 129) 565. An additional argument that could be made is 
that although the decisions of the ECtHR are not generally binding, states often accept those decisions 
as authoritative and adjust their behaviour accordingly. 
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legitimacy of a general policy of action is contested and therefore the cases cannot be 
construed as adversarial or a case of considering merely private interests.138 
Consequently, the ECtHR can provide a forum where constituent actors can exercise 
political control in the form of compelling justifications for constituted power action 
in accordance with the legal framework of the Council of Europe, and with the 
potential for sanctions and mandatory action when the action is found to be illegal 
under the ECHR system.  
3.3.6. Participation in the Norm of Democratic Accountability 
The process of the operation of the norm of democratic accountability can be 
evidenced through the institution of the ECtHR within the Council of Europe for two 
reasons. First, the ECtHR has the ability to act as a forum to capture and expose 
political impacts that violate ECHR rights on a case-by-case basis. Second, it is a 
mechanism that provides limited democratic accountability as it is a forum where 
constituent actors can exercise political control in the form of compelling justifications 
for constituted power action in accordance with the legal framework of the Council of 
Europe, and with the potential for sanctions and mandatory action when the action is 
found to be illegal under the ECHR system. The ECtHR therefore provides a platform 
for revealing who is participating in a process of constituency within the Council of 
Europe. An analysis of who is participating in that process reveals who are the 
constituted and constituent powers.  
Individuals seeking admissibility to the ECtHR constitute a body of people who are 
‘affected, in ways that implicate their democratic entitlements to autonomy and 
equality, by some responsible power-wielding agent’. The constituents secure the 
legitimacy of the Member States as rights abiding signatories to the ECHR by holding 
Member States to account for actions that allegedly are not in conformity with the 
ECHR. The individuals can be ‘affected, in ways that implicate their democratic 
entitlements to autonomy and equality’ – democratic entitlements defined by the 
ECHR within the constituency of the Council of Europe – without proving a rights-
violation upon the merits. Individuals seeking admissibility to the ECHR form part of 
the process of constituency when they meet the substantive admissibility rules. 
                                                 
138 Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (n 1) 175.  
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Substantive admissibility rules require a preliminary evaluation of the factual 
circumstances giving rise to the application to the ECtHR.139 Whether an ECHR right 
is triggered is paramount to determining who can potentially form part of the 
constituency, and those who come to the Council of Europe and do trigger the ECHR 
do form part of the constituency. In accordance with the admissibility criteria set out 
in the ECHR, if the alleged rights violation triggers a right under the ECHR; if there 
is sufficient evidence; if the rights violation is significant enough to invoke the 
democratic entitlements under the ECHR; and an individual actually engages with the 
system through applying to the ECtHR which is a mechanism for democratic 
accountability; the operation of the norm of democratic accountability is in operation. 
It is not necessary for the action to be ultimately proven to be legal or illegal under the 
ECHR for an individual to be a constituent power. If the ECHR is triggered, the 
democratic entitlements of those individuals are in operation and they can form part 
of the constituency of the Council of Europe if they so choose.  
Article 34 provides that the Court ‘may receive applications from any person, 
nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a 
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the Protocols’. Article 35(3) (a) provides that the application will be 
inadmissible if the case is ‘incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the 
Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual 
application’.140 Article 35(3)(b) states that the application will be inadmissible if the 
applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage.141 Looking at these requirements 
in the context of the analysis of constituency provided above, the constituency is 
composed of individuals who have been affected in such a way as to trigger the 
application of one or more of the provisions of the ECHR or its Protocols in 
                                                 
139 This is in contrast to the procedural admissibility rules that are bureaucratic, arbitrary criteria. See 
further, ‘Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria’ (Council of Europe, 2014) available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf> last accessed 11 June 2016. 
140 For a critique of the ECtHR’s treatment of the manifestly ill-founded criterion see Janneke Gerards, 
‘Inadmissibility Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Critique of the Lack of 
Reasoning’ (2014) HRLR 1. 
141  For a critique of the criteria of significant disadvantage see Dinah Shelton, ‘Significantly 
Disadvantaged? Shrinking Access to the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 16(2) HRLR 303.  
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accordance with Article 35(3)(a) of the ECHR. There needs to be sufficient evidence 
according to Article 35(3)(a) and the ‘autonomy and equality’ limiting affectedness 
needs to give rise to a significant disadvantage under Article 35(3)(b).  
Member States are constituted powers whose exercise of power is justified according 
to ECHR standards, as signatories to that treaty. When their actions have an impact on 
individuals which directly affect their enjoyment of the fundamental rights enshrined 
in the ECHR, then they are democratically accountable to those individuals under the 
ECHR system. Those individuals are entitled to exercise some form of political control 
over Member States that implicate their ECHR rights. Constituents are entitled to 
justification for those actions as legitimate or the imposition of sanctions or mandatory 
action when the action is found by the ECtHR to be illegitimate action. The fact that 
Member States do not evade the jurisdiction of the ECtHR when an application from 
a territory outside the Council of Europe comes to the ECtHR, but rather engage in 
justifying their activity according to the standards set out in the ECtHR precedent, is 
evidence of their subscription to the ECHR system. Under this model of constituency, 
Member States cannot contest who are constituents in relation to their geographical 
position. Constituents are those who bring enough evidence to allege that they have 
been directly affected by a Member State’s rights-violating behaviour. As long as the 
applicants meet the other substantive admissibility criteria, then they are not precluded 
from the ECtHR based upon location. Member States can push against the 
constituency in the merits stage. For example, in armed conflict, they can state that 
part of the ethos of war is to engage in battle. Article 2 right to life cannot extend to 
create liability for states in all situations of combat, precluding killing in all situations. 
Member States have their voice heard in determining the contours of the constituency 
in this way. The fact that Member States push against extraterritorial application is not 
evidence of their lack of subscription to the system. Their subscription to the 
substantive terms of the ECHR are all that is relevant to determining whether they 
engage in constituency. If a Member State decides to leave the Council of Europe, 
then they no longer form part of the constituency. If Member States refuse to 
participate in proceedings at the ECtHR relating to extraterritoriality then they do not 
form part of the operation of the norm of democratic accountability at the Council of 
Europe, and this signals lack of consensus on who should form part of the constituent 
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power. If it should happen that a Member State refuses to accept the jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR in this instance, then the constituent power may have to be redefined.  
Further evidence of their participation, is that Member States engage in complex legal 
arguments in order to defend the legitimacy of their actions even when there is 
significant financial loss at stake. Furthermore, Member States have pursued the 
enforcement of decisions relating to extraterritorial applications. For example, 
carrying out investigations into alleged rights-violations, 142  submitting public 
apologies in recognition of their rights violations,143 and compensating victims in the 
case of rights violations.144  This is in order to secure the legitimacy of their own power 
and the system of the Council of Europe which purports to ensure that all Member 
State behaviour is in conformity with the standards required under the ECHR. This 
process of constituency has been conceded by both constituted and constituent powers, 
                                                 
142 For details of the response taken by the government to Al Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) EHRR 
18, see: ‘Responding to Human Right Judgments, Report to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on 
the Government Response to human rights judgments 2013-14’ (Ministry of Defence, December 2014) 
26-7, available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389272/responding-
to-human-rights-judgments-2013-2014.pdf> last accessed 11 June 2016. In response to R (Ali Zaki 
Mousa(No.2)) v Secretary of State for Defence [2013] EWHC 2941 (Admin) the government carried 
out rigorous review of detaining policies in Iraq. For details see: ‘Review of systemic issues arising 
from military operations overseas’ (Ministry of Defence, 7 July 2014) available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-systemic-issues-arising-from-military-
operations-overseas> last accessed 11 June 2016. See further details on the Baha Mousa Inquiry 
available at 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120215203912/http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/> 
last accessed 11 June 2016.  
143 Kim Sengupta, ‘MoD admits human rights breaches over death of tortured Iraqi civilian’ (The 
Independent, 28 March 2008) available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/mod-
admits-human-rights-breaches-over-death-of-tortured-iraqi-civilian-801761.html> last accessed 11 
June 2016; South Scotland, 
‘Ministry of Defence makes Jason Smith Iraq heat death apology’ (BBC News, 24 February 2014) 
available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-26328285> last accessed 11 June 
2016. 
144 Tom Porter, ‘UK pays out £27m in compensation to Iraqi and Afghan civilians’ (International 
Business Times, December 24, 2015) available at <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/uk-pays-out-27m-
compensation-iraqi-afghan-civilians-1534805> last accessed 11 June 2016. 
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and is taking place within the Council of Europe, in relation to individuals situated in 
territories where Member States have a significant impact on interests that are 
enshrined under the ECHR. 
The operation of the norm of democratic accountability is visible at the ECtHR.  The 
Council of Europe forms a nexus where democratic entitlements enshrined under the 
ECHR are protected and secured by different institutions within the Council of Europe. 
Any threat or breach of democratic entitlements necessitate forms of democratic 
accountability. Circumstances where individuals whose democratic entitlements are 
breached by powerful political actors - that rely for their legitimacy on upholding those 
democratic entitlements - necessitate forms of democratic accountability. The ECtHR 
is a mechanism of democratic accountability. It is a forum where constituent actors 
can exercise political control in the form of compelling justifications for constituted 
power action in accordance with the legal framework of the Council of Europe, and 
with the potential for sanctions and mandatory action when the action is found to be 
illegal under the ECHR. The norm of democratic accountability is visible at the 
ECtHR when individuals, whose ECHR rights have been breached by Member States, 
bring a substantively admissible application to the ECtHR. Their applications need to 
trigger a right under the ECHR, be supported by evidence and concern a significant 
rights violation to be admissible. It does not need to be ultimately successful. Member 
States who engage with the ECHR system by defending their activity in the ECtHR 
and aim to legitimise their action in accordance with the ECHR are constituted powers. 
Whether they disagree with the extraterritorial application of the ECHR is irrelevant 
to consideration of whether they are constituted powers. They subscribe, and aim to 
base their legitimacy of action, upon the standards prescribed under the ECHR. They 
have an opportunity to shape and contest the contours of the constituency in the merits, 
when they argue for a particular interpretation of an ECHR obligation. The 
constituents equally have a voice at the merits stage in defining the contours of the 
constituency. Ultimately, that will be decided by an interpretation of the substance and 
content of the ECHR in the particular circumstances.  
3.4. Extraterritoriality at the ECtHR  
This section asks how the recommendations for strengthening democratic 
accountability within the Council of Europe can be translated into doctrinal indicators, 
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distinguishing features in existing extraterritoriality jurisprudence as progressive or 
regressive from a global constitutionalist perspective. According to a global 
constitutionalist approach, extraterritoriality rules, rules that provide for the 
exceptional application of the ECHR outside of the state, is no longer viable for 
legitimate forms of global governance.  In a complex global governance system where 
‘some states regularly shape the life opportunities of persons in faraway states by their 
daily decisions’ and actions, 145  democratic accountability cannot be territorially 
defined according to the promise of more legitimate forms of governance that 
underpins normative global constitutionalism. Attempts to secure democratic 
accountability in global governance need to be at once ambitious and modest. They 
need to be ambitious in defining the constituent power. The complexities of 
identifying who is entitled to forms of accountability towards which powerful actors 
need to be fully considered, especially in an evolving global governance system. 
Defining the constituent power through fixed territories or values creates binaries in 
governance which can be exploited by powerful actors to exclude constituents. 
Identifying the constituent power through a ‘process … of interconnected 
actions/functions interacting to establish an ever-evolving definition of a group 
associated with the operation of governance’146 is more fitting for the emerging and 
evolving global governance system, and ensures that binaries are not created. The 
underlying rationales for the norms of constitutionalism’s existence give substance to 
those actions and functions, making the task of identifying constituent powers more 
manageable.147 Attempts to secure democratic accountability also need to be modest. 
Because of the complexities of global governance constituencies, identifying any 
existing mechanisms of even limited democratic accountability is necessary. Those 
existing mechanisms need to be used and optimised, to ensure the fulfilment of 
democratic purposes and the non-exclusion of relevant constituents.  
Extraterritoriality at the ECtHR functions to delineate the constituency according to 
geographical location. This is no longer sustainable from a global constitutionalist 
perspective. The constituent power at the Council of Europe are those whose 
democratic entitlements, defined by the ECHR, have been violated by Member States, 
                                                 
145 Benvenisti, ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity’ (n 129) 298.  
146 Higgins, Problems and Process (n 6) 8.  
147 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 4) 78-9. 
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and who use the ECHR system as a forum for democratic accountability in relation to 
those standards. The norm of democratic accountability is in operation at the ECtHR, 
and it indicates that people situated outside of the Council of Europe form part of that 
operation. Member States engage in the ECHR process to justify their activity 
according to ECHR standards, even when applications come from outside of the 
Council of Europe. Those Member States that participate in this process, form part of 
the operation of the norm of democratic accountability in relation to extraterritorial 
individuals, and form part of defining that constituent power. If Member States ignore 
accusations of ECHR violations, and refuse the ECtHR’s jurisdiction, then perhaps 
the constituent power would have to be redefined. But accepting its jurisdiction and 
arguing that the ECHR is not extraterritorially applicable has no bearing on the 
constituent power. They are engaging with the process and seek to legitimise their 
actions according to the ECHR system. The day that Member States refuse jurisdiction 
to the ECtHR in instances of torture, illegal killings, prolonged detention abroad, 
appears entirely removed from the reality of today, where Council of Europe states 
seek to legitimise their actions according to treaty and other international law 
obligations.  
From a global constitutionalist perspective, delimiting extraterritoriality through 
arbitrary tests of control is no longer sustainable. There needs to be a presumption 
against extraterritoriality in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. This means that, all other 
things being equal - if there is enough evidence, if the rights violation is sufficiently 
serious, if a right under the ECHR is triggered, if the action can be attributed to the 
Member State etc – there is a presumption that an application from outside the territory 
of the Member State is admissible. This thesis has contended that the paradox of 
extraterritoriality can be captured by a global constitutionalist frame. The global 
constitutionalist frame recommends a presumption of extraterritoriality. In order to 
determine whether a presumption of extraterritoriality captures the ECtHR’s emerging 
approach, doctrinal indicators are required to trace the trajectory of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. Three existing doctrinal features of the ECtHR’s extraterritoriality 
jurisprudence indicate a move towards a presumption of extraterritoriality: when the 
‘jurisdiction’ threshold is lowered; when the espace juridique principle is no longer 
applied; and when Article 1 jurisdiction is conflated with attribution. The next section 
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examines the content of those doctrinal features of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and 
why they indicate a progression towards a presumption of extraterritoriality. 
The ‘jurisdiction’ threshold refers to how much control is needed in order for the 
ECHR to apply extraterritorially. If there is a higher degree of control needed to meet 
the jurisdiction threshold, i.e. to trigger the extraterritorial application of the ECHR, 
then this indicates a strong presumption against extraterritoriality at the ECtHR. This 
doctrinal indicator is broken down into five elements. Four of those elements take 
account of the different ways in which the existing tests of extraterritoriality at the 
ECtHR, the state agent authority and control and effective control over an area tests, 
may indicate a presumption of extraterritoriality. Those four elements are when the 
state agent authority and control test is met in more factual circumstances;148 when the 
effective control over the territory test is not applied at the exclusion of the state agent 
authority and control test;149 and when spaces over which the effective control over 
the territory test triggers the ECHR, diversify and apply over smaller spaces.150 It also 
includes an additional category where the ECtHR abandons consideration of either 
test: when Article 1 jurisdiction is not considered in any depth by the ECtHR.151 All 
of these instances, which will be explored further in their application to the 
jurisprudence in Chapter 5, signal a lowering of the jurisdiction threshold as they 
increase the circumstances where the ECHR is applied extraterritorially, and lower the 
degree of control exercised by a state required for holding it accountable under the 
ECHR.  
The two other doctrinal indicators, the espace juridique principle and conflation of 
Article 1 jurisdiction with attribution, refer to more specific features of the ECtHR. 
The espace juridique principle refers to the principle that the ECHR only applies 
                                                 
148 See e.g. Issa v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 27; Al Skeini (n 142) Jaloud v Netherlands App No 47708/08 
(ECtHR, November 2014).  
149 See e.g. Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) (1995) Series A no 122; Banković v Belgium 
ECHR 2001-XII 333; Al Skeini (n 142). 
150 See e.g. Al-Saadoon v UK (2010) 51 EHRR 9 para 83; Medvedyev v France (2010) 51 EHRR 39  
paras 66-7; Hirsi Jamaa v Italy (2012) 55 EHRR 21. 
151 See e.g. Nada v Switzerland (2013) 56 EHRR 18.  
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within the territory of the Council of Europe.152 Disallowing the application of the 
ECHR outside of the Council of Europe runs contrary to the global constitutionalist 
perspective. A presumption of extraterritoriality is indicated if the ECtHR abandons 
the espace juridique principle or specifically limits its application. The conflation of 
Article 1 jurisdiction with attribution involves asking whether the ECtHR applies 
traditional extraterritoriality tests – state agent authority and control and effective 
control over an area tests - or whether the ECtHR is focusing on the question as to 
who should be held accountable.153  
An ‘attribution’ test determines who should be held responsible for a rights violation 
rather than whether a state’s obligations are engaged extraterritorially in the first 
place.154 An attribution test is normally applied when a variety of actors are involved 
in the relevant events and it is not obvious which actors in the context should be held 
responsible for a rights violation. In this context, an attribution test may be applied to 
the exclusion of the application of the two traditional jurisdiction tests confirmed in 
Al Skeini: control over an individual and control over a territory. Unlike the state agent 
authority and control test, an attribution test does not aim to establish whether the state 
agent exercised a particular kind of control over the individual such as ‘physical force’ 
or ‘custody’ 155  in order to trigger the application of the ECHR extraterritorially. 
Unlike the control over a territory test, an attribution test does not aim to establish 
whether there is sufficient military presence for a sufficient period of time 156  or 
whether a particular space, such as a prison or boat constitutes a ‘territory’ for the 
                                                 
152 See e.g. Banković (n 149) para 80; Al Skeini (n 142) para 141; Marko Milanovic, ‘Al Skeini and Al 
Jedda’ (2012) 23 (1) EJIL121, 125; Conal Mallory, ‘European Court of Human Rights Al Skeini and 
Others v United Kingdom (Application No 55721/07) judgment of 7 July 2011’ (2012) 61(1) ICLQ 
301, 303. 
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purposes of that test.157 Distinguishing an attribution test from a jurisdiction test when 
interpreting the ECtHR’s jurisprudence can be a matter of emphasis. The main 
difference in emphasis is that an attribution test is concerned with determining who 
should be held responsible rather than whether the ECHR is applicable abroad. In this 
way, an attribution test signals a lack of concern by the ECtHR that the actions took 
place abroad. The arbitrary delimitation on the extraterritorial application of the ECHR 
provided by models of extraterritoriality based on control over an individual or an area 
are no longer applicable. The location of an individual no longer constitutes a barrier 
to accountability under the ECtHR.  
Those three doctrinal indicators are applied in Chapter 5 to determine whether the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence is moving towards a presumption of extraterritoriality, and can 
therefore be captured by the global constitutionalist frame.  
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3.5. Conclusion 
Global constitutionalism is a ‘tried and tested’ method of domestic governance and a 
‘faithful servant of legitimacy’ capable of accounting for - and suggesting ways of 
filling - legitimacy gaps which have opened up in a Post-Westphalian world. Political 
constitutionalism calls upon governance to be based on politically changeable and 
controllable means through ordinary, politically accountable decision-making. Law 
and politics should not be viewed as competing values in opposition to one another, 
but as complementary or mutually reinforcing. The political aspect is that a 
constitutionalist governance system is governed by and for the benefit of a constituent 
body, while the rule of law still forms an important part of the operation of that 
political system. A model of constitutionalism which can accommodate multiple and 
overlapping constituencies is required. A constituency can be identified through a 
process of interconnected actions/functions interacting, to establish an ever-evolving 
definition of a group associated with the operation of governance. The combination of 
norms of the rule of law, democracy and separation of powers identifies the parameters 
of the constituency. The underlying rationales for the norms of constitutionalism’s 
existence are linked to an identifiable group whose relations are moderated by those 
norms.  
The operation of the norm of democratic accountability is visible at the ECtHR.  The 
Council of Europe forms a nexus where democratic entitlements enshrined under the 
ECHR are protected and secured by different institutions within the Council of Europe. 
The ECtHR is a mechanism of democratic accountability. It is a forum where 
constituent actors can exercise political control in the form of compelling justifications 
for constituted power action in accordance with the legal framework of the Council of 
Europe, and with the potential for sanctions and mandatory action when the action is 
found to be illegal under the ECHR. The norm of democratic accountability is visible 
at the ECtHR when individuals, whose ECHR rights have been breached by Member 
States, bring a substantively admissible application to the ECtHR. Member States who 
engage with the ECHR system by defending their activity in the ECtHR and aim to 
legitimise their action in accordance with the ECHR are constituted powers.  
According to a global constitutionalist approach, extraterritoriality rules, rules that 
provide for the exceptional application of the ECHR outside of the state, are no longer 
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viable for legitimate forms of global governance.  Extraterritoriality at the ECtHR 
functions to delineate the constituency according to geographical location. From a 
global constitutionalist perspective delimiting extraterritoriality through arbitrary tests 
of control is no longer sustainable. This thesis has contended that the paradox of 
extraterritoriality can only be captured by a global constitutionalist frame. The global 
constitutionalist frame recommends a presumption against extraterritoriality. Three 
existing doctrinal features of the ECtHR’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence indicate a 
move towards a presumption against extraterritoriality: when the ‘jurisdiction’ 
threshold is lowered; when the espace juridique principle is no longer applied; and 
when Article 1 jurisdiction is conflated with attribution. Those indicators will be 
applied in Chapter 5 to determine whether the global constitutionalist frame captures 
the ECtHR’s emerging approach to extraterritoriality. Further issues remain present in 
this constitutionalist approach including the rule of law. The analysis now moves to 
look at the rule of law: its relationship with the norm of democratic accountability and 
further guidance on a model for extraterritoriality. 
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4.  A Global Constitutionalist 
Approach: The Rule of Law 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the rule of law within a constitutionalist setting in order to 
assess how the ECtHR should manage norm conflicts arising from the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR, and its place within an international legal system.  
The rule of law’s role in supporting constitutionalism’s political function of 
connecting constituted and constituent powers is examined.1 This is to ensure that the 
global constitutionalist frame enables the legal question of norm conflicts to be 
informed by both political and legal considerations within the constitutionalist setting. 
The regulation of extraterritoriality and norm conflicts should not be bifurcated, nor 
should each be considered as respectively political and legal matters. The 
corroboration of constitutionalist norms breaks down the political/legal dichotomy and 
enables for matters relating to admissibility and the merits to be dealt with 
coextensively.  
As the focus of this thesis is the ECtHR’s ability to conform to a global 
constitutionalist approach, and as the ECtHR is an international human rights court, 
this chapter analyses the role that international courts play in upholding the rule of law 
in global governance, rather than policy-makers, states, or domestic courts. An 
examination of the phenomenon of fragmentation is indispensable for understanding 
the role and challenges faced by international courts in global governance. 
Fragmentation refers to the branching out of various aspects of the international legal 
regime, gaining some form of quasi-independence and ‘self-containment’. 2 
                                                 
1 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will’ (1993-IV) 241 
Rec Des Cours 219; Martin Loughlin, Swords and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between 
Law and Politics (Hart 2000) 232-3; Aoife O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global 
Constitutionalisation (CUP 2014) 25-31. 
2 Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in Jan Klabbers et al (eds) The Constitutionalisation of International 
Law (OUP 2009) 11. See further, International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law—Report of the Study 
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International courts form an integral aspect of this global phenomenon. The extent to 
which the praise and charges against fragmentation are transferrable to the debate on 
whether international courts potentially strengthen or weaken the rule of law is 
examined.3  Those findings may then be relevant to the ECtHR in understanding how 
the latter can conform with a global constitutionalist frame through its articulation of 
the relationship between the ECHR and other external, international conflicting 
standards in extraterritoriality decisions. Global constitutionalist solutions for 
ensuring international courts strengthen the rule of law, in light of the appraisal of 
fragmentation, are assessed.4 In this regard, the principle of systemic integration is 
evaluated as a tool for enabling courts to uphold the rule of law in global governance 
including the strengths, weaknesses and ambiguities in its operation. 5  Innovative 
criteria for addressing purported weaknesses of the principle of systemic integration 
as a means of supporting the rule of law in global governance are devised.6 The chapter 
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ultimately aims to discover the criteria that the rule of law, within a constitutionalist 
setting, recommends for the ECtHR in managing norm conflicts arising from the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR, providing an insight into the significance of 
the ECHR in the international legal system, without ignoring the politics of norm 
conflicts. 
4.2. The Rule of Law 
The rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the 
defence of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an 
unqualified human good.7 
There are two main understandings of the rule of law: formal and substantive.8 A 
formal conception of the rule of law points to the manner in which the law was made, 
the clarity of norms and whether those norms are prospective or retrospective.9 A 
substantive conception of the rule of law looks to the content of the law and requires 
that certain rights be protected and embodied in the law in order for a ‘rule of law’ to 
exist.10 An example of a formal conception of the rule of law comes from Joseph Raz 
who states that laws should be prospective, stable and guided by open, general, and 
clear rules, an independent judiciary and access to courts.11 An example of substantive 
rule of law is provided by Ronald Dworkin who finds that citizens have moral and 
political rights that ought to be enforced through positive laws.12  
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These categorisations can be challenged. For example, Nick Barber states that whether 
a law satisfies the requirement of certainty speaks directly to the substance of the law.13 
A preoccupation with categorising the rule of law as substantive or procedural can 
lead to overly simplistic results14 and works upon the presumption that law provides 
the answers to good governance and the only question remaining is how.15 It bypasses 
considerations of whether law operates in isolation from other mutually reinforcing 
norms of good governance or not, and affirms an antinomy between the operation of 
law and politics in particular. 16  Chapter 3 examined the importance of political 
accountability mechanisms through which constituent powers could exercise some 
form of control over political action in a legitimate system of governance.  It also 
highlighted that law and politics should not be viewed as competing values, but that 
they can be complementary and mutually reinforcing within a constitutionalist 
setting.17 The rule of law needs to nurture a sense of ‘trust’ in politics.18 Law needs to 
be located in a way that facilitates the relationship between constituted and constituent 
powers.19 Raz argues that the rule of law ‘means that government in all its actions is 
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to 
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of knowledge’.20 The 
requirements of the rule of law within a constitutionalist setting are that constituted 
power holders’ actions are constrained by law;21 and second, to ensure that power 
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14 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (OUP 2nd edn, 2009) 210. 
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exercised through the rule of law is not exercised arbitrarily, requiring the provision 
of clear and consistent rules.22 
From a global constitutionalist perspective, legalisation is considered as evidence of 
an emerging rule of law in global governance.23  The rule of law is considered a 
substitute to governance through force whereby law curtails abuses of power24 and 
establishes non-violent mechanisms for resolving political disputes. In a constitutional 
setting the rule of law maintains that ‘law, not power, prevails and underpins other 
values that follow in the constitutional order, including divisions of power and 
democratic legitimacy’.25 The rule of law, alongside democratic accountability, is a 
link between constituent and constituted power holders.26 Law focuses on constraining 
the action of constituted power holders and the exercise of authority is contained 
within the realms of law.27 For Tomuschat, ‘a legal community presupposes as a 
minimum that the relationships between its members be defined by law so that it does 
not confine itself to a purely factual juxtaposition of the individual actors’.28 The idea 
that constituted power should be subjected to law does not deny that some aspects of 
governance should be independent of the law as it is important that the rules governing 
both constituted and constituent power can be changed if that is what is wanted by 
those who form part of the constituency. 29  Following from the Republican 
constitutionalism espoused Tomkins, an exclusive or predominant reliance on law 
denies contestation and presupposes that there is an identifiable way of knowing what 
                                                 
22 Ibid 25. 
23 Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as Constitution’ (n 3) 99; O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism 
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everyone does and should want. 30  Law serves an important function in linking 
constituent with constituted powers, through which the norm of democratic 
accountability can operate effectively. It constrains power and provides a framework 
which enables constituents to know the laws through which they are governed and 
contest constituted power activity according to those laws. According otht is 
understanding of the rule of law, the ECtHR should have a clear line on how it intends 
to manage norm conflicts arising from extraterritoriality rather than leaving it as 
ambiguous. A clear approach enables applicants to know on what basis, or whether 
they ought to at all, bring an application to the ECtHR, whilst ensuring Member States 
know when they are acting in conformity with their ECHR obligations, and enabling 
them to defend their actions according to those standards. 
Jan Klabbers states that ‘constitutionalization entails something else than 
“legalization”’. 31  While legalisation is appropriate for describing the increasing 
number of treaties and for the creation of courts, ‘a very dense web of obligations and 
courts is still compatible with a Westphalian, non-constitutional order’.32 Klabbers 
challenges those who believe that law and courts do play a central role in 
constitutionalisation to articulate their reasons for doing so, as it is not a foregone 
conclusion.  International courts can play a significant role in subjecting constituted 
power to law. Dicey emphasises the judiciary as a body which can enforce the rule of 
law and check that executive power is subject to the law33 and Raz also emphasises 
that an independent judiciary and access to courts is paramount to the rule of law.34 In 
international legal discourse, Henkin contends that most states obey most tenets of 
international law almost all of the time, without much judicial enforcement.35 The 
reasons for general obedience include that states have an interest in being regarded as 
members of international society in good standing; that they can reap the benefits of 
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international cooperation; international obligations can at times exert a  moral pull on 
domestic publics; and international law can serve as a bulwark against majoritarianism 
domestically.36 However, without accessible accountability mechanisms, there is no 
means by which to ascertain whether different state actors actually conform with 
international law standards. This indicates that, contrary to the assertions made by 
Henkin. the ECtHR may play a role in supporting the rule of law by holding a Member 
State accountable through contestation, sanctions and mandatory action. 
The rule of law requires non-arbitrary exercise of power37 and that law should not 
facilitate the arbitrary exercise of power.38 Constituted power may not be exercised 
‘arbitrarily and therefore the law must be prospective, accessible and clear; the law 
must apply to the [constituted power] with an independent institution such as a 
judiciary to apply the law in specific cases; and the law must apply equally to all’.39  
Law does not only constrain power but also can act as a source of power. Whether 
courts can have a minimal role if any in making the production of the law more 
equitable is improbable.40 However, courts can clarify the law, creating transparency 
and access to the law for constituent and constituted power holders.41 Clarity enables 
constituents to more effectively challenge constituted powers’ activity according to 
clearly defined rules. 42   Clear and consistent rules enable the governed to more 
effectively participate in their own governance, by improving constituents’ ability to 
challenge state behaviour according to the rules to which the governing power are 
meant to adhere.43 Following from this analysis, the ECtHR’s adjudication has some 
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bearing on upholding the rule of law and in relation to managing norm conflicts in 
extraterritoriality decisions, it should provide some degree of clarity in its approach 
for mediating the relationship between constituent and constituted powers. 
4.3. Fragmentation: Enhancing and Undermining the Rule 
of Law 
An engagement with the phenomenon of fragmentation is indispensable for 
conceptualising the role that an international court, like the ECtHR, plays in 
strengthening and weakening the rule of law in global governance. This section 
investigates the relationship of fragmentation with the rule of law and whether it 
strengthens or weakens the latter. The place of international courts in fragmentation 
provides further understanding of whether and how the ECtHR can strengthen, weaken 
or have no effect, on the rule of law in its extraterritoriality decisions.  
4.3.1.  Fragmentation Enhances the Rule of Law 
Fragmentation refers to the branching out of international legal regimes and 
adjudicatory bodies set up to implement those regimes.44 In 1918, Francis Pollock 
argued for a League Covenant ‘whose binding force must depend on the renouncement 
by every party to it, in some measure, of independent sovereign power, and in 
particular of the right to be a judge in one’s own cause’.45 Although states refused to 
grant the Permanent Court of International Justice compulsory jurisdiction, the League 
Covenant was a step towards instantiating the ‘coming rule of law’:46  ‘[a]ll binding 
promises, great or small, restrain the promisor’s freedom. That, indeed, is the essence 
of promise’.47 International organisations and the specialisation of international law 
have been in existence for some time. However, the phenomena of fragmentation 
accelerated with the proliferation of courts and organisations after the fall of the 
communist bloc in 1989. For example, the Rio Conventions and numerous hard and 
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soft environmental instruments were adopted in 1992. 48  The United Nations 
Convention on the law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force in 1994, and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2002.49 Membership to existing treaty 
bodies, such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
and the ECHR accelerated during the 1990s. 50  The ECtHR transformed into a 
permanent Court with direct access for individuals in 1998. The World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) was founded in 1996. Stefan Talmon labelled the UNSC as a 
world legislature following a resurgence of activity in the organisation after the events 
of 9/11, contributing to the fragmentation of general international law.51 International 
human rights courts expanded from Europe and the Americas to Asia, the Middle East 
and Africa.52 
There is support for the proposition that the proliferation of international courts 
strengthens the rule of law as it provides greater oversight and enforcement of 
constituted power activity.53 The deficiency of the rule of law in international affairs 
is, in the first place, ‘due not to a lack of rules but to a lack of adjudication of those 
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rules’.54 The rule of law is realised to the extent that states do in fact obey the law and 
that enforcement of law by both international and national courts can increase the 
likelihood of state compliance. 55  These statements indicate that the further 
judicialisation of international law from fragmentation leads to a strengthening of the 
rule of law. For O’Donoghue and Murray, courts are ‘bellwethers’ of their respective 
legal orders. The proliferation of courts represents a move away from protecting 
interests of states as ‘ad hoc consensual forms of dispute settlement’ to one where 
‘constituent and constituted power holders within a system accept adjudication’ as a 
viable method of dispute resolution.56 In a similar vein, Geir Ulfstein recognises that 
the plurality of international tribunals has advantages for global governance. First, it 
enables new tribunals to be established that can represent interests that are otherwise 
underrepresented. Second, it facilitates examination of similar cases from different 
angles broadening perspective on a given factual circumstance. When international 
tribunals take into account decisions of other courts they have a more rounded and 
informed perspective.57 Overdvest and Zectlin argue that accountability is increased 
by the existence of more and ‘new opportunities for dissatisfied parties to challenge 
existing rules’.58 
While many see fragmentation as a positive development, others are ambivalent, 
arguing ‘we should not exaggerate the phenomenon of fragmentation’.59 Koskenniemi 
and Leino consider that anxiety expressed by the ICJ judges has less to do with 
concerns about the coherence of the international legal order and more to do with the 
overshadowing of principles of diplomatic law and the ICJ’s centralised role in making 
authoritative decisions on international law. 60  Tomer Broude, in his reading of 
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Koskenniemi,61 recognises that insofar as fragmentation arises in response to ‘new 
technical and functional requirements’ it pushes utopian demands from international 
law, pushing it to fulfil expectations of its ability to regulate certain interests but he 
also identifies that fragmentation is something which states ‘do’ in order to further 
their own ends. 62  Broude argues that the tension between utopian demands and 
fragmentation as a tool to be used for political ends is what makes it normal: it is no 
different, no better and no worse than international law: ‘the fragmentation of law is 
the epiphenomenon of real-world constitutional conflicts, as legal fragmentation is – 
mediated via autonomous legal regimes – a legal reproduction of collisions between 
the diverse rationalities within global society’.63 
The significance of fragmentation should not be entirely overlooked in an attempt not 
to exaggerate it. While the proliferation of law may be something that states ‘do’ for 
their own political ends, states’ political actions are checked by courts that administer 
the legal regimes founded on state consent. Fragmentation may serve as another tool 
adopted by states to manipulate the global governance system, but it also has effects 
that strengthen the rule of law. With the proliferation of international courts, there is 
increased likelihood of enforcement of legal obligations and accountability. Courts 
defend actors other than states, whose interests would otherwise go underrepresented, 
thus increasing inclusivity of actors within the global governance system. The ECtHR 
forms part of this fragmented network that constrains constituted power action and 
diversifies actors involved in global governance. Fragmentation should be understood 
as enhancing the rule of law insofar as it provides more forums for contestation of 
state action by affected actors. 
4.3.2. Fragmentation and Law-Application: Undermining the Rule of 
Law 
Fragmentation in law-making should be distinguished from fragmentation in law-
application. 64  Anne Peters argues that ‘[t]he political process of developing 
                                                 
61 Tomer Broude, ‘Keep Calm and Carry On: Martti Koskenniemi and the Fragmentation of 
International Law’ (2013) 27(2) Temple Int’l and Comp L J 279. 
62 Ibid 286. 
63 Ibid 286-7. 
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international (treaty) law results in fragmented law, either for lack of political 
agreement on inter-regime relations, or due to hegemonic interest or powerful law-
making states’.65 Fragmentation can also arise due to negligence. It can arise from a 
lack of initiative by law-makers to talk to each other and comprehensively regulate a 
particular issue.66 Aside from good, bad or no intentions, fragmentation in law-making 
can arise due to concerns of expediency. A new normative framework may be put in 
place to regulate a certain set of factual circumstances, but due to the concern of 
relative expediency, no time is taken to consider how the new rules will conflict with 
other pre-existing legal frameworks. The present section confines its analysis to 
fragmentation arising from law-application.67 It is this fragmentation which is relevant 
to the question of how to regulate norm conflicts resulting from the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR. While the ECtHR can incrementally develop ways of 
managing norm conflict through law application, a much more wholesale, root-and-
branch development is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Fragmentation from law-application can have deleterious effects on the rule of law by 
creating incoherency and inconsistency in the international legal order. Chesterman 
has noted that a multitude of decentralised courts creating uncoordinated authoritative 
decisions could undermine one of the central tenets of the rule of law: clarity.68 Paulus 
has stated that ‘[i]nternationally, the rule of law [is]…permanently threatened by the 
lack of comprehensive judicialisation’.69 He finds that the success of international 
adjudication will depend on an atmosphere of mutual deference and respect between 
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courts and tribunals.70 ICJ judges have expressed concerns that the coherency of the 
international legal system is under threat: 
The assumption is that there are discrete subjects, such as ‘international human 
rights law’ or ‘international law and development’. As a consequence the 
quality and coherence of international law as a whole are threatened… A 
further problem arises from the tendency to separate the law into compartments. 
Various programmes or principles are pursued without any attempt at co-
ordination…there may be serious conflicts and tensions between the various 
programmes or principles concerned.71  
Whilst welcoming the increase in adjudicatory bodies, President Schwebel’s 1999 
speech to the General Assembly expressed a concern that there might be ‘substantial 
conflict among them, and evisceration of the docket of the International Court of 
Justice [ICJ],’ advising that there should be a facility whereby those courts could apply 
for an advisory opinion from the ICJ which might be important to the ‘unity of 
international law’.72 In 2000 and 2001, Judge Guillaume also expressed concern about 
forum shopping and a rise in conflicting jurisprudence, also advocating for the ICJ to 
serve an advisory function to other international tribunals in these circumstances.73 
For Ulfstein ‘[t]he hierarchical order of national courts shall serve the finality, 
consistency, and implementation of the courts’ decisions, in short the effective 
constitutional function of the judiciary’. 74  But he recognises that international 
tribunals are not organised in a hierarchical order. He proposes horizontal integration 
and/or a vertical international judiciary comparable to national constitutional 
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structures with the ICJ at the apex. Other courts could be given the possibility of 
requesting preliminary rulings from ICJ, comparable to system between national 
courts and ECJ. He notes that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
proposed to replace existing human rights treaty bodies with a unified treaty body or 
even a World Court of Human Rights.75  However, he acknowledges that general 
redesign of the international judicial architecture would probably not receive political 
support.  
Three potential problems of fragmentation include overlapping jurisdictions between 
different tribunals,76 conflicts between and inconsistencies in their decisions, and the 
threat to subject matters that do not have their own judicial institutions.77 The MOX 
Plant case demonstrates the challenges arising from overlapping jurisdictions of courts 
and legal regimes.78 The dispute was between Ireland and the UK on the disposal of 
radioactive waste from recycling plutonium. Ireland brought a case before the arbitral 
tribunal on the basis of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention). It instituted proceedings before an 
arbitral tribunal provided in Annex VII to UNCLOS. The question was raised whether 
Ireland had the competence to bring such a case before an international tribunal under 
EC law. The arbitral tribunal deferred proceedings until the then ECJ had expressed 
its opinion.79 The ECJ found it had exclusive jurisdiction. Ireland had no right to bring 
a case before dispute settlement mechanisms of UNCLOS.80 Therefore, this particular 
decision did lead to a final decision. The OSPAR arbitral tribunal yielded to the 
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decision of the ICJ. However, it illustrates potential dangers arising from overlapping 
jurisdictions.  
Ulfstein argues that overlapping jurisdictions may lead to forum shopping and no 
finality to a decision.81 However, he identifies numerous ways of deciding which 
forum’s decision is decisive and mechanisms which set out in advance means for 
establishing which forum will decide a case when there are numerous bodies that have 
jurisdiction over the matter.82 For example, the relationship between a general and 
specialised treaty is usually regulated in the rules of the specialised tribunal.83  Where 
there are no rules in place to determine which mechanism should be able to make the 
final decision on proceedings, the principle of res judicata,84 litispendence,85 and a 
duty to cooperate86 can help mitigate overlapping jurisdiction concerns. Where there 
are no formal mechanisms or rules for deciding which court has jurisdiction other than 
a court’s own applicability rules, there can be informal methods by which one body 
decides to yield to another’s decision. 87  Problems arising from overlapping 
jurisdictions can therefore be alleviated through the existence of formal regulatory 
provisions in the treaties themselves, principles of interpretation and doctrines 
employed by the courts themselves, and informal practice amongst courts, through 
yielding to other court decisions. 
Yuval Shany is concerned that subject matters that do not have their own tribunals 
promoting their own special interest may be under threat of not being represented 
properly in special tribunals promoting other interests.88 Conversely, the benefits for 
the underrepresented regime of taking into account an external international law in 
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any specialist regime dispute have been highlighted. At the WTO for example, in the 
Shrimp-Turtle case, the Panel had defined ‘exhaustible natural resources’ in article 
XX (g) of GATT so as to include only ‘finite resources such as minerals, rather than 
biological or renewable resources’. The Appellate Body, on the other hand, found that 
‘exhaustible natural resources’ had to be interpreted in view of recent developments 
which included taking into account a number of different international law such as the 
1992 Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, the Biodiversity Convention of 1992, and the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Appellate Body found that ‘the 
generic term ‘natural resources’ in article XX (g) is not ‘static’ in its construct but is 
rather “by definition evolutionary”’. It reached the interpretation that all natural 
resources, living and non-living were included.89 Because of the existence of the WTO 
forum, protection is afforded to ‘natural resources’ as defined by treaties such as the 
Biodiversity Convention which may not otherwise have any opportunity to be 
enforced vis-à-vis two parties to a dispute. Similarly, Francoise Hamspon argues that 
it is beneficial for the enforcement and representation of IHL that it be taken into 
account in ECtHR decisions in cases concerning armed conflict abroad.90 Forums that 
represent particular interests often end up taking into account underrepresented 
interests or treaties that are not equipped with their own court system of oversight, 
adjudication, and enforcement. All interests are arguably better represented as a result 
of the proliferation of international courts.  
 
Conflicting norms of decentralised international courts and legal regimes can 
potentially undermine the clarity and consistency of international law. 91  The ILC 
Fragmentation Report concludes that fragmentation does not undermine the clarity 
and consistency of the international legal system, because international courts use 
interpretation techniques to overcome problems arising from norm conflicts and 
competing legal orders. 92  Likewise, Bruno Simma and Rosalyn Higgins argue that 
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judges ‘painstakingly’ aim to preserve the unity of international law.93 While decisions 
are made and there are attempts to balance conflicting norms against each other, this 
does not necessarily mean that those decisions are in conformity with the rule of law. 
The broader implications of those decisions and whether they actually result in clarity 
and consistency of the international legal order need further consideration. Normative 
considerations must be evaluated in deciding what is the best approach from a global 
constitutionalist perspective.  
 
Fragmentation can both weaken and strengthen the rule of law from a global 
constitutionalist perspective. Fragmentation of the international legal order enhances 
the rule of law by imposing further legal constraints upon, and enabling judicial 
oversight of, state and non-state power, through the proliferation of treaties and courts. 
However, fragmentation can also undermine the clarity and consistency of 
international law, both through law-making and law-application. In relation to 
international courts, there are concerns that fragmentation gives rise to forum shopping, 
conflicting jurisprudence and underrepresentation of interests which are not enforced 
by their own specialist court system. This section found that problems arising from 
overlapping jurisdictions can be alleviated through the existence of formal regulatory 
provisions in treaties themselves, principles of interpretation and doctrines employed 
by courts, and an informal practice amongst courts yielding to other court decisions. 
Problems of conflicting jurisprudence and underrepresentation of interests can be 
limited by specialist regime courts taking into account external international law. The 
next section addresses ways in which external international law can be to be 
considered by a court in a way that does not paradoxically undermine either the interest 
protected by the specialist regime or the interest protected under the external law.  
4.4. A Global Constitutionalist Approach to Fragmentation 
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If anyone were to propose a pairing of phrases to characterise current 
developments in international law, the smart money would surely be on 
constitutionalisation and fragmentation.94  
Many global constitutionalists attempt to provide methods for overcoming 
incoherency arising from fragmentation. An analysis of global constitutionalist 
theories will both illuminate the challenges, as well as point toward solutions, to 
managing conflicting jurisprudence which can be used by the ECtHR in its 
extraterritoriality decisions. Global constitutionalists have proposed various methods 
to assist courts in counteracting the purported incoherence that may arise from 
conflicting norms and jurisprudence. 95  Johannes van Mulligen argues that 
‘[c]constitutionalism’s anti-fragmentational virtue may indeed be said to represent its 
prime rationale, impetus, and driving force’. 96   This section explores two main 
methods of managing norm conflicts. Constitutionalism offers ‘hierarchy…or…a set 
of coordinating mechanisms’ in response to incoherency created by fragmentation of 
the international legal order. 97  This section discusses theories of global 
constitutionalism that advocate hierarchies based on Article 103 of the UN Charter, 
jus cogens and human rights and the role that courts can play in enforcing those 
hierarchies. It asks whether an international legal order governed by fixed values is 
desirable and whether it can effectively solve problems of inconsistency in the 
international legal order. It then evaluates alternative ‘coordinating mechanisms’ put 
forward by theories of constitutional pluralism, social constitutionalisation, and what 
some refer to as the ‘constitutionalist’ principle of systemic integration, all of which 
rely on adjudicatory mechanisms for instantiating those coordinating mechanisms. 
This section ultimately attempts to suggest a method by which the ECtHR can manage 
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norm conflicts arising in its extraterritoriality decisions between the ECHR and 
external international law. 
4.4.1. The UN Charter, jus cogens and human rights 
Theories that rely on fixed norms to create an international value system were 
addressed in Chapter 3 and criticised on the grounds that a constitutionalist system 
based upon unassailable fixed values is neo-imperialist, those fixed values are very 
limited and contested in nature, and they are deeply political and therefore bound to 
fail.98 This section considers not whether the entire global constitutionalist governance 
system should be conceived around those values, but whether they can provide 
guidance on resolving particular norm conflicts that arise before international courts 
in the context of fragmentation and the rule of law.  
The UN Charter is considered to give expression to a hierarchy of norms by global 
constitutionalists such as Fassbender.99 Pasquale de Sena and Maria Chiara Vitucci 
support the argument that international courts should enforce the hierarchy developed 
in the UN Charter. They observe that a number of different courts implement values 
inherent in the UN legal order in accordance with George Scelle’s theory of relations 
between legal orders. 100  They translate Scelle’s theory of legal relations - which 
purports to regulate the relationship between international and national law – to 
understand the relationship between different specialist and regional legal regimes in 
the international legal order. For them, the UN Charter is the ‘“droit intersocial”… 
destined naturally to prevail over the legal orders of the societies under it…on account 
of its being the expression of a broader society (the international society) the legal 
values of which thus have broader scope’.101 De Sena and Vitucci find that courts ‘act 
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on behalf of the UN legal order aiming specifically at facilitating the realization of 
values stemming from that order’. 102  However, they criticise decisions of the 
ECtHR103 and the UK House of Lords104 that only take into account the collective 
security action concerns enshrined in the UN Charter, and in particular in Article 
103.105 They argue that human rights interests embodied in the UN Charter should 
equally be taken into account.106 The UN Charter is not necessarily a ‘droit intersocial’ 
at the ECtHR. The reason why the UN Charter may be considered to have the status 
of ‘droit intersocial’ is because of its universal state membership. However, the World 
Bank has almost universal state membership and it has not been characterised as 
providing a ‘droit intersocial’. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, states are not 
representative of the interests of many actors. Furthermore, in reality, few states have 
the power to accord meaning and content to the UN Charter. The UN Charter should 
not be destined to prevail over the ECHR offhand because of its wider geographical 
membership. Furthermore, if a decision does not concern the ECHR and UN Charter, 
the Scelle approach to norm conflict resolution is no use. There needs to be a more 
comprehensive tool. Always prioritising an instrument with universal state 
membership and representing broader society, over one that aims to protect the 
individual against the broader society, runs contrary to creating a global governance 
system where powerful actors can be held accountable for illegitimate action against 
weaker actors. 
De Wet criticises the idea that the UN Charter is the sole source of a hierarchy of 
norms. She argues that the UN Charter cannot be ‘the constitution’ of the international 
community because it only has State membership and states are not the only members 
of the international community.107 It does serve an important ‘linking function’ or 
‘connecting factor’ between states of which the international community is 
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predominantly composed and who remain central to the legislating process.108 It is a 
‘linking function’ and ‘catalyst’ for an international legal order based on hierarchically 
superior values.109 However, the international constitutionalist value system comes 
from outside the UN Charter and does not only comprise of the values enshrined 
within it. The three layers of an international constitutionalist value system proposed 
by De Wet are: 
The first layer consists of ius cogens norms that by definition have erga omnes 
effect. The second layer consists of erga omnes norms that have evolved into 
customary norms, but not yet into ius cogens norms. In addition there is a third 
layer of emerging erga omnes norms, i.e. norms whose customary and/or erga 
omnes character are still disputed.110  
De Wet believes the ECtHR can strengthen the international value system through a 
‘spill-over effect’ of its own judgments. When the ECtHR interprets international law 
in light of human rights standards, it contributes to the enforcement of the layers of 
jus cogens and erga omnes.111 She identifies a number of cases in which the ECtHR 
finds human rights normatively superior to external international law norms and that 
this is evidence of a move from securing human rights from erga omnes to jus cogens 
norms with the Council of Europe system.112 The idea that the decisions of a European 
Court could help to stabilise the international value system could be criticised as a 
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European imperialist approach to the making or enforcement of international law.113 
It also denies the importance of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which 
amongst other things, is a forerunner in rights protection relating to disappearances.114 
No consideration is given to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which 
has made significant judgements in relation to assassinations of journalists.115 She 
does not justify why the ECtHR is more significant or able than other international 
human rights courts in creating a spill over effect.   
While this analysis is confined to ascertaining whether the UN Charter, jus cogens and 
erga omnes can help with the fragmentation problem, it inevitably leads to criticisms 
related to those put forward in Chapter 3 even when confined to the rule of law and 
international courts context. Four related criticisms are posited here against the 
enforcement of fixed values in courts, whether founded within the UN Charter or jus 
cogens and erga omnes norms, in an international legal system: it is hegemonic, 116  
simplistic, impractical and divorced from reality to enforce fixed values. 117  Enforcing 
fixed values is hegemonic because it does not allow for contestation of what values 
are important to people and reduces the complexities of an international legal order 
down to black and white rules. International law should be seen as a process rather 
than fixed in time by the norms enshrined under the UN Charter and jus cogens. The 
narrow civil and political focus on jus cogens  norms should be subject to scrutiny and 
not taken for granted. Torture, slavery and slave trade, genocide, the prohibition of 
aggression are amongst those considered to be jus cogens norms. 118  Hilary 
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin argue that a feminist rethinking of jus cogens 
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would give prominence to a range of human rights including sexual freedom, food, 
reproductive rights, freedom from fear of violence and oppression, and peace. 119 
Under these circumstances the rule of law can be manipulated into a rule by law once 
again.120 
Even if it were desirable to enforce fixed values it is doubtful that it would be possible. 
Deciding who should compile the list would give rise to practical and theoretical 
difficulties. From a legitimate governance perspective, the list should be compiled by 
all stakeholders in order to secure democratic legitimacy. Otherwise, an elite group of 
people may get to decide, entirely detached from a great number of people who are 
ultimately affected by that list.121 A constitution cannot (and should not) solve the 
value conflicts of the founding principles of a legal order but may provide mechanisms 
for how to balance them in cases of clash to preserve the unity of international law in 
spite of the absence of hierarchical order between the increasingly diverse 
international adjudicatory mechanisms.122 There needs to be an examination of global 
constitutionalist theories that recognise the importance of contestation, flexibility, 
process, and the complexity of a global legal order, but that also insist on clarity and 
consistency in a fragmented legal order in accordance with the rule of law. Neil 
Walker’s theory of constitutional pluralism,123 Günther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-
Lescano’s theory of societal constitutionalism124 and proponents of the principle of 
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systemic integration are examined as potential candidates for managing norm conflicts 
arising from the extraterritorial application of the ECHR.  
4.4.2. Constitutional Pluralism, Societal Constitutionalism and the 
Principle of Systemic Integration 
Neil Walker sets out a number of criteria that are required in order for a 
constitutionalist system to be so named beyond the state.125 One is that there needs to 
be normative coherency.126 He suggests that ‘constitutionalism should be defined in a 
sufficiently inclusive and open-ended way as not to militate in favour of some and 
against other constitutional aspirations, provided those aspirations or claims meet a 
minimal standard’.127 He states that this is part of a highly reflexive conception of 
democracy. He wants to provide adequate representation and reconciliation of 
diversity of democracy respecting interests. He asserts that a pluralist 
constitutionalism can achieve this. For Walker, constitutional monism encapsulates 
‘the idea that the sole centres or units of constitutional authorities are states’. 128 
Conversely: 
Constitutional pluralism…recognises that the European order inaugurated by 
the Treaty of Rome has developed beyond the traditional confines of inter-
national law and now makes its own independent constitutional claims, and 
that these claims exist alongside the continuing claims of states. The 
relationship between the orders, that is to say, is now horizontal rather than 
vertical – heterarchical rather than hierarchical.129 
Walker recognises three different dimensions to the pluralist claim. First, it serves an 
explanatory function in recognising multiple sites of constitutional discourse and 
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authority.130 Second, it has a normative dimension insofar as it recognises the need for 
mutual recognition and respect between different constitutional claims.131 Third, it 
recognises a ‘different epistemic starting point and perspective with regard to each 
unit(y); and that so long as these different unit(ies) continue to be plausibly represented 
as such, there is no neutral perspective from which their distinct representational claim 
can be reconciled’.132 He recognises that the ‘incommensurability of authority claims’ 
can never be more than an aspiration because of the ‘resilient distinctiveness and 
authoritativeness-in-the-last-instance’ of the constitutional units forming part of the 
multi-constitutional site of governance. 133  The requirement of ‘interpretative 
autonomy’134 – the ability to have a last word on interpretation – is tied to constituent 
texts of the polity: ‘an interpretation of a sectorally or functionally limited text, 
however expansive, remains an act circumscribed by an acknowledgement of 
boundaries within the terms set by a particular interpretative community’.135 Therefore, 
it is not indeterminately open-ended and it will not subsume every legal issue in the 
international legal order.  
Walker provides a theoretical justification for acknowledging the various claims in the 
international legal order: that there is a reflexive democratic justification for 
acknowledging competing values and claims. He also calms fears of overlapping 
jurisdictional matters by stating that the constituent treaty limits jurisdiction. However, 
there is no concrete guidance for judges on what to do when norm conflicts arise. 
Although judges in the ‘constitutional’ courts (who are the final arbiters of the 
boundaries of the constituencies136) are directed to acknowledge competing claims to 
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authority, there is no guidance on when to prioritise one claim over another or how to 
balance them. Acknowledging competing claims of other constitutional sites may 
form part of a constitutionalist solution which takes normative implications seriously, 
but it does not represent a complete model for managing norm conflicts. There needs 
to be further concrete guidance on how to manage the competing authoritative claims.  
Support for a fragmented system that represents different values and peoples but 
recognises the need to coordinate fragmented sites of governance is also seen in the 
work of Teubner and Fischer-Lescano.137 They argue that the origins of fragmentation 
lie in social context rather than law which makes its challenges much more difficult to 
address.138 Drawing upon Luhmann, they conceptualise fragmentation as taking place 
along ‘social sectoral lines’ resulting in collisions between distinct global social 
sectors. 139  Reducing the problem of fragmentation to norm collisions and as a 
detraction from the unity of public international law (legal reductionism) is a 
mistake.140 Fragmentation must be recognised as originating from an ‘accelerated 
differentiation of society into autonomous social systems’ that are ‘issue specific’.141 
As a result, the only realistic option to combating fragmentation is to ‘develop 
heterarchical forms of law that limit themselves to creating loose relationships 
between the fragments’;142 a ‘weak compatibility between the fragments’ is all that 
can be hoped for.143 What is of interest are ‘the external relations of these global 
villages; the relationships they maintain with one another and the more general 
relations with their environment.’144  
Global functional systems create a sphere for themselves in which they are free 
to intensify their own rationality without regard to other social systems or, 
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indeed, regard for their natural or human environment. They do this so long as 
they can; that is, for as long as it is tolerated by their environments.145  
Legal regimes are coupled with the independent logic of the social sectors so for 
example, ‘[s]tandard contracts within the lex mercatoria reflecting the economic 
rationality of global markets collide with WHO norms that derive from fundamental 
principles of the health system’ or the ban on the use of force has a difficult 
relationship with international human rights law.146 The collisions are intense because 
of the constitutional underpinning of many of these special regimes.147 Teubner and 
Fischer Lescano propose that in order to deal with the incompatibility between social 
sectors a secondary set of ‘collision rules’ need to be established akin to that used in 
conflicts law between nation states when deciding which jurisdiction to point to for a 
given set of legal proceedings.148 It is not superior courts that provide networking 
answers between regimes but rather the process of legal decision to legal decision, 
resembling the precedent tradition, but not necessarily requiring every judgment to be 
binding.149 Teubner and Fischer Lescano show that there is a nexus between the 
conflict between those interests and their manifestation in conflicting legal judgments 
and therefore provides a solution that operates at the level of law which means that the 
problem which he ends up addressing is one considering what courts can do in order 
to help the regimes operate compatibility in a larger system. Teubner and Fischer-
Lescano acknowledge the incremental process of developing relationships between 
regimes that serve their own individual purposes. They also open up this system of 
coordination beyond constitutionalised structures. It can therefore be distinguished 
from Walker’s analysis that only caters for sites of governance that have fully 
constitutionalised.  
Three issues should be pointed out in relation to Teubner and Fischer-Lescano’s 
solution to managing competing sites of governance. First, no matter whether they 
boast a particular claim to authority –constitutional or otherwise- regardless of size of 
                                                 
145 Ibid citing Niklas Luhmann, ‘Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft’ (1997) 133. 
146 Ibid 1013, 1014. 
147 Ibid 1014. 
148 Ibid 1021-2. 
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membership, or the importance of the value they protect, each sectoral regime is 
accorded the same weight. So for example, sports law may have the same relative 
importance as the regime on state use of force. Although fixed values should be 
avoided, there may need to be some concession made for valuing a specific regime 
over another in a given context. Second, Paulus finds it disingenuous to claim that 
subsystems develop their rules autonomously or “auto-poietically” rather than with 
regard to general international law, in particular when a closer look reveals that they 
derive their authority from international sources or state authority and not from some 
functionalist claim of legitimacy based on an ultimately arbitrary division between 
different subsystems.150 Third, although Teubner and Fischer-Lescano believe that 
conflict rules akin to those in private law may help to mediate the relationship between 
sectoral regimes, there is no detail provided of their operation in practice. Therefore, 
similar to Walker, they leave open discussion for more concrete guidance on how to 
manage norm conflicts. There needs to be further direction on what ‘collision rules’ 
would entail that can be used as practical criteria for judges in managing norm 
conflicts arising from the extraterritorial application of the ECHR. A practical tool that 
can assist judges in mediating the relationship between different regimes is required. 
The tool should enable incremental development of the relationship between different 
sectoral orders, preserve the claims of those orders but also conserve the legitimacy of 
an order that holds completing claims to authority. This tool should also cater for the 
different sizes and normativity of those claims.  
The principle of systemic integration is considered a ‘constitutional principle’ for 
resolving conflicts between special regimes in the international legal order.151 This 
principle requires that a treaty be interpreted by reference to its ‘normative 
environment’.152 It refers to a degree of integration between different legal systems by 
                                                 
150 Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ (n 3) 84-5. See further Andreas L Paulus, 
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the norms in one system being taken into account in another system. Under this 
principle, the idea that all legal systems are ‘hermetically sealed’ is challenged.153 Lars 
Veillechner states that ‘constitutionalism as an overarching framework does not only 
call for consistent human rights protection, but, through its rule of law component in 
its emanation of legal certainty and its principle of legal equality, also requires 
avoiding conflicting norms as far as possible’.154 Koskenniemi finds that the use of the 
principle of systemic integration ‘illustrate[s] the constitutionalist mind set at work’.155 
The constitutionalist mindset requires that specialised rule systems should not be 
treated as independent from the rest of law: ‘il n’y a pas de hors-droit’.156 The principle 
of systemic integration is important for a ‘constitutionalist mindset’ because ‘legal 
words cannot be separated from the language in which they lead their life. They 
operate only in the context of other legal words and of a professional grammar about 
how they are used in relation to each other’.157 Koskenniemi finds that ‘a practice does 
exist of “constitutionalising” international relations by constant adjudication between 
rules and rule-systems, deciding on institutional powers of international bodies, and 
formulating legal “principles” out of scattered materials’.158 
Systemic integration is an interpretation technique that requires judges to take into 
account the normative environment in which the rule being interpreted functions; it is 
the gap between rule and system.159  Therefore, it does not deny the international law 
context from which it was born, unlike Teubner and Fischer-Lescano’s societal 
constitutionalism. When several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the 
greatest extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible 
obligations. Systemic integration ‘emphasises both the “unity of international law” 
and the sense in which rules should not be considered in isolation of general 
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international law’.160 This unifying interpretation technique follows from the logic that 
‘you cannot just remove one of its fingers and pretend it is alive. For the finger to work, 
the whole body must come along’.161  
The principle of systemic integration is potentially an effective tool for improving 
coherency and consistency in a global governance system within which there are 
potentially conflicting claims to authority. Three reasons can be noted for favouring 
the adoption of this constitutionalist principle. First, while theories of constitutional 
pluralism and societal constitutionalism justify hypothetical indices that may guide the 
coordination between different constitutionalised fragments, the principle of systemic 
integration in its application by courts and problematising by academics provides 
concrete solutions for managing norm conflicts.162 This thesis adopts the principle of 
systemic integration as a tried and tested method for furthering clarity and coherence 
in the international legal order. Second, the principle of systemic integration does not 
presuppose that each international legal order operating is constitutionalised. It 
advocates a much more reciprocal relationship between different legal regimes as well 
as between legal regimes and international legal orders than that put forward by 
theories which presuppose a much more adversarial plurality of constitutions. It 
provides greater flexibility in determining the relative weight to be given to different 
legal regimes in particular circumstances, as is explained further in Section 4.5. Third, 
echoing the critique provided by Paulus that autopoietic regimes neglect that they 
come from international law, systemic integration is particularly suited to determining 
a specialist regime’s relationship within international law. As will be explained below, 
it is enshrined in treaty and customary international law and not only aims to mediate 
the relationship between different specialist regimes but also situates sectoral systems 
within the international legal order from which those regimes were created. This is 
particularly important when the concept of extraterritoriality is elucidated through 
comparison with other fundamental concepts of international law such as jurisdiction, 
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state responsibility, and occupation. This thesis does not argue that the principle of 
systemic integration has or should have a significant part to play in law-creating or 
law-making. Whether or not this interpretation tool expands the capacity of individuals 
or other non-state actors such as NGOs to contribute to law-making by their 
involvement in international adjudication and legal argumentation is not under 
consideration here. However, what is relevant here is that systemic integration 
embodies a certain idea of a flexible democracy, akin to the one prescribed by Walker, 
as it enables a number of interests outside those represented in the constituent treaty 
of a sectoral regime to be represented. Systemic integration can act as a control for 
decisions that may significantly influence other areas of peoples’ lives than that 
regulated by the constituent treaty under adjudication. 
The principle of systemic integration appears to allow room for contestation, 
flexibility, process, and caters for the complexity of the global legal order in a way 
that the other global constitutionalist responses to fragmentation do not. As a tried and 
tested method of managing norm conflicts, it contextualises special regimes within the 
global legal order from which they derive, and advocates a reciprocal relationship 
between regimes. However, there needs to be further consideration of its status, 
diverse application, ambiguities and potential problems for the rule of law in order to 
ascertain whether it is a satisfactory global constitutionalist solution for resolving 
norm conflicts arising from extraterritoriality at the ECtHR.  
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4.5. Article 31(3)(c) and the Principle of Systemic 
Integration 
Un traité ne peut être considéré isolement. Non seulement il est encré dans les 
réalités sociales, mais encore ses dispositions doivent être confrontées avec 
d’autres norms juridiques avec lesquelles elles peuvent entrer en 
concurrence.163  
4.5.1. The principle of systemic integration 
A clarification of the interpretation technique, including its status and diverse 
application, as well as the challenges relating to its application, such as ambiguities 
and concerns that it contributes to incoherency and inconsistency of the international 
legal order, are addressed here.  This is in order to ascertain whether it is a suitable 
interpretation technique that could be adopted by the ECtHR in securing the rule of 
law in its extraterritoriality decisions.  
Article 31 sets out the rules for treaty interpretation. Article 31(1) and (3) provides:  
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.  
2. … 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of 
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties.’  
Hugh Thirlway doubts ‘whether this sub-paragraph [would] be of any assistance in the 
task of treaty interpretation’.164 Judge Weeramantry, commenting on the vagueness of 
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Article 31(3)(c) notes in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project case, that this provision 
‘scarcely covers [the aspect of intertemporal law] with the degree of clarity requisite 
to so important a matter’.165 That the principle of systemic integration enshrined in 
Article 31(3)(c) is part of customary international law appears now uncontested.166  
This is significantly due to the flowering of case-law wherein several tribunals started 
basing their judicial reasoning on an application of Article 31(3)(c).  
The fact that ‘[l]egal texts only make sense within the context of the system that gives 
them authority and meaning’ is a central rationale of systemic integration.167 Xue 
Hanquin describes the interpretation technique as the ‘master key’ to the house of 
international law.168 McLachlan explains the metaphor in the following terms:  
Mostly the use of individual keys will suffice to open the door to a particular 
room. But, in exceptional circumstances, it is necessary to utilise a master-key 
which permits access to all of the rooms. In the same way, a treaty will 
normally be capable of interpretation and application according to its own 
terms and context. But in hard cases, it may be necessary to invoke an express 
justification for looking outside the four corners of a particular treaty to its 
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place in the broader framework of international law, applying general 
principles of international law.169  
Referring to other international law pursuant to Article 31(3) (c) should clarify and 
assist in giving meaning to the terms used in a treaty, not to change or overrule the 
meaning of those terms.170 Often, a court need not make formal reference to Article 
31 (3) (c) to indicate that it is applying the principle of systemic integration.171 Instead, 
there is a presumption that parties that enter into treaty agreements do not intend to act 
inconsistently with principles of international law or treaty obligations that they have 
previously entered into (negative presumption); and when the terms of a treaty do not 
in itself provide answers to all of the questions arising from a case, the parties are 
taken ‘to refer to general principles of international law’ (positive presumption).172 
Systemic integration reinforces the idea that whatever the outcome, what matters is 
that the justification for a particular decision refers back to the wider legal environment 
and the ‘system’ of international law as a whole.173 The underlying logic is that no 
norm is without relevance for others but is part of a legal system and has to be 
understood in this systemic context: ‘whatever their subject matter, treaties are a 
creation of the international legal system and their operation is predicated upon that 
fact’.174 The principle of systemic integration is used by many different courts in 
relation to varying subject matters. In Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal expressly invoked Article 31(3)(c) to justify reference to the law of 
diplomatic protection in order to ascertain whether an applicant of dual nationality 
could be admissible to the Tribunal.175 Under Article 5 of the Hague Convention 1930, 
the Tribunal was to act as a ‘third state’ and apply the concept of dominant nationality 
to dual nationals, finding the application admissible.176 In the Shrimp-Turtle judgment, 
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the Appellate Body of the WTO expressly relied on Article 31(3)(c) to interpret 
‘exhaustible’ in ‘exhaustible natural resources’ to include all seven recognised species 
of sea-turtles listed in Appendix 1 of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.177 
The ILC Fragmentation Report sets out a number of interpretation techniques for 
resolving norm conflicts alongside the principle of systemic integration, including ‘(a) 
specificity (lex specialis); (b) temporality (lex posterior), and (c) status (jus cogens, 
obligations erga omnes and Article 103 United Nations Charter).’178 Jus cogens and 
erga omnes were considered in Chapter 3 and Section 4.4 while lex specialis is 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
lex posterior derogat legi priori means that the more recent norm prevails over the 
older norm’.179 Article 30(3) states that ‘[w]hen all the parties to the earlier treaty are 
parties also to the later treaty..., the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its 
provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty’. The idea behind lex posterior 
is that the will of states may change over time and that new treaties derogating from 
older ones reflect this ‘new’ will. This underlying rationale holds only when 
membership of both treaties is identical.180 This means that the lex posterior rule 
applies to only a limited number of cases of conflict.181 Yearwood has stated that the 
lex posterior principle is rendered ‘practically ineffective’ because the ‘constant 
development, application and renewal of treaties make the determination of ratione 
temporis unclear’.182  That is, it is difficult to know what date determines which 
expression of the will of a country prevails.183 A further limitation of the lex posterior 
rule is that it can only apply when the conflicting treaties cover the ‘same subject 
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matter’, as laid down in Article 30(3) and (4). For example, Yearwood states that an 
issue ‘related to trade’ is not the equivalent of covering the ‘same subject matter’:184 
‘[g]iven the potential overlap of trade with many other areas of international law, it is 
quickly realised that the practical use of lex posterior is limited because everything 
can be somewhat trade-related in the context of the globalised trading system’.185 Lex 
posterior can be considered to be unhelpful due to the ambiguities surrounding its 
application.  Interpretation techniques that focus on status or specificity are more 
useful in providing concrete guidance. The ILC Fragmentation Report advocates that 
all interpretation techniques form part of an holistic approach to managing norm 
conflicts under the umbrella of the principle of systemic integration. The relationship 
between lex specialis and the principle of systemic integration in the context of norm 
conflicts arising from extraterritorial application of the ECtHR is addressed in Chapter 
6.  What should be taken from this section are three points: systemic integration is a 
tried and tested interpretation technique used by international courts for mediating the 
relationship between various types of treaties; it contextualises treaty terms within 
their normative environment; and is flexible, encapsulating a variety of interpretation 
techniques used to resolve norm conflicts. The next section focuses on ambiguities 
relating to systemic integration’s operation. 
4.5.2.  Relevant Rules; the weight of obligations and inter-temporality. 
While the principle of systemic integration is considered a useful device for enhancing 
the clarity and consistency of the international legal order, ambiguities relating to its 
application need to be addressed and resolved in order to ensure that systemic 
integration can provide a satisfactory global constitutionalist solution to incoherency 
arising from fragmentation. Three issues have been raised in relation to Article 
31((3)(c): the rules that should be taken into account; the weight of the obligations to 
be taken into account; and the issue of inter-temporality.  
First, there is ambiguity as to what rules should be taken into account under Article 
31(3)(c). While rules pertaining to the factual situation and relevant to regulating the 
dispute at hand should be taken into account, it is important that an entirely different 
legal question is not examined to influence the decision. For example, the ICJ was 
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criticised for its reasoning in Oil Platform186 wherein it was accused of using Article 
31(3)(c) as a ‘peg on which to hang the whole corpus of international law on the use 
of force’.187 President Higgins stated that the ICJ should have regard to the ‘context’ 
of the treaty which gave jurisdiction to the ICJ which was limited to economic and 
commercial matters.188  
Koskenniemi disputes whether it is necessary for all the parties to the treaty being 
interpreted to also be parties to the treaty relied upon as the external source of 
international law.189 The Panel decision in EC-Biotech Products may indicate that 
only agreements to which all WTO members are party can be taken into account under 
Article 31(3)(c) in the interpretation of WTO agreements.190 The WTO Appellate 
Body in EC-Biotech states that: 
This understanding of the term ‘the parties’ leads logically to the view that the 
rules of international law to be taken into account in interpreting the WTO 
agreements at issue in this dispute are those which are applicable in the 
relations between the WTO Members’.191  
Marisa Martin, Freya Baetens and Panos Merkouris note that the Panel’s choice of 
words seems to leave open the possibility of a more expansive interpretation. 192 
Because the case was not one where the relevant rules were applicable to all the parties 
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to the dispute, the Appellate Body did not need to ‘take a position on whether in such 
a situation [they] would be entitled to take the relevant other rules of international law 
into account’.193 This indicates that in other cases where the parties to the dispute are 
all signatories to the external international law, then they may reconsider the rule that 
all WTO members need to be signatories to the external treaty.  
Koskenniemi argues that it is unlikely that the membership to many important 
multilateral conventions will be the same. The implication of EC-Biotech Products 
decision is that external international law will not be used to interpret the terms of the 
convention under adjudication. This would have the ‘ironic effect’ that the more the 
membership of a multilateral treaty such as the WTO covered agreements expanded, 
the more those treaties would be cut off from the rest of international law.194 It would 
also prohibit any use of regional or other particular implementation agreements – 
including inter se agreements – that may have been concluded under a framework 
treaty, as interpretative aids to the latter.195 This would seem contrary to the ethos 
behind most multilateral treaty-making and the intent of most treaty-makers.196 Some 
rules may be treated as customary international law and apply to all members 
anyway.197 Furthermore, this interpretation of the EC-Biotech decision could mean 
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that no reference would be made to treaties which represent the most important 
elaboration of the content of international law on a specialist subject matter.198  
The alternative solution offered by Koskenniemi is that reference to another treaty 
should be permitted when the parties in dispute are also parties to that other treaty.199 
This may create the possibility of eventually divergent interpretations, but that it would 
at least reflect party will. The risk of divergence would be mitigated by making the 
distinction between ‘reciprocal’ or ‘synallagmatic’ treaties (in which case mere 
‘divergence’ in interpretation creates no problem) and ‘integral’ or ‘interdependent’ 
treaties (or treaties concluded erga omnes partes) where the use of that other treaty in 
interpretation should not be allowed to threaten the coherence of the treaty to be 
interpreted.200 The extent to which the external treaty is ‘implicitly’ accepted or at least 
tolerated by the other parties ‘in the sense that it can reasonably be considered to 
express the common intentions or understanding of all members as to the meaning of 
the term concerned’ must be taken into account.201  This is in order to identify a 
‘common understanding’ in a particular technical field without necessarily reflecting 
formal customary law.  
As well as the rules that should be taken into account, the weight to be given to the 
external law is also a point of contention. An approach which gives excessive weight 
to the normative environment over and above the treaty under adjudication could stifle 
the legal significance of the latter treaty. The ability to ‘react to new circumstances 
and to give effect to interests or needs that for one reason or another have been 
underrepresented in traditional law’ is necessary in processes of law-making. Rather, 
the significance of the need to ‘take into account’ lies in its performance of a systemic 
function in the international legal order, linking specialised parts to each other and to 
universal principles.202 The question of the weight to be accorded to particular rights 
and obligations must be argued on a case-by-case basis. The weight to be accorded to 
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the ECHR and international humanitarian law (IHL) in extraterritorial armed conflict 
is examined in Chapter 6.  
The third issue, intertemporality, concerns whether one takes into account external 
international law at the time the treaty was concluded (inter-temporal law) or whether 
you interpret it consistently with contemporary law. 203  Many agree it should be 
interpreted consistently with contemporary law - at the time the decision is being 
made.204 For example, in interpreting a reference in a 1961 treaty relating to the 
continental shelf, it is necessary to consider not only the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf 1958 but also the much more up-to-date provisions on the same 
subject in UNCLOS.205  
Koskenniemi rationalises both approaches. Taking account of the law in force at the 
time of conclusion of the treaty gives us a better understanding of the intentions of the 
parties.206 Conversely, legal relationships inevitably change, reflected in the need to 
take into account the subsequent practice of states. In a similar way, ‘the views of the 
parties about the meaning and application of the treaty develop in accordance with the 
passing of time, the accumulation of experience and new information and novel 
circumstances’.207  The doctrine of inter-temporal law208 is essentially a reminder of 
these two rationales, one pointing to the past as a guide for finding party intent, the 
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1964 Vol II draft article 56(1), 8. 
206 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 2) 241 para 476. 
207 Ibid 241 para 476. 
208 Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas case described the doctrine of intertemporality as the following: 
‘…a juridical fact must be appreciated in light of the law contemporary with it and of the law in force 
at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled’: Island of Palmas Case 
(Netherlands, US) 2 R Int’l Arb Awards 831, 845.  
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other pointing to the present for the exact same reason.209 Koskenniemi lists factors 
that need to be considered when deciding whether to apply article 31(3)(c) so as to 
‘take account’ of those ‘other obligations’ as they existed when the treaty was 
concluded or present day understandings. For this he looks to the language of the treaty 
itself for evidence that contemporary law should be taken into account. 
When a treaty uses a term which is ‘not static but evolutionary’ then it means that 
present day law should be taken into account.210 In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
case, the ICJ applied the presumption according to which a generic term is ‘intended 
to follow the evolution of the law and to correspond with the meaning attached to the 
expression by the law in force at any given time’211. When language must be read 
against the object and purpose of a treaty, it provides evidence of the fact that the 
parties have committed themselves to a programme of progressive development. The 
ICJ in Gabčikovo-Nagymaros stated: 
 [T]he Court wishes to point out that newly developed norms of environmental 
law are relevant for the implementation of the Treaty and that the parties could, 
by agreement, incorporate them…[in]…the Treaty. These articles do not 
contain specific obligations of performance but require the parties… to take 
new environmental norms into consideration when agreeing upon the means 
to be specified in the Joint Contractual Plan. By inserting these evolving 
provisions in the Treaty, the parties recognised the potential necessity to adapt 
the Project. Consequently, the Treaty is not static, and is open to adapt to 
emerging norms of international law’.212  
                                                 
209 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 2) 241 para 477. 
210 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (n 205) 1282. One example is the use of 
the notion of ‘sacred trust of civilization’ as part of the League’s mandates regime. See Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 31 
para 53.  
211 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf ICJ Reports (1978) 32.   
212 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (n 165) paras 132-147. For the argument that the decision’s effect 
and influence on international environmental law is not positive see e.g. Jessica Howley, ‘The 
Gabcikovo Nagymaros Case: The Influence of the International Court of Justice on the Law of 
Sustainable Development’ (2009) 2(1) QLSR 1.  
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When obligations are described in very general terms, they are usually evidence of the 
fact that the meaning of the terms are meant to evolve over time in accordance with 
the changing surrounding normative environment. In Shrimp-Turtle, the general 
exceptions in the GATT article XX, in permitting measures ‘necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health’ or ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources’, were intended to adjust to the situation as it develops over time. 
The preamble of the WTO Agreement, which used the generic term “natural resources” 
in Article XX(g) was not “static” in its content or reference but was rather “by 
definition, evolutionary”’. 213  Koskenniemi notes that the measures necessary to 
protect shrimp evolve depending upon the extent to which the survival of the shrimp 
population is threatened: 
 Although the broad meaning of article XX may remain the same, its actual 
content will change over time. In that context, reference to “other rules of 
international law”, such as multilateral environmental treaties, becomes a form 
of secondary evidence supporting the enquiry into science and community 
values and expectations, which the ordinary meaning of the words, and their 
object and purpose, invites.214 
Therefore, contemporary interpretation is generally favoured over intertemporal 
interpretations. The operation of the principle of systemic integration questions the 
extent to which a court can expand its own jurisdiction to adjudicate upon other 
international law. If there is an international legal regime that is suitable or significant 
for regulating the circumstances then it should be taken into account. It is best not to 
leave interests that do not have their own court system underrepresented. Leaving out 
consideration of relevant rules of international law also skews international law’s 
general position on an issue, and gives rise to manipulation of the law. While problems 
of consistency arise in relation to who is signatory to the external treaty or legal rule, 
there appears to be a general push towards enabling the external treaty to apply when 
the parties to a dispute are signatory. This should happen even when not all member 
                                                 
213 US-Shrimp Products Case (n 89) para 130; Robert Howse, ‘The Appellate Body Rules in the Shrimp 
Turtle Case: A New legal Base line for the Trade and Environment Debate’ (2002) 27 Colum J 
Environmental L 491. 
214 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 2) 243 para 478. 
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states of the regime under adjudication are signatories to the external treaty. The 
regime’s rules should reflect the international environment of which it forms part, and 
that should be accepted by signatories. The weight to be accorded to different 
obligations needs to be decided on a case by case basis. Chapter 6 analyses how ECHR 
norms should be balanced against IHL in extraterritorial armed conflict. In terms of 
inter-temporality, it appears there is growing support for a contemporaneous 
interpretation of treaties. Having provided some clarity on general ambiguities relating 
to the operation of systemic integration, the next section addresses concerns that this 
interpretation tool cannot practically ensure consistency in accordance with the 
requirements of the rule of law when applied by the ECtHR. 
4.6. The ECtHR, the principle of systemic integration and 
the rule of law 
 [The] Convention…cannot be interpreted in a vacuum […and] should so far 
as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of 
which it forms part.215 
Criticisms and praise of the ECtHR’s use of the principle of systemic integration are 
presented in this section, as well as suggestions for ensuring that this interpretation 
technique improves the consistency of international law in accordance with the rule of 
law. The purpose of this analysis is to reveal criteria for ensuring a global 
constitutionalist frame for norm conflicts arising from the extraterritorial application 
of the ECHR. 
The ECtHR invokes other rules of international law in its jurisprudence. This practice 
is undertaken to a variety of different ends. For example, the ECtHR in the decision 
of Golder v UK used Article 31(3) (c) to take into account complementary norms 
which indicated that international law principles supported and corroborated existing 
ECHR standards of the right to access to justice, reinforcing the ECHR’s telos.216 The 
                                                 
215 Al Adsani v UK App No 35763/97 (ECtHR, 21 Nov 2001) para 50. 
216 Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR’ (n 6) 685, 686. For 
another relevant example concerning interim measures prescribed under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court 
see Mamtkulov & Abdurasulovic v Turkey App No 46827/99 & 46951/99 (ECtHR 6 Feb 2003); 
confirmed by the Grand Chamber in Mamatkulov & Askarov v Turkey ECtHR 225, 330 (2005).  
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ECtHR also addresses contradictory norms, both in ways which have been positively 
and negatively received. An example of a decision with general negative reception is 
Al Adsani v UK. 217  The ECtHR asked whether state immunity could restrict the 
applicant’s right of access to justice under Article 6. The court recalled that ‘[t]he 
Convention, including Article 6, [could not] be interpreted in a vacuum…[It] should 
so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of 
which it forms part, including those relating to the grant of State Immunity.’218 The 
ECtHR stated that the doctrine of state immunity pursues ‘the legitimate aim of 
complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States 
through the respect of another State’s sovereignty’.219 This lead to a large restriction 
on article 3, upheld by Jones v UK,220 since criticised as a serious curtailment of rights 
protection.221 An example of a positive decision where the ECtHR takes into account 
contradictory norms of international law is the decision of Medvedyev v France.222 In 
that judgment, the ECtHR took into account the UN Narcotics Convention 1988, 
UNCLOS and diplomatic notes issued by the French authorities to find that the 
detention at sea was within French jurisdiction and illegal under article 5(1) but that 
there was no delay in being brought before a court under Article 5(3). The ECtHR’s 
taking into account of international law appears to be met with approval.223 
There are obstacles to securing clarity and consistency in the international legal order 
through the adoption of the principle of systemic integration by the ECtHR. One 
                                                 
217 Al Adsani (n 215). 
218 Ibid para 100.  
219 Ibid para 99.  
220 Jones v UK App Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06 (ECtHR 14 January 2014). 
221 Lorna McGregor, ‘Jones v UK: A Disappointing End’ (EJIL: talk! 16 January 2014) available at 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-a-disappointing-end/> accessed 10 June 2016; Philippa Webb, 
‘Jones v UK: The re-integration of State and official immunity?’ (EJIL: talk! 14 January 2014) available 
at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-the-re-integration-of-state-and-official-immunity/> last 
accessed 10 June 2016.       
222 Positively received here: Douglas Guilfoyle ECHR Rights at Sea: Medvedyev and others v. France 
(EJIL: talk!) April 19, 2010 available at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/echr-rights-at-sea-medvedyev-and-
others-v-france/> last accessed 10 June 2016. 
223 See e.g. Stefano Piedimonte Bodini, ‘Fighting Maritime Piracy under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2011) 22(3) EJIL 829. 
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criticism is that taking into account other international law standards inevitably means 
undermining the rights enshrined under the ECHR. 224  However, this does not 
necessarily need to be the case. There are different ways in which the ECtHR can 
interpret ECHR norms in light of competing norms which are explored in more detail 
in Chapter 7. Competing norms can be balanced against one another or can apply to 
the exclusion of another. But it is important to note two points: it is not inevitable that 
ECHR rights are undermined when competing norms are considered by the ECtHR. 
Also, the ECtHR needs to be explicit in providing a clear and consistent narrative on 
why they made the choices that they did. If, taking the example of Jones, they 
considered another international law norm as normatively superior to a fundamental 
ECHR right such as article 3 right against torture, they need to explain that, and why 
they believe it is the case. An explicit narrative on what judges decide, and an 
explanation as to their decision is required so that constituted and constituent powers 
can respond to the ECtHR’s choices. The decision needs to be fully transparent and 
available to potential applicants to dispute. Provision of clear reasoning enables 
‘critique and contestation’, an important aspect of fragmentation.225 Furthermore, it is 
only then that other international law courts can use or distinguish the standards 
adopted by the ECtHR. Otherwise, poorly constructed narratives and reasoning at the 
ECtHR will breed similar results in other international courts.  
Another concern is that the ECtHR undermines consistency when it provides different 
interpretations of external international law standards, that could be construed as 
completely distorting the standard or the very concept invoked. The requirement 
articulated above still holds true: there needs to be an explicit, clear and consistent 
narrative on the choices the ECtHR makes. But further to this, the ECtHR must 
provide a reasonable interpretation of the international law norm. The reasonableness 
standard must be high. There should be a discernible consensus amongst key 
stakeholders that the standard was subjected to an unreasonable interpretation, going 
beyond mere disagreement about what that standard should be. Key stakeholders 
should include experts, academics and those that form part of the institution - if there 
is one- administering the external international law regime. A discernible agreement 
                                                 
224 McInerney-Lankford, ‘Fragmentation of International Law Redux’ (n 6) 626-9. 
225 Peters, ‘Constitutional Fragments’ (n 3) 42.  
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that the law is considered incorrect, so as to completely distort the law, or the 
application of the law to the facts of the decision, must be established for the ECtHR 
to have provided the external provision with an unreasonable interpretation.  If the 
interpretation of the external standard is not explicit nor reasonable, it is not in 
conformity with the rule of law. Clarity and consistency cannot be achieved if the 
interpretation of the external rule or concept distorts its original meaning with no 
further explanation. However, if there is a reasonable interpretation that is different 
from a particular understanding of the external standard, that interpretation does not 
affront the rule of law. 
Tzelevekov recognises the important role of Article 31(3)(c) as ‘an aperture into and 
out of the ECHR regime, through which the judges of Strasbourg can observe, consider, 
and possibly even integrate or modify broader international law’.226 If the ECtHR 
evolves its jurisprudence in a way which is in contradiction to the international legal 
order, ‘any deflection in its interpretation from that order triggers evolution within the 
international order and, evolution of the international order itself’.227 Even if Article 
31(3)(c) does give rise to a lack of unity in the international legal order ‘nothing 
excludes that this phenomenon will not be temporary –for a dynamic system such as 
the international legal order disposes of the means to both reject or integrate any kind 
of evolution’.228 What Tzelevekov does not say, but which is crucial to enable for a 
clear and consistent narrative in international law is that the ECtHR should be explicit 
that it is departing from other interpretations of the conflicting norm and provide a 
justification for doing so. By providing a clear narrative, constituent and constituted 
powers can rely on the law for mediating their relationship in conformity with the rule 
of law in a constitutional setting. This narrative enables an external body administering 
another legal regime to respond, interact, distinguish or criticise the ECtHR’s 
approach, enabling their constituency to properly regulate their own relationship 
effectively.  
                                                 
226 Tzelevekov, ‘The use of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR’ (n 6) 690. 
227 Luzius Wildhaber, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and International Law’ (2007) 56 
ICLQ 217230-231.  
228 Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR’ (n 6) 689. 
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Third, there are concerns that the ECtHR does not reciprocally have an effect on 
international law - it is a unilateral relationship whereby external law only has an effect 
on the ECtHR system. This is not in keeping with the promise of the principle of 
systemic integration that the international legal system is truly responsive to 
decentralised legal developments, special regimes and networks. In other words, some 
doubt that the ECtHR has a ‘symbiotic’ relationship with international law. 229 
Tzevelkov states that ‘[i]f evolution is to be inherent to a non-static legal order such 
as the international one, then the opening – by means of systemic integration – of the 
ECHR’s box towards that order should be equally inherent’.230  Contrary to these 
concerns, the ECtHR is known to have an effect on international law rules. For 
example, the ECHR has had an effect on the law of diplomatic protection.231 Therefore 
its relationship with the international legal system is reciprocal rather than unilateral. 
The ECtHR invokes rules of international law to corroborate existing ECHR standards 
as well as to narrow the scope of its application. In order to avoid criticisms of serious, 
unsubstantiated curtailments of rights protection through the adoption of systemic 
integration, the ECtHR must provide a clear and consistent narrative on its approach 
and reasons for its ultimate decision. A reasonable interpretation of external law must 
also be provided, otherwise using systemic integration will not result in strengthening 
the rule of law due to the confusion it produces. Constituted and constituent powers 
need the court to use systemic integration in this way so they have a clear and 
consistent frame through which to mediate their relationship with one another. 
Therefore, this section recommends that in its extraterritoriality decisions, the ECtHR 
should adopt the principle of systemic integration using an explicit narrative on how 
it balances ECHR standards with external law, providing an informed interpretation 
of the external standard. 
Balancing the unique aims of the ECHR and its subordination to and dependency on 
general international law remains a perennial challenge for the ECtHR. 232  Each 
                                                 
229 Wildhaber, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and International Law’ (n 227) 230-231. 
230 Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT in the Case law of the ECtHR’ (n 6) 689. 
231 Sebastien Pesch, ‘The Influence of Human Rights on Diplomatic Protection: Reviving an Old 
Instrument of Public International Law’ in Norman Weiss and Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds), The 
Influence of Human Rights on International Law (Springer 2015) 55. 
232 Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights (n 6) 377. 
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instance in which the ECtHR attempts to do this relies on an analysis in relation to the 
specific circumstances of the case. Carrying over the criteria of explicit, clear and 
consistent narrative, and reasonable interpretation, Chapter 7 includes a detailed 
analysis of the debate on how the ECHR should protect rights in armed conflict 
through the principle of systemic integration and lex specialis.  
4.7. Conclusion 
A global constitutionalist approach to managing norm conflicts arising from the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR requires the ECtHR to adopt the principle of 
systemic integration, using a clear and consistent narrative, and reasonable 
interpretation of the law.  
A central norm of global constitutionalism is the rule of law which complements and 
corroborates the norm of democratic accountability, as it aims to form a link between 
constituted and constituent powers: a clear framework which mediates their 
relationship and mechanisms which oversee whether constituted powers act in 
conformity with the law.  
International courts have the ability to strengthen and weaken the rule of law. They 
form part of a process of fragmentation whereby the proliferation of international 
adjudicatory bodies has helped strengthen judicial oversight of state compliance with 
international law obligations, thus strengthening the rule of law. Therefore, the ECtHR 
is buttressing the rule of law by providing adjudication in extraterritoriality decisions. 
On the other hand, international courts have the potential to weaken the other arm of 
the rule of law: a clear and consistent legal framework through which the constituency 
can mediate its relationship. This can happen through decentralised interpretations of 
legal norms. Global constitutionalists suggest methods for counteracting inconsistency 
arising from fragmentation and decentralised decision-making. 
Theories of global constitutionalism suggesting alternative methods for ensuring 
clarity and consistency in the international legal order include those based upon 
normative hierarchies and coordinative strategies. Normative hierarchies based on the 
UN Charter, jus cogens and human rights are deeply political, inflexible, and say 
nothing about the relationship between international legal regimes that do not concern 
those values. Amongst coordinative methods, the principle of systemic integration is 
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preferred for three reasons. First, the principle of systemic integration is the most 
theorised and problematized, as well as the most tried and tested, amongst those 
seeking to find solutions to incoherencies arising from fragmentation. Second, while 
other constitutionalist theories presuppose a much more adversarial plurality of 
constitutions, the principle of systemic integration conceives of legal regimes as much 
more flexible. While there is no doubt that specialist regimes tend to possess bias in 
protecting their own respective interests, a normative project which attempts to 
coordinate regimes to ensure consistency should not from the offset embody that bias. 
Systemic integration is the most effective option for ensuring impartiality. Third, 
taking into account external law not only mediates the relationship between specialist 
regimes but helps to articulate that regime’s relationship with its foundational, 
normative background from which it was conceived: general international law.  
Two broad criteria were developed for ensuring clarity and consistency in accordance 
with the rule of law in managing norm conflicts: an explicit, clear and consistent 
narrative, and a reasonable interpretation of the law. The rule of law requires a clear 
narrative on how international law is taken into account. If a court’s reasoning is clear, 
other international courts can respond and parties to that decision can engage in 
effective deliberation. The rule of law thus requires the operation of the principle of 
systemic integration for managing extraterritorial norm conflicts. In adopting this 
interpretation technique, the ECtHR must provide an explicit, clear and consistent 
narrative, as well as a reasonable interpretation of the external international law. A 
further examination of the operation of the principle of systemic integration in 
applying the ECHR in armed conflict is pursued in Chapter 6. Having developed a 
model of extraterritoriality in accordance with democratic accountability and the rule 
of law, the next two chapters consider whether the global constitutionalist frame fully 
captures the approach taken by the ECtHR in its extraterritoriality jurisprudence. 
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5.  Extraterritoriality at the European 
Court of Human Rights 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter forms the first part of assessing whether the global constitutionalist frame 
fully captures the emerging approach of the ECtHR in its extraterritoriality 
jurisprudence. The extent to which the ECtHR is in conformity with the global 
constitutionalist norm of democratic accountability is examined by ascertaining 
whether the ECtHR is reversing the presumption against extraterritoriality in its 
jurisprudence. The model of extraterritoriality deriving from the norm of democratic 
accountability was translated into three doctrinal indicators which are justified in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.4 as representing the declining significance of extraterritoriality 
as a barrier to adjudication. Those are when the ‘jurisdiction’ threshold is lowered; 
when the espace juridique principle is no longer applied; and when Article 1 
jurisdiction is conflated with attribution, 1  recalling that attribution asks who is 
responsible for a particular action, rather than whether ECHR obligations are triggered 
in the first place. A lower threshold of control, and diversification of situations in 
which decisions are admissible, mean that more individuals who are affected in ways 
that limit their autonomy and equality as defined by the ECHR have recourse to 
democratic accountability at the ECtHR. When the espace juridique principle no 
longer applies, individuals whose ECHR rights are allegedly violated from outside the 
Council of Europe are no longer barred from admissibility. A conflation of jurisdiction 
with attribution signals that territory is no longer a delimitation to democratic 
accountability, in conformity with the global constitutionalist approach of a 
presumption of extraterritoriality set out in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.  
The jurisdiction threshold is lowered when the state agent authority and control test is 
met in more factual circumstances;2 when the effective control over the territory test 
                                                 
1 See further Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
2 See e.g. Issa v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 27; Al Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18; Jaloud 
v Netherlands App No 47708/08 (ECtHR, 20th November 2014).  
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is not applied at the exclusion of the state agent authority and control test;3 when 
spaces over which the effective control over the territory test triggers the ECHR, 
diversify and apply over smaller spaces; 4  and when Article 1 jurisdiction is not 
considered in any depth by the ECtHR.5 The espace juridique principle refers to the 
principle that the ECHR only applies within the territory of the Council of Europe.6 
The conflation of Article 1 jurisdiction with attribution involves asking whether the 
ECtHR applies traditional extraterritoriality tests or whether the ECtHR is focusing on 
the question as to who should be held accountable.7 Doctrinal indicators are applied 
pre-Banković, post-Banković and post-Al Skeini in order to determine whether the 
global constitutionalist frame captures the ECtHR’s emerging approach.8 
5.2. Lowering the Threshold  
5.2.1. Jurisdiction Tests: Pre-Banković 
The earliest decisions of the European Commission for Human Rights,9 consider the 
actions of ‘diplomatic and consular representatives’ of the respondent country, 
                                                 
3 See e.g.  Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) (1995) Series A no 122; Banković v Belgium 
ECHR 2001-XII 333; Al Skeini (n 2).  
4 See e.g. Al-Saadoon v UK (2010) 51 EHRR 9 para 83; Medvedyev v France (2010) 51 EHRR 39 paras 
66-7; Hirsi Jamaa v Italy (2012) 55 EHRR 21. 
5 See e.g. Nada v Switzerland (2013) 56 EHRR 18; Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439 para 91; El 
Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2013) 57 EHRR 25.   
6 See e.g. Banković (n 3) para 80; Al Skeini (n 2) para 141; Marko Milanovic, ‘Al Skeini and Al Jedda’ 
(2012) 23(1) EJIL121, 125; Conal Mallory, ‘European Court of Human Rights Al Skeini and Others v 
United Kingdom (Application No 55721/07) judgment of 7 July 2011’ (2012) 61(1) ICLQ 301, 303. 
7 See e.g. Loizidou (preliminary objections) (n 3); Banković (n 3); Ilascu v Moldova and Russia (2005) 
40 EHRR 46; Catan v Moldova and Russia (2013) 57 EHRR 4; Jaloud (n 2); Marko Milanovic, 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Policy and Practice (OUP 2011) 41-52; 
Jane M Rooney, ‘The Relationship between Jurisdiction and Attribution after Jaloud v Netherlands’ 
(2015) 62(3) NILR 407.  
8 Banković (n 3); Al Skeini (n 2). 
9 The European Commission of Human Rights is the adjudicatory mechanism of the Council of Europe 
preceding the creation of the ECtHR but still relevant and cited in the ECtHR’s contemporary case law. 
For a detailed description of the role and progression of the European Commission of Human Rights 
see Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: from its Inception to the 
Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (OUP 2010).  
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including X v Germany,10 X v UK11 and M v Denmark.12 The decision of X v Germany 
concerned a German national who brought an action against the German consular 
authorities for having him expelled from Morocco by the authorities of the latter. 
While the application failed on evidence, the applicant was found to be within German 
‘jurisdiction’ under Article 1 even when ‘domiciled or resident abroad’ because of the 
duties that the German diplomatic and consular representatives in Morocco had 
towards the German national. 13  The extraterritoriality test is interpreted as a 
‘nationality’ principle entailing that the protection afforded by the ECHR follows its 
state agents.14 Similarly, in X v UK, the applicant was a UK national taking a case 
against the British Consul which allegedly failed to intervene when the applicant’s 
child was taken back to Jordan.15 She made a claim against the British Consul under 
Article 8 right to private life for failing to intervene or trying to unite them. The 
Commission uses a broader test of state agent authority over an individual using 
‘diplomatic and consular representatives’ as an example of when that test should be 
applied: ‘…authorised agents of a State, including diplomatic and consular agents 
bring other persons or property within the jurisdiction of that State to the extent they 
exercise authority over such persons or property. Insofar as they affect such persons 
or property by their acts or omissions, the responsibility of the state is engaged’.16 
Rather than relying on the nationality principle or the fact that the state agents were 
‘diplomatic and consular agents’ there was a much broader statement of principle of 
control over persons and property in relation to both acts and omissions. However, the 
                                                 
10 X v Germany App No 1611/62, 25 September 1965 (1965) 8 Yearbook of the ECHR 158 (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff).  
11 X v UK App No 7547/76, (Admissibility, ECommHR 15 December 1977) 12 Decisions and Reports 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1978) 73.   
12 M v Denmark App No 17392/90 (Admissibility, ECommHR, 14 October 1992) 73 Decisions and 
Reports (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1992) 193. 
13 Ibid 168.  
14 Rick Lawson, ‘Life After Banković: On the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, in Fons Coomans and Menno T Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, 2004) 90; Karen da Costa, Extraterritorial Application of Selected 
Human Rights Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2012) 97. The ‘nationality’ principle is a 
principle applied in determining the extraterritorial application of legislative jurisdiction.  
15 X v UK (n 11).  
16 Ibid 74 [emphasis added]. 
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application of this broader principle is still limited to the factual circumstances of 
diplomatic and consular agents. In M v Denmark, the Commission invoked the X v UK 
‘nationality’ principle to establish jurisdiction through the actions of Danish 
diplomatic and consular representatives in their embassy in East Berlin. In the pre-
Banković decisions of Cyprus v Turkey and Freda v Italy the ‘nationality’ principle 
extended to registered ships and aircraft.17 The diplomatic and consular representative 
decisions of extraterritoriality, founded more broadly upon the ‘nationality’ principle 
represent a prominent category of extraterritoriality. 
Other miscellaneous decisions of extraterritoriality were decided pre-Banković. The 
ECtHR applied a ‘state agent authority and control’ test in Cyprus v Turkey, the 
ECtHR held Turkey accountable for systemic violations of rights by the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 18  It found extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
extradition and expulsion decisions.19 In Drozd and Janousek the ECtHR found that 
French and Spanish judges presiding in an Andorran court ‘produced effects’ in 
Andorra and therefore engaged Article 1 jurisdiction.20 There are other cases which 
concerned extraterritoriality wherein the Commission did not consider whether the 
Article 1 jurisdiction threshold had been met. 21  It is questionable whether those 
decisions represent a statement of principle or merely an ad hoc approach to a diverse 
                                                 
17  Cyprus v Turkey App No 6780/74 and 6950/75, (Admissibility ECommHR, 26 May 1975), 2 
Decisions and Reports 125 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1975) 136 para 8; Freda v Italy App No 
8916/80 (Admissibility ECommHR, 7 October 1980) 21 Decisions and Reports 250 (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe 1981) 256 para 3. 
18 The use of a ‘state agent authority and control’ test can be construed as miscellaneous as the ECtHR 
has since consistently adopted the ‘effective control over the territory’ test in inter-state cases. See e.g. 
Cyprus v Turkey (2002) 35 EHRR 30; Cyprus v Turkey (2014) 59 EHRR 16.  
19 Soering (n 5) para 91; Cruz Varas v Sweden judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A no 201, paras 69 
and 70; Vilvarajah v UK judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A no 215, para 103. The ECtHR has 
since not characterised extradition cases as cases concerning ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ in Banković 
(n 3) See Section 5.4 below for arguments for and against describing extradition cases as 
‘extraterritorial’. 
20 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 745. 
21 Hess v UK App No 6231/73 (Admissibility ECommHR, 28 May 1975) 2 Decisions and Reports 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe: 1975) 72; X and Y v Switzerland App No 7289/75 and 7349 
(Admissibility ECommHR, 14 July 1977) 9 Decisions and Reports 57 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 
1978). 
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range of factual circumstances. It appears that the Commission generally found 
decisions admissible under Article 1 jurisdiction in relation to the territorial scope of 
the ECHR whether by applying the state agent authority and control test, applying a 
different test to fit the factual circumstances or by simply not seeing the jurisdiction 
threshold as an issue.  
Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) provided one of the most significant 
authorities in the pre-Banković period.22 The applicant complained that the Turkish 
armed forces had prevented her from returning to Northern Cyprus after its occupation 
and peacefully enjoying her property under Article 1 Protocol No 1. The test applied 
by the ECtHR was the following: 
...the responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a 
consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises 
effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to 
secure in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention 
derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through 
its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration.23 
 
Whether Loizidou (preliminary objections), is indeed an extraterritoriality test or an 
attribution test is the subject of much debate. The judgment is interpreted in two ways 
both in the literature and by the ECtHR. First, it is interpreted as meaning that as a 
result of the control exercised over the territory, the respondent state has obligations 
under the ECHR towards everyone within that territory both to protect rights and to 
prevent rights violations by other individuals (the ‘control over the territory’ test).24 
Second, the rights violations carried out by the subordinate local administration are 
attributed to the respondent state because of the control the latter exercises over the 
                                                 
22 Loizidou (preliminary objections) (n 3). 
23 Ibid para 62. 
24 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 7) 47. Sarah Miller, ‘Revisiting 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: a Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the 
European Convention’ (2009) EJIL 1123, 1236; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests 
Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’ (2007) 18(4) EJIL 649, 659 see footnote 
17; Ralph Wilde, ‘Legal “Black Hole”? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on 
Civil and Political Rights’ (2005) 26 Michigan JIL 739. 
 151 
 
former (attribution test).25 Milanovic explains the ‘control over the territory’ test by 
reference to positive obligations. The positive obligations explanation provides that 
the respondent state, when it exercises control over the territory, must take positive 
actions to prevent others from committing rights violations within that territory.26 He 
posits that the ECtHR in Loizidou (preliminary objections)27 established that Turkey, 
by virtue of its effective overall control over northern Cyprus, had a positive obligation 
to prevent human rights violations, regardless of by whom they were committed.28   
It is ambiguous as to which reading the ECtHR subscribes in Loizidou (preliminary 
objections). The ECtHR states that ‘the applicant’s loss of her property stemmed from 
the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkish troops and the establishment 
of the TRNC…’29 This statement could be interpreted as suggesting that it was the 
Turkish occupation of the territory (control over the territory) or Turkey’s 
establishment of the TRNC (attribution test) that was decisive for establishing 
jurisdiction. On an adjudication of the merits in Loizidou it was obvious from the ‘large 
number of troops’ in Northern Cyprus that Turkey exercised ‘effective overall control’ 
thus entailing ‘detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities’ of the 
“TRNC”’. 30 In the merits, therefore, it is still ambiguous as to whether the ECtHR 
applies a control over the territory or attribution test. Cyprus v Turkey 31  is also 
ambiguous. What was decisive in that case was whether ‘Turkey actually exercised 
detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the “TRNC”’ but the 
                                                 
25 Michel Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2009) 164; Stefan Talmon, ‘The Responsibility of Outside Powers 
for Acts of Secessionist Entities’ (2009) ICLQ 493, 508; Yael Ronen, ‘Non-Recognition, Jurisdiction 
and the TRNC before the European Court of Human Rights’, (2003) CLJ 535. Cyprus v Turkey has 
been recognised as advocating an attribution test in order to establish Article 1 jurisdiction: Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the recent jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR’ (2003) 14 EJIL 529, 545; Monica Hakimi, ‘State Bystander Responsibility’ (2010) 21(2) EJIL 
377. 
26 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 7) 46. 
27 Loizidou (preliminary objections) (n 3). 
28 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 7) 47. 
29 Loizidou (preliminary objections) (n 3) para 46. 
30 Loizidou v Turkey (1997) 23 EHRR 513  para 56. 
31 Cyprus (n 18) 331. 
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judges placed emphasis on the ‘effective overall control’ of the territory as enabling 
Turkey to exercise control over that part of the territory.32 Turkey was responsible for 
‘the acts of the local administration which survive[d] by virtue of Turkish military and 
other support’.33  
Loizidou and Cyprus are therefore both ambiguous in relation to whether they 
represent a conflation of jurisdiction with attribution. In subsequent cases the Loizidou 
test is interpreted by the ECtHR as either a respondent’s control over the territory test 
or as an attribution test, and indicates more fully whether the ECtHR is moving 
towards convergence and therefore a presumption of extraterritoriality. 
For now, it is important to note that Loizidou (preliminary objections) was innovative 
pre- Banković and expanded extraterritoriality, as it introduced a test different from 
the state agent authority and control test but not to the exclusion of that test. The 
effective control test is used as a means of holding Turkey accountable for a number 
of rights violations over a period of time. This represents a further lowering of the 
jurisdiction threshold insofar as it aims to expand extraterritorial accountability in 
space and time. Pre-Banković, the ECtHR provides tests to facilitate the finding of the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR using a form of the state agent authority and 
control test, an effective control over the territory test, other miscellaneous tests and 
overlooking extraterritoriality as an issue. It appears to adopt quite a low threshold for 
jurisdiction which can only be evaluated by looking at the later periods of 
jurisprudence. 
5.2.2. Jurisdiction Tests: Post-Banković 
Banković concerned airstrikes carried out by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(‘NATO’) on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the conflict 
in Kosovo between Serbian and Kosovar Albanian forces during 1998 and 1999. A 
Radio TelevizijeSrbije (‘RTS’) building was hit by a missile launched from a NATO 
forces’ aircraft. The ECtHR invoked the public international law definition of 
jurisdiction in order to determine the ‘ordinary meaning’ of jurisdiction within Article 
                                                 
32 Ibid para 77. 
33 Ibid. 
 153 
 
1 as was required by the customary rules of treaty interpretation as reflected in  Article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on  the Law of Treaties 1969.34  
The ECtHR provided specific factual incidences in which the ECHR could be applied 
abroad including extradition or expulsion of a person that gives rise to an issue under 
Articles 2 and/or 3 and exceptionally under Articles 5 and 6;35 Drozd and Janousek 
case;36 and of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels 
registered in, or flying the flag of, that State.37 Otherwise, the ECHR would only apply 
extraterritorially in ‘exceptional’ circumstances: when ‘through the effective control 
of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military 
occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of 
that territory’ the respondent state ‘exercises all or some of the public powers normally 
to be exercised by that Government’.38 In applying this test, the ECtHR expressly 
asserted that ‘the scope of Article 1…is determinative of the very scope of the 
Contracting Parties’ positive obligations and, as such, of the scope and reach of the 
entire Convention system’.39 A ‘cause-and-effect’ notion of jurisdiction was rejected 
by the ECtHR, meaning that jurisdiction could not be established through a specific, 
singular incident of rights-violation abroad. Instead, jurisdiction would only be 
established when there was a sufficient degree of control as to trigger the entire breadth 
of the ECHR towards everyone within that territory.40 In this way rights under the 
ECHR could not be ‘divided and tailored’.41 The ECtHR found that the NATO states 
that bombed the radio television station did not exercise sufficient ‘control over the 
territory’ to establish Article 1 jurisdiction.42 
Apart from the exceptional circumstances listed, Banković does not acknowledge the 
application of a state agent authority and control test of jurisdiction because the ECHR 
                                                 
34 The public international law conception of jurisdiction is addressed in Chapter 7.  
35 Banković (n 3) paras 67-79, 73. 
36 Ibid para 69. 
37 Ibid para 73 
38 Ibid para 74. 
39 Ibid para 65. 
40 Ibid para 75. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid para 82. 
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cannot be ‘divided and tailored’.43 The test requires a ‘high degree of territorial control’ 
for jurisdiction to be established.44 Otherwise, there is no jurisdiction even if a state 
agent unquestionably violated the ECHR. 45  This higher threshold applies to the 
exclusion of a state agent authority test. Furthermore, the ECHR applies only in 
‘exceptional’ circumstances, thus indicating a presumption against 
extraterritoriality.46 The reasons why the ECtHR restricted extraterritoriality in this 
way is subject to much speculation. 47  Regardless, it is generally accepted that 
Banković significantly curtailed extraterritorial accountability.48  
Despite Banković, succeeding decisions in lower chambers of the ECtHR departed 
from its reasoning. They applied the state agent authority and control test to new 
factual circumstances expanding beyond the diplomatic and consular test which 
consistently marked the Pre-Banković period of extraterritoriality, to include situations 
of shooting. In Issa v Turkey, the applicants brought an action under Article 2 right to 
life claiming that Turkish soldiers had shot their relatives, who were shepherds, in a 
cave during military operations in northern Iraq aimed at pursuing and eliminating 
                                                 
43 Ibid para 75. 
44 Miller, ‘Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (n 24) 1236. 
45 Ibid 1236. 
46 Banković (n 3) para 61. 
47 Rick Lawson argues that Banković is a mistake and a misreading of the Court’s previous cases rather 
than an intentional change in direction by the ECtHR. See further Lawson, ‘Life After Banković’ (n 
14) 86. Milanovic argues that Banković was the result of the ECtHR’s less than transparent weighing 
of competing policy considerations, and its ultimate desire to come up with a superficial, legalistic 
rationale that would justify making the extraterritorial application of the ECHR exceptional, in 
Milanovic, ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda’ (n 6) 123. See further Wilde, ‘Legal “Black Hole”?’ (n 24) 739; 
Damira Kamchibekova, ‘State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations’ (2007) 13 
Buffalo Human Rts L Rev (2007) 87. See John Cerone, ‘Out of Bounds? Considering the Reach of 
International Human Rights Law’ Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No 5 
(2006). Olivier de Schutter, ‘Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2006) 6 Baltic YBIL 185-247; Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties (n 7) 41-52. 
48 But see Samantha Besson who does not see Banković as a significant restriction on extraterritoriality 
but can be interpreted as consistent with its previous and contemporary approach, in Samantha Besson, 
‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on 
Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to’ (2012) 25(4) LJIL 857, 869. 
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terrorists. 49  The ECtHR stated that jurisdiction is established when armed forces 
exercise ‘effective overall control of the area’.50  However, despite the large number 
of troops it appeared that Turkish troops had not exercised control over the ‘entire’ 
area in contrast to the case of Loizidou, and had not been there for a sufficient period 
of time to establish effective control over the territory.51 The ECtHR found jurisdiction 
by asking whether the evidence revealed that Turkish forces killed the shepherds.52 It 
therefore appears that the ECtHR applied a state agent authority and control test. 
A more explicit application of the state agent test applied in factual circumstances 
similar to Banković, establishing jurisdiction under Article 1 in Pad v Turkey. Pad v 
Turkey concerned shots fired from a helicopter, killing individuals from Iran on the 
Turkish border.53 It was not confirmed whether the Iranian nationals were killed on 
the Turkish or Iranian side of the border. The ECtHR stated that it was ‘not required 
to determine the exact location of the impugned events, given that the Government 
had already admitted that the fire discharged from the helicopters had caused the 
killing of the applicant’s relatives’.54 The Chamber held that the victims were within 
Turkish jurisdiction and that a state would be responsible under the ECHR in another 
territory when it exercised ‘authority and control through its agents operating’.55 In 
Isaak v Turkey, Turkish Cypriot agents in a UN buffer zone in Northern Cyprus beat 
an individual to death.56 The Chamber stated that ‘…even if the acts complained of 
took place in the neutral UN buffer zone, the ECtHR considers that the deceased was 
under the authority and/or effective control of the respondent State through its 
agents’.57 Similarly, in Andreou v Turkey an individual was shot just outside a UN 
buffer zone by a Turkish or TRNC soldier in close vicinity to the Greek-Cypriot Guard. 
58  The Turkish/TRNC agents opened fire on the territory of the TRNC. The ECtHR 
                                                 
49 Issa (n 2) para 73. 
50 Ibid para 74. 
51 Ibid para 75. 
52 Ibid paras 76-81. 
53 Pad v Turkey App no 60167/00 (ECtHR, 28 June 2007).  
54 Ibid para 54. 
55 Ibid para 53. 
56 Isaak v Turkey App No 44587/98 (ECtHR, 28 September 2006). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Andreou v Turkey App No 45653/99 (ECtHR, 3 June 2008). 
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stated that in exceptional circumstances jurisdiction would be found when a state 
‘produced effects’ in a territory over which it had no control: ‘the opening of fire on 
the crowd from close range, which was the direct and immediate cause of those injuries’ 
brought the applicant within the jurisdiction of Turkey.  
In Issa, Pad, Isaak and Andreou are examples of cases where the ECtHR adopts the 
state agent authority and control test in situations of shooting to establish jurisdiction. 
The shootings can come from the air, from the ground, or from across a border. They 
can take place in another state’s territory or in an international organisation’s neutral 
buffer zone. The ECtHR also diverges from the principle that it does not adopt a 
‘cause-and-effect’ approach to extraterritoriality. This is especially visible in the 
wording of Andreou where the ECtHR established jurisdiction because the shots fired 
by Turkish agents were the ‘direct and immediate cause’ of the death. In the same 
post- Banković period, the ECtHR found that ‘directly after being handed over to the 
Turkish officials by the Kenyan officials [in Nairobi airport], [Öcalan] was under 
effective Turkish authority and therefore within the ‘jurisdiction’ of that State for the 
purposes of Art 1 of the Convention’.59 The applicant was ‘physically forced to return 
to Turkey by Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his 
arrest and return to Turkey’.60  
Banković significantly limited extraterritoriality to ‘exceptional’ circumstances, 
applying the effective control test to the exclusion of the state agent authority and 
control test, and admitting of other limited exceptions to the rule of non-
extraterritoriality. However, following Banković, the ECtHR expands jurisdiction to 
cover shootings and physical force, using the state agent authority and control test. 
Therefore, while Banković limited extraterritoriality, decisions that followed quickly 
began to expand its application again.  
                                                 
59 Öcalan v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 45 para 91. 
60  Ibid para 93 [emphasis added]; Miller interprets this decision as giving the ECHR broad 
extraterritorial scope in the post-Bankovic period. See further Miller, ‘Revisiting Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction’ (n 24) 1229. 
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5.2.3. Jurisdiction Tests: Post-Al-Skeini 
In substance the United Kingdom is arguing, sadly, I believe, that it ratified the 
Convention with the deliberate intent of regulating the conduct of its armed 
forces according to latitude: gentlemen at home, hoodlums elsewhere.61 
Al Skeini v UK replaced Banković v Belgium as the leading Strasbourg authority on 
the extraterritorial application of the ECHR.62 Al Skeini concerned the US invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. Major combat operations ended later that year following the 
displacement of the Ba’ath regime and the USA and the UK became Occupying 
Powers, setting up the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).  The case progressed 
through the UK courts, attracting much academic interest, before reaching the ECtHR. 
63 The applicants successfully claimed at the ECtHR that the UK had breached their 
procedural obligation under Article 2 right to life to carry out an effective investigation 
into the death by British soldiers of their relatives who were six Iraqi civilians. The 
first and fourth applicant were shot during a British patrol at night, the second 
applicant was shot at night during a house raid, the third applicant was shot in crossfire, 
the fifth applicant was allegedly arrested by British soldiers, beaten up and forced into 
a river where his body was found and the sixth applicant was killed in custody.64 The 
ECtHR noted that in the case of Baha Mousa, the sixth applicant, a full public inquiry 
had been undertaken and therefore found no violation. 65  The ECtHR described 
‘jurisdiction’ as a threshold criterion and a necessary condition for a Contracting State 
                                                 
61 Al Skeini Concurring Opinion Judge Bonello (n 2). 
62 Milanovic, ‘Al-Skeini and Al Jedda’ (n 6) 121; Mallory ‘European Court of Human Rights Al-Skeini 
(n 6) 303. 
63 R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2004] EWHC 2911 
(ADMIN), [2004] All ER (D) 197 (Dec); R (on the application of Al Skeini and others) v Secretary of 
State for Defence [2005] EWCA Civ 1609, [2005] All ER (D) 337 (Dec); R (on the application of Al 
Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] AC 153; See e.g. Tobias 
Thienel, ‘The ECHR in Iraq’ (2008) 6 J Int’l Criminal Justice 115; Ralph Wilde, ‘The “Legal Space” 
or “Espace Juridique” of the European Convention on Human Rights: Is it Relevant to Extraterritorial 
State Action?’ (2005) 10 EHRLR 115.  
64 Al Skeini (n 2) paras 33-71. 
65  William Gage, The Report of the Baha Mousa Enquiry (TSO 2011) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120215203912/http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/report
/index.ht; Andrew Williams, A Very British Killing: The Death of Baha Mousa (Jonathan Cape: 2012). 
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to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it.66 It maintained 
that jurisdictional competence was ‘primarily territorial’ and applied extraterritorially 
only in ‘exceptional’ circumstances. 67  The ECtHR consolidated two tests of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction: a ‘state agent authority and control’ test68 and an ‘effective 
control over an area’ test.69 Under the ‘state agent authority and control’ test the 
ECtHR listed a number of different circumstances for establishing jurisdiction. It 
included first, the diplomatic and consular cases,70 second, a ‘public powers’ test, and 
third, it listed a number of cases where the ‘use of force’ by a state agent could bring 
someone within the jurisdiction of a state including cases whereby an individual was 
‘brought into custody’, citing Öcalan, Issa, Al-Saadoon and Medvedyev. 71  It 
confirmed that under the ‘state agent authority and control’ test ‘Convention rights 
[could] be “divided and tailored” (compare Banković and Others, cited above § 75)’.72 
It also confirmed that the state agent authority and control test and effective control 
test exist alongside one another rather than to the exclusion of one another. 
The second ‘public powers’ category recognised the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by a Contracting State when, ‘through the consent, invitation or 
acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it exercises all or some of the public 
powers normally to be exercised by that Government (see Banković and Others, cited 
above, §71)’ including executive and judicial functions.73 Under the ‘effective control 
over an area’ heading, the ECtHR stated that jurisdiction will be found: 
 [W]hen, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting 
State exercises effective control of an area outside that national territory. The 
obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Convention, derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised 
                                                 
66 Al Skeini (n 2) Ibid para 130. 
67 Ibid para 131. 
68 Ibid para 133. 
69 Ibid para 138. 
70 Ibid para 134 citing X v Germany (n 10); X v UK (n 11); M v Denmark (n 12). 
71 Ibid para 136. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid para 135. 
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directly, through the Contracting State’s own armed forces, or through a 
subordinate local administration.74  
In applying the law to the facts, the ECtHR first asked whether the UK exercised 
public powers. Evidence in the correspondence between UK and US Permanent 
Representatives and the UNSC,75  CPA legislation,76  UNSCRs77  indicated that the 
UK’s security tasks in Al-Basra included ‘patrols, arrests, anti-terrorist operations, 
policing of civil demonstrations, protection of essential utilities and infrastructure and 
protecting police states’.78 The ECtHR thereby found that the UK had assumed the 
exercise of ‘public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government’ from 
the falling of the Ba’ath regime to the accession of the interim Iraqi government.79 Its 
public power function was to maintain security in southeast Iraq. In these ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ the UK ‘through its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basra 
during the period in question, exercised authority and control over individuals killed 
in the course of such security operations’ and therefore established jurisdiction.80  
Aurel Sari and Martin Scheinin interpret the decision as requiring control over the 
territory, in the form of military occupation as well as the application of the state agent 
authority and control test.81 Most commentators interpret the judgment as requiring 
the exercise of public powers and control over an individual test.82 According to this 
interpretation had the UK not exercised public powers, the personal model of 
                                                 
74 Ibid para 138 citing Loizidou (preliminary objections) (n 3) Cyprus v Turkey (n 18) para 76, Banković 
(n 3) para 70, Ilascu (n 7) paras 314-316 and Loizidou (merits) (n 30) para 52. 
75 Ibid para 144, 146. 
76 Ibid para 145. 
77 Ibid para 148 citing UNSC Res 1511 (16 October 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1511; UNSC Res 1546 (8 
June 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1546. 
78 Ibid para 147. 
79 Ibid para 149. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Aurel Sari, ‘Untangling Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction from International Responsibility in Jaloud v 
Netherlands: Old Problem, New Solutions?’ (2014) 53 Military L and L War Rev 287, 296-9; Martin 
Scheinin, ‘Al-Skeini and the elusive parameters of extraterritorial jurisdiction’ (2011) 5 EHRLR 566, 
579. 
82 Milanovic, ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda’ (n 6) 130; Paolo Ronchi, 'The Borders of Human Rights' (2012) 
128 LQR 20.  
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jurisdiction would not have applied.  At first sight, this combined test approach – an 
approach requiring the exercise of public powers and control over the individual - 
indicates that a high level of control was required in order to make the ECHR 
applicable under Article 1. However, the substance of public powers is ambiguous and 
arguably any action by a state agent could be construed as a public power. 83 
Importantly, although it clarified a number of grounds upon which jurisdiction could 
be established, Al Skeini v UK did not overrule the finding in Banković that Article 1 
jurisdiction was ‘primarily territorial’ and exceptional in nature. Anna Cowan finds 
that Al Skeini does not represent a significant departure from Banković.84  First, she 
states that although Al Skeini, unlike Banković, does recognise the state agent authority 
and control test, Al Skeini does not condone ‘cherry picking’ i.e. it does not allow 
states to choose which rights they protect when they have control and does not 
condone a cause and effect approach to extraterritoriality.85 Second, she argues that 
the ‘effective control’ test put forward in Banković, is consistent with the two tests of 
effective control and state agent authority and control put forward by Al Skeini: 
If the comma is placed after “occupation” [in Banković], it reads as if the Court 
is maintaining the typical distinction between effective control of territory (or 
the spatial model of jurisdiction) and a situation where the state’s authorities 
are exercising public powers with the local government’s 
consent/invitation/acquiescence, which can be interpreted as a formulation of 
state agent authority exception (or the personal model of jurisdiction).86  
The main problem with this argument is that there is not a comma after ‘occupation’ 
in Banković. The decision to exclude a comma indicates that the ECtHR meant that 
occupation and public powers not be distinguished as two tests. Just because a mere 
                                                 
83 See e.g. Samantha Miko, ‘Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the 
European Convention for Human Rights’ (2013) 35(3) Boston College Intl and Comp L Rev 63, 77; 
Cedric Ryngaert, ‘LJIL Symposium: Response to Samantha Besson’ (Opinio Juris 21 December 2012) 
available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2012/12/21/ljil-symposium-response-to-samantha-besson/> last 
accessed 13 June 2016.  
84 Anna Cowan, ‘A New Watershed? Re-evaluating Banković in Light of Al Skeini’ (2012) (1)1 CJICL 
213, 213-4. 
85 Ibid 222. 
86 Ibid 223. 
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comma would change the meaning to be consistent with Al Skeini, does not mean that 
including a comma would be a simple alteration to the text.87  Furthermore, the ECtHR 
found in Banković that rights could not be ‘divided or tailored’ which indicates that 
they were not advocating the application of a ‘state agent authority and control’ test 
alongside an ‘effective control over an area’ test. Milanovic appears to agree that Al 
Skeini does not represent a significant departure from Banković. He maintains that Al 
Skeini is consistent with Banković: ‘[w]hile the ability to kill is ‘authority and control’ 
over the individual if the state has public powers, killing is not authority and control 
if the state is merely firing missiles from an aircraft’.88 He acknowledges that Al Skeini 
and Banković do not account for cases such as Issa, Pad and Isaak.89 The NATO 
bombers exercised sufficient authority and control to meet their target of the RTS in 
Banković. Conall Mallory concludes that although Al Skeini is an ‘enhancement and 
clarification’ of the concept of jurisdiction, ‘it builds on the previous jurisprudence of 
the Strasbourg bodies rather than radically re-writing [it]’.90 While the reasoning is not 
radical, it stands up to Banković in making the extraterritorial application of the ECHR 
abroad less of an exception. Relative to the Banković decision, Al Skeini, on principle, 
recognises an expansion of extraterritoriality. However, it also appears to have applied 
a more restrictive approach than the Issa, Pad, Andreou, Issaak and Öcalan decisions, 
because of the introduction of a public powers test.  
The post-Al Skeini period is marked by debates concerning whether the ECtHR’s 
approach fits into the traditional extraterritoriality tests of state agent authority and 
control and effective control over an area that predominantly account for the ECtHR’s 
approach up until and including Al Skeini. It is a matter of contention whether Jaloud,91 
which concerns a shootout at a checkpoint, employs a state agent authority and control 
test, incorporating the requirement of exercising a ‘public power’, or only an 
                                                 
87  See e.g. Lynne Truss, Eats, Shoots & Leaves: The Zero Tolerance Approach to Punctuation 
(HarperCollins 2011). Alternatively, there may have been no emphasis placed on the comma at the time 
of the decision. The comma may as a result have no bearing on the meaning that was adopted. 
88 Milanovic, ‘Al Skeini and Al Jedda’ (n 6) 131. 
89 Ibid 131.  
90 Mallory, ‘European Court of Human Rights Al-Skeini’ (n 6) 302. 
91 Jaloud (n 1). For a similar factual situation see Pisari v The Republic of Moldova and Russia App No 
42139/12 (ECtHR, 21 April 2015). 
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attribution test at the exclusion of tests of extraterritoriality.92 Furthermore, decisions 
such as Catan, Chiragov, Ivantoc and Mozer, that have a similar factual context to 
Ilascu, are ambiguous in terms of whether an extraterritoriality or attribution test is 
applied. 93  There appears to be a significant decline in the importance of an 
extraterritoriality test at the ECtHR. Instead, the ECtHR appears to assume 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and place emphasis on the merits for deciding the outcome 
of the case.  
5.2.4. Jurisdiction Tests: Conclusion 
The ECtHR has progressively lowered the jurisdiction threshold by applying the state 
agent authority and control test to increasingly different factual circumstances and the 
effective control over an area test is applied no longer to the exclusion of the former 
post-Al Skeini. Diplomatic and consular cases form a consistent part of the 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence pre-Banković. Anomalous exceptional factual 
circumstances and the Loizidou (preliminary objections) judgment that introduced the 
effective control over an area test also mark that period. Banković limits the scope of 
extraterritoriality by finding it only in ‘exceptional’ circumstances, and requires 
enforcement of the entire scope of the ECHR under the ‘effective control over an area’ 
test, emphasising the high threshold required to meet jurisdiction. It denies a ‘cause-
and-effect’ notion of jurisdiction and general application of a ‘state agent authority 
and control’ test. After this decision, however, Issa, Pad, Isaac and Andreou, 
contradict Banković finding that shooting and aerial bombing trigger the application 
of the ECHR abroad.  Al Skeini consolidates the ‘state agent and authority and control’ 
test which was denied in Banković. However, the ‘public powers’ requirement 
arguably limits the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The post-Al Skeini period then 
marks a move away from the simple division between the ‘state agent authority and 
control’ and ‘effective control over the territory’ tests. The significance of this change 
needs to be evaluated through another doctrinal indicator of a presumption of 
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extraterritoriality: whether Article 1 jurisdiction is considered at all in the ECtHR’s 
reasoning.  
5.2.5. ‘effective control over the territory’ test 
Loizidou (preliminary objections) and Banković required a high level of control over 
a large part of another state’s territory in order to establish jurisdiction. This section 
considers decisions where the ‘geographical model collapses into the personal one [as] 
it is applied to smaller and smaller areas or even objects’ over time.94 Decisions where 
the ‘effective control over an area’ test applied to establish jurisdiction over a prison,95 
a plane96 and boat97 over time are evaluated.  
Al-Saadoon v UK applies the ‘effective control over an area’ test to the smaller space 
of a detention facility. In Al-Saadoon two Iraqi members of the Ba’ath party were 
arrested in 2003 in Basra, Iraq, by British forces because they allegedly posed a threat 
to them. 98  The British forces were occupying powers in Basra at the time. The 
detainees were transferred from the US detention centre, Camp Bucca, to British run 
detention facilities where they stayed for over five years, after which time Iraqi 
authority requested their transfer to Iraqi custody. The applicants brought an 
application under articles 2 (right to life), 3 (right against torture and inhumane 
treatment), and 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 1 of Protocol No 13 (abolition of the 
death penalty). 99 When dealing with the admissibility issue, the Chamber noted that 
the UK was an occupying power in Iraq and had two detention facilities on Iraqi 
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territory as a result of military force. While the exercise of ‘control and authority over 
the individual’ was initially due to the de facto control of the territory in which the 
detention facilities were located, the ‘exclusive control and authority over the 
detention facilities’ were subsequently authorised in law under the CPA Order No 17 
(Revised) 24 June 2004. This provision remained in force until midnight on 31 
December 2008.100 The ECtHR concluded on jurisdiction that ‘[g]iven the total and 
exclusive de facto, and subsequently also de jure, control exercised by the UK 
authorities over the premises in question, the individuals detained there, including the 
applicants, were within the UK’s jurisdiction …’.101 In the merits, the ECtHR stated 
that ‘the respondent State’s armed forces, having entered Iraq, took active steps to 
bring the applicants within the UK’s jurisdiction, by arresting them and holding them 
in British-run detention facilities’.102  
Another relevant decision considering control over a space was the case of Medvedyev 
concerning jurisdiction established on a ship. Pre- Banković, decisions considering 
jurisdiction on state-owned ships and aircraft applied the ‘nationality’ principle with 
‘diplomatic and consular premises’ including state flag ships and planes. Therefore, a 
victim of a rights violation situated on the respondent state’s plane or boat would 
trigger jurisdiction under the ECHR. 103   Post-Banković, the ECtHR found that 
jurisdiction could be established when the respondent state committed the violation on 
board a ship that was not owned by them by asking whether the state exercised control 
over the ship. In Medvedyev v France, the applicants were crew members on a 
merchant ship flying the Cambodian flag. Believing that the ship was carrying large 
quantities of drugs and after obtaining permission from Cambodian authorities to do 
so, French authorities searched the ship and detained those aboard. 104 The ship was 
then brought to a French port where the applicants were brought before a court. The 
Grand Chamber reasoned that jurisdiction could not be found under article 1 through 
‘instantaneous extraterritorial acts’ 105  but could be found in cases ‘involving the 
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activities of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad and on board aircraft and ships 
registered in, or flying the flag of, that State’.106 It stated that France had jurisdiction 
under Article 1 because it ‘… exercised full and exclusive control over the [boat] and 
its crew, at least de facto, from the time of its interception, in a continuous and 
uninterrupted manner until they were tried in France’.107 Milanovic states that this is 
an example of control exercised over an individual.108 The same question of whether 
the ECtHR applied a control over an area or control over an individual test arose in 
the context of another transport vehicle, planes. Carlos Ramirez Sanchez, otherwise 
known as Carlos the Jackal, fled to Sudan because French and US authorities wanted 
to arrest him for engaging in terrorist activities. He was handed over to the French 
agents in an airport in Yugoslavia and flown on a French military plane to Paris where 
he was tried and convicted. He brought an action under article 5 for his arrest. What 
mattered to the ECtHR ‘was that Carlos was handed to French officers, not that he was 
put on a French-flagged plane’.109 
The ECtHR listed a number of cases where the ‘use of force’ by a state agent could 
bring someone within the jurisdiction of a state including cases whereby an individual 
was ‘brought into custody’ providing the examples of Öcalan, Issa, Al-Saadoon, and 
Medvedyev.110 It did not consider that jurisdiction was found in those cases ‘solely’ 
because of the ‘control exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft 
or ship’ where each individual was held. What was ‘decisive’ was the ‘exercise of 
physical power’ over the person.111 Milanovic has argued that the word ‘solely’ leaves 
open the possibility of applying the spatial model to these cases rather than an 
authority and control over the individual model.112 Either way, conceptualising those 
decisions as applying over a smaller space has lead the ECtHR closer to bridging the 
gap between the state agent authority and control test and effective control over an 
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area test. In the post-Al Skeini decision of Hirsi, 113 the ECtHR finally bridged that gap.  
The Grand Chamber unanimously found a violation of Article 3, Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4 (prohibiting collective expulsion) and a violation of Article 13 (guarantee of a 
domestic remedy). The applicants had left Libya for Italy on three vessels. When the 
applicants were within the Maltese Search and Rescue Region of responsibility, they 
were intercepted by the Italian Revenue Police and Coastguard, transferred onto Italian 
military ships and sent to Tripoli. In Tripoli, the Italian authorities handed the 
applicants over to the Libyan authorities. The ECtHR acknowledged that the events 
had occurred on the high seas on military ships flying the Italian flag and the applicants 
were transferred onto ships situated within Italian jurisdiction.114 It stated  ‘by virtue 
of the relevant provisions of the law of the sea, a vessel sailing on the high seas is 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State of the flag it is flying’ and that the 
ECtHR has found jurisdiction of a state on a ship flying a state’s flag.115 But then 
added that ‘[w]here there is control over another, this is de jure control exercised by 
the State in question over the individuals concerned’116 and ‘the applicants were under 
the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities’. 117 
The ECtHR placed emphasis on the fact that ‘the events took place entirely on board 
ships of the Italian armed forces, the crews of which were composed exclusively of 
Italian military personnel’118 but the control over the individual was decisive.  
It appears that the ECtHR uses a state agent authority and control test where it would 
previously use a control over an area test in decisions concerning vessels or buildings.  
This represents a complete collapse of the effective control over an area test to the 
state agent authority and control test of jurisdiction. This lowering of the jurisdiction 
threshold illustrates that the emerging approach of the ECtHR post-Al Skeini is a 
presumption of extraterritoriality.  
5.3. Espace juridique 
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This section considers the espace juridique principle in the ECtHR’s extraterritoriality 
jurisprudence, when the ECtHR adopted it and whether it is still in operation now. 
Espace juridique refers to the principle that only individuals situated within the 
Council of Europe can bring an application to the ECtHR. When the espace juridique 
principle no longer applies, individuals who are directly affected by Member States in 
a way that contravenes their democratic entitlements as defined by the ECHR rights 
have recourse to the ECtHR as a forum for democratic accountability.  
Pre- Banković, decisions such as X v Germany and X v UK do not acknowledge an 
espace juridique principle. In X v Germany the rights violation was carried out in 
Morocco by German consular authorities and in X v UK the British Consul was 
accountable for failing to have a child returned from Jordan. Although the applicant 
mother was British and situated in British territory at the time, the decision required 
the British Consul to act abroad in order to fulfil its ECHR obligations. Neither 
Morocco nor Jordan are signatories to the ECHR and therefore, the ECHR operated 
outside of the Council of Europe. The espace juridique principle was not applicable 
pre-Banković. In Issa and Pad the ECtHR held Turkey accountable for its actions in 
Iran, and in Isaak, a shooting in the neutral UN buffer zone triggered jurisdiction. 
Therefore, post- Banković, the ECtHR does not adhere to the espace juridique 
principle. Banković explicitly restricted its application to violations occurring within 
the ECHR ‘legal space’.119 In Al Skeini the ECtHR stated that the ECHR did not 
purport to govern the actions of States not Parties to it and it did not purport to require 
the Contracting States to impose ECHR standards on other States.120 The ECtHR then 
continued cryptically: 
The Court has emphasised that, where the territory of one Convention State is 
occupied by the armed forces of another, the occupying State should in 
principle be held accountable under the Convention for breaches of human 
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rights within the occupied territory, because to hold otherwise would be to 
deprive the population of that territory of the rights and freedoms hitherto 
enjoyed and would result in a “vacuum” of protection with the “legal space of 
the Convention” (see Cyprus v Turkey, cited above, §78, and Banković and 
Others, cited above, §80). However, the importance of establishing the 
occupying State’s jurisdiction in such cases does not imply, a contrario, that 
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention can never exist outside the 
territory covered by the Council of Europe member States. The Court has not 
in its case-law applied any such restriction (see, among other examples, 
Öcalan; Issa and Others; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi; and Medvedyev and Others, 
all cited above).121 
This passage could be interpreted as finding that the espace juridique test still applies 
for the effective control over an area test but not for the state agent authority and 
control test. The ECtHR cites effective control over an area decisions in reference to 
the ‘legal space of the Convention’, and state agent authority and control decisions 
following the statement that ‘the Court has not in its case law applied any such 
restrictions’. A closer reading suggests that the ECtHR is trying to articulate a more 
nuanced position on the legal space of the ECHR. The ECtHR explicitly denies that 
the espace juridique principle ever existed as a restriction. Rather, it is in place to 
emphasise that there should not be a vacuum of ECHR protection within that space.  
Milanovic states that espace juridique was a red herring or a ‘fishy French phrase’122 
in Banković but at least Al Skeini confirmed that the doctrine applied for both the 
personal and the spatial conceptions of jurisdiction. 123  It therefore appears that 
Banković represented an anomalous decision, wherein the espace juridique principle 
applied to restrict protection under the ECHR, rather than to use the legal space of the 
ECHR as a justification for extraterritorial protection. Otherwise, the ECtHR presumes 
a presumption of extraterritoriality: the ECHR applies outside the legal space of the 
Council of Europe.  
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5.4. Article 1 Jurisdiction and Attribution  
Section 3.6.2 in Chapter 3 demonstrated that a conflation of Article 1 jurisdiction with 
attribution indicated a reversal of the presumption against extraterritoriality because it 
indicates that the ECtHR has skipped the question of whether the ECHR is triggered 
and moved onto the question as to who should be held responsible. Whether Loizidou 
(preliminary objections), which introduced the effective control over a territory test, 
is indeed an extraterritoriality test or an attribution test is still ambiguous.  Later 
decisions interpret the Loizidou precedent in different ways. This section assesses 
whether there is a prevailing approach.  
Both Ilascu and Catan concerned rights violations carried out by the Moldovan 
Republic of Transdniestria (MRT). Following the declaration of the Republic of 
Moldova in June 1990, the 14th Russian Army aided Transdniestrian separatists to set 
up the MRT in September 1990.124 In Ilascu, Russia was found to have violated Article 
3 (right against torture and inhumane and degrading treatment and punishment) and 
Article 5 (right to liberty and security) with regards to all of the applicants concerned 
from the date of its ratification of the ECHR. 125  The judgment was focused 
predominantly upon establishing links between Russia and the MRT itself which 
included its historical links: during the Moldovan conflict in 1991-1992, forces of the 
14th Russian Army stationed in Transdniestria fought with and on behalf of the 
Transdniestrian separatist forces; 126  throughout ‘clashes between the Moldovan 
authorities and the Transdniestrian separatists, the leaders of the Russian Federation 
supported the separatist authorities by their political declarations’; 127  Russia had 
provided the separatists with large quantities of weapons;128 separatists had seized 
possession of other weapons unopposed by Russian soldiers.129 In terms of the present 
day connections between Russia and the MRT, the ECtHR attached particular 
importance to the fact that the MRT enjoyed financial support from the Russian 
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Federation.130 The Russian Federation cleared the MRT’s debt to it, supplied gas to 
Transdniestria on better financial terms than to Moldova, and state-controlled 
companies of the Russian Federation entered into commercial relations with 
companies in the MRT.131 The fact that Russia helped to install the MRT with military 
aid, and enabled its survival with financial aid, were crucial to holding Russia 
responsible for the acts of the MRT. The point of emphasis was whether there was 
sufficient control or influence exercised by Russia over the MRT rather than sufficient 
control over the territory.  
The ECtHR noted that after the ceasefire the ‘Russian Federation continued to provide 
military, political and economic support to the separatist regime…, thus enabling it to 
survive by strengthening itself and by acquiring a certain amount of autonomy vis-à-
vis Moldova’.132 The ECtHR did not use positive obligations to explain Russia’s 
extraterritorial obligations under the ECHR despite the fact that it used positive 
obligations to explain the obligations of Moldova—the territorial state on which the 
separatist regime was situated. 133  If the ECtHR had intended to use a positive 
obligations explanation in relation to Russia’s extraterritorial obligations, it had 
created an opening for doing so. The fact that it did not provide a positive obligations 
explanation suggests that the test applied was an attribution test.  
In Catan the ECtHR went into much greater detail concerning both the historical and 
contemporary links between Russia and the MRT.134 It repeated the factors that it had 
considered crucial in Ilascu 135  and also added more specific considerations. For 
example, it noted that in April 1992, the Russian Army stationed in Transdniestria 
intervened in the conflict allowing the separatists to gain possession of Tighnia.136 The 
Russian public corporation Gazprom supplied gas to the region and the MRT paid for 
only a tiny fraction of the gas consumed.137 Furthermore, the Russian Government had 
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spent millions of US dollars every year in the form of humanitarian aid to the 
population of Transdniestria, including the payment of old age pensions, financial 
assistance to schools, hospitals and prisons. 138  This was even more significant 
considering the fact that only 20% of the MRT population was economically active.139 
It appears the ECtHR attempted to demonstrate the control and influence that Russia 
had on the MRT in order to attribute the actions of the MRT to Russia. 
In contrast to Ilascu and Catan, which appeared to apply an attribution test, the cases 
of Banković140 and Saddam Hussein v Albania141 applied a control over the territory 
test. As described above, Banković  found jurisdiction when ‘through the effective 
control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military 
occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of 
that territory’ the respondent state ‘exercises all or some of the public powers normally 
to be exercised by that Government’.142 In applying this test, the ECtHR expressly 
asserted that ‘the scope of Article 1…is determinative of the very scope of the 
Contracting Parties’ positive obligations and, as such, of the scope and reach of the 
entire Convention system’.143 It rejected a ‘cause-and-effect’ notion of jurisdiction 
meaning that it rejected the idea that a state could be held responsible for a specific, 
singular incident of rights-violation abroad, but would rather be held responsible under 
the entire breadth of the ECHR towards everyone within that territory.144 In this way 
rights under the ECHR could not be ‘divided and tailored’.145 The ECtHR found in 
that case that the NATO states carrying out the bombing did not exercise sufficient 
‘control over the territory’ to establish Article 1 jurisdiction because there had been 
no military occupation and no exercise of public powers. Saddam Hussein v Albania 
also adopted the ‘control of the territory’ test.146 Without any thorough analysis of the 
nature of the control exercised by any of the states over the territory of Iraq, the ECtHR 
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concluded that Hussein had not demonstrated that any of the states had ‘control of the 
territory where the alleged violations took place’ citing Loizidou v Turkey and Cyprus 
v Turkey.147  
The test in Loizidou (preliminary objections) is ambiguous and can be interpreted to 
mean an attribution or control over the territory test: perhaps Turkey had responsibility 
under the ECHR in Northern Cyprus because of its control over the TRNC or over the 
territory in Northern Cyprus. However, it is clear in Ilascu and Catan that the ECtHR 
focused on establishing a control link between the respondent state and the separatist 
regime, the MRT, rather than control over the territory; and Banković and Hussein 
both explicitly applied the control over the territory approach. Post-Al Skeini decisions 
such as Chiragov v Armenia and Jaloud v Netherlands.148 indicate that the ECtHR is 
increasingly skipping the extraterritoriality question to answer questions of attribution.  
Chiragov v Armenia concerned the right of displaced persons to access their property 
after a conflict.149 The case had similar factual circumstances to Ilascu and Catan as 
the ECtHR found that Armenia exercised effective overall control over a separatist 
entity, the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ (NKR), to establish admissibility.150 The 
ECtHR decided that the Republic of Armenia had significant and decisive influence 
over the NKR, in line with the Ilascu and Catan decisions.151 Milanovic stated that 
‘the overall picture coming from Chiragov is that it confirms the post-Al Skeini trend 
that the ECtHR is now likely to find Article 1 jurisdiction’.152  
The ECtHR in Jaloud uses an attribution test to the exclusion of an extraterritoriality 
test in an Al Skeini-type context i.e. establishing jurisdiction through the act of 
shooting. In Jaloud, an unknown car sped through a vehicle checkpoint in South 
Eastern Iraq.153 The personnel guarding the checkpoint were members of the Iraqi 
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Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). A Dutch Lieutenant, who had been called to the 
checkpoint by the ICDC due to security fears, fired shots at the car speeding through 
the checkpoint, killing one passenger.154 It was not clear whether any of the ICDC had 
fired shots.155 Under the same category of ‘jurisdiction’ the ECtHR then addressed to 
whom actions should be attributed. The ECtHR stated that the respondent state was: 
 …not divested of its “jurisdiction”, within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention, solely by dint of having accepted the operational control of the 
commander of the MND (SE), a United Kingdom officer. The Court notes that 
the Netherlands retained “full command” over its military personnel, as the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence pointed out in their letter to 
Parliament (see para 57 above)… The practical elaboration of the multinational 
force was shaped by a network of Memoranda of Understanding defining the 
interrelations between the various armed contingents present in Iraq. The letter 
sent to the Lower House of Parliament on 6 June 2003 by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Defence (see paragraph 57 above) emphasises that the 
Netherlands Government retained full command over the Netherlands 
contingent in Iraq.156 
For the ECtHR, it appeared from the relevant sources that the drawing up of distinct 
rules on the use of force ‘remained the reserved domain of individual sending 
states’. 157  For this reason, the ‘Netherlands assumed responsibility for providing 
security in that area, to the exclusion of other participating States, and retained full 
command over its contingents there’.158 It did not matter that the checkpoint was 
nominally manned by the ICDC because they were subordinate to the Coalition 
Forces.159 Dutch forces were not placed ‘at the disposal’ of, or ‘under the exclusive 
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direction or control’ of any other State, referring to Article 6 of the ILC Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility and the Bosnian Genocide case.160  
Under the separate heading of ‘attribution’, the ECtHR stated that ‘“jurisdiction” 
under Article 1 of the Court has never been equated with the test for establishing a 
State’s responsibility of an internationally wrongful act under general international 
law ...’161 It concluded its analysis of attribution by stating that: 
The facts giving rise to the applicant’s complaints derive from alleged acts and 
omissions of Netherlands military personnel and investigative and judicial 
authorities. As such they are capable of giving rise to the responsibility of the 
Netherlands under the Convention.162 
Milanovic argues that Jaloud uses two different kinds of attribution tests and a 
jurisdiction test. The attribution tests are attribution of jurisdiction-establishing 
conduct and attribution of violation establishing conduct.163 Jurisdiction-establishing 
conduct is the conduct (act or omission) which gives rise to the control over the 
territory or control over the individual. Violation-establishing conduct is the act or 
omission which constitutes the violation of the right. He argues that the ECtHR 
resolved the attribution of jurisdiction question when it found that the Netherlands 
troops were not placed ‘“at the disposal” of any foreign power’.164 For him, the ECtHR 
addressed the separate ‘jurisdiction’ question when it stated that ‘the respondent Party 
exercised its ‘jurisdiction’ within the limits of its SFIR mission and for the purpose of 
asserting authority and control over persons passing through the checkpoint’. 165 
Attribution of the actual alleged violations was then addressed under the separate 
heading of ‘attribution’ when the ECtHR stated that ‘[T]he facts giving rise to the 
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applicant’s complaints derive[d] from alleged acts and omissions of Netherlands’ and 
were therefore capable of giving rise to the responsibility of the Netherlands’.166 
It is argued here that the ‘jurisdiction’ section (from paras 140-151 at the very least) 
is concerned with demonstrating that the Netherlands, rather than the occupying 
powers (the US and UK) or the IDRC manning the checkpoint, are responsible for the 
death of Jaloud. The ECtHR finds that being an occupying power is not determinative 
of jurisdiction.167 Nor is executing a decision or an order given by the authority of a 
foreign State.168 The fact that the checkpoint is nominally manned by the Iraqi ICDC 
is not determinative of jurisdiction either.169  What was important for establishing 
jurisdiction was that the Netherlands had ‘retained full command’.170  ‘Full command’ 
was the test applied which attributed the actions to the Netherlands, and not to the 
ICDC or the UK and US. This indicates that the ECtHR conflated the question of 
jurisdiction with attribution, and answered who, out of the different actors concerned, 
was responsible, rather than whether the ECHR was triggered abroad. 
The ECtHR states that Jaloud was killed while ‘passing through a checkpoint manned 
by personnel under the command and direct supervision of a Netherlands Royal Army 
Officer’.171 Milanovic believes this statement resolves the issue of jurisdiction. This 
more closely resembles an attribution test rather than a control over the territory or 
authority and control over an individual test and no Article 1 jurisdiction case law is 
cited in support of this ruling. The ECtHR further states that the Netherlands 
Lieutenant ‘exercised its “jurisdiction” within the limits of its SFIR mission’.172 This 
corroborates earlier statements that the Netherland’s mandate required the Lieutenant 
to be in ‘full command’ of his actions and does not refer to the jurisdiction tests. 
Although the ECtHR states that the Netherlands ‘asserted authority and control’ while 
‘exercising its “jurisdiction” within the limits of its SFIR mission’173 this appears to 
                                                 
166 Ibid citing para 155. 
167 Jaloud (n 1) para 142. 
168 Ibid paras 143-149. 
169 Ibid para 150. 
170 Ibid paras 143, 147, 149. 
171 Ibid para 152. 
172 Ibid para 152. 
173 Ibid.  
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be a rhetorical flourish rather than an assertion that it based its finding of jurisdiction 
on a ‘state authority and control’ test.  
Sari, like Milanovic, maintains that the jurisdiction test is intact. He argues that the 
ECtHR established jurisdiction from three factors: assumption of authority by the 
Netherlands over the area, authority over the ICDC at the checkpoint, and the nature 
of the checkpoint as an instrument for asserting control over persons passing through 
it.174 However, the first two factors were arrived at through an attribution analysis, and 
‘the nature of the checkpoint as an instrument for asserting control over persons 
passing through it’ was a factor which Sari had imputed into the judgment rather than 
a factor explicitly spelled out by the ECtHR. Taken together with the fact that the 
‘attribution’ section contained no further analysis, it appears that the ECtHR conflated 
jurisdiction and attribution. 
The ECtHR has progressively missed the ‘extraterritoriality’ question in cases where 
the line between attribution and jurisdiction is blurred. A conflation of the questions 
of jurisdiction and attribution happens in decisions concerning separatist regimes and 
the recent decision of Jaloud v Netherlands which entails a factual context similar to 
Al Skeini – jurisdiction established through shooting, but without the public powers 
requirement. The effective control over an area test can be divided into two sub-tests 
control over the territory and an attribution test. While Loizidou (preliminary 
objections) is ambiguous about whether it prescribes a control over the territory or 
attribution test, Banković and the Saddam Hussein decisions use the control over the 
territory test.175 Post- Banković, the ECtHR uses an attribution test in Ilascu. although 
it does not acknowledge this. Post-Al Skeini, in a similar factual context to Ilascu the 
ECtHR applies an attribution test in Catan and Chiragov. Jaloud is significant insofar 
as it concerns not separatist regimes, but a shooting by a state agent, and focuses on 
the question as to whom conduct should be attributed rather than whether the ECHR 
is triggered in the first place. It appears that the relationship between jurisdiction and 
attribution tests is becoming more blurred and that the ECtHR increasingly conflates 
                                                 
174  Sari, ‘Untangling Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction from International Responsibility in Jaloud v 
Netherlands’ (n 81) 300. 
175 Banković (n 3); Saddam Hussein v UK App No 29750/09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014). 
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jurisdiction with attribution. This indicates that the ECtHR is skipping the question as 
to whether the ECHR is triggered, presuming extraterritoriality, and moving to the 
question of who, out of a number of different actors, should be held responsible in the 
circumstances.  
5.5. Extradition, Extraordinary Rendition and Enforcement 
of UN Security Council Resolutions 
This section considers extradition and extraordinary rendition, whether they can be 
characterised as concerning extraterritoriality and their role in expanding 
extraterritoriality of the ECHR. In the Pre-Banković period, Soering was the first 
extraterritoriality decision considered by the ECtHR.176 The case concerned a German 
national who would face the ‘death row phenomenon’ if extradited to the US for a 
murder trial. The ECtHR found that it would be a breach of Article 3 if a Contracting 
Party extradited an individual to another state where the state knew or ought to have 
known that the individual would face a ‘real risk’ of being subjected to torture or 
inhumane and degrading treatment.177 Many commentators argue that the decision 
does not concern extraterritoriality because the inhuman treatment is the decision of 
the extraditing state to actually proceed with the extradition, while being aware of the 
risk that the individual will be subjected to inhuman treatment.178 In Banković the 
ECtHR stated that Soering was an example of jurisdiction ‘not restricted to the national 
territory’ but concerned the actions of a ‘person while he or she is on its territory, 
                                                 
176 Soering (n 5). 
177 Ibid para 91.  
178 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 7) 9; Gondek, The Reach of 
Human Rights in a Globalising World (n 25) 6; Manfred Nowak, ‘Obligation of States to Prevent and 
Prohibit Torture in an Extraterritorial Perspective’, in Gibney and Skogley (eds) Universal Human 
Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations (University of Pennsylvannia Press 2010) 19; Michael O’Boyle, 
‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Comment on “Life 
After Bankovic”’ in Fon Coomans and Menno T Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2004) 125, 126-7. However, there is a recognition that non-
refoulement abroad does constitute an extradition. See Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (n 7) 9.  
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clearly within its jurisdiction’ and does not concern the actual exercise of a State’s 
competence or jurisdiction abroad’. 179 
It is understandable why Soering could be construed as non-extraterritorial. A state is 
held accountable for actions taking place on its own territory. Nevertheless, Miller 
argues that it is the extraterritorial harm itself that gives rise to the rights-violation 
because of the prior territorial connection to the extraditing state. 180  Indeed, 
extradition decisions appear to be more about holding the accommodating and sending 
state accountable for the violations committed abroad, rather than the sending state’s 
thought process at the time of sending the individual abroad. The ECtHR is filling a 
vacuum of accountability at a global level, rather than merely within the Council of 
Europe. Understanding the resulting liability under Article 3 has more to do with what 
will happen abroad, and a Member State’s complicity in that, and less to do with a 
seemingly benign act of sending someone off to another state for trial. The ECtHR 
includes extradition on its factsheet for the extra-territorial application of the ECHR.181 
For these reasons, extradition should be thought of as an extraterritoriality decision.  
The ECtHR is expanding its extraterritoriality jurisprudence. While many extradition 
decisions concern the potential violation of Article 3, including risk of the death 
penalty and prison life sentences, post-Al Skeini the Abu Qatada decision was a high-
profile decision relating to Article 6 right to a fair trial.182 That decision concerned the 
extradition of a radical cleric, Abu Qatada to Jordan. The ECtHR found that sending 
Abu Qatada back to face a trial that did not meet the standards of transparency and 
procedural fairness required to dispel doubts about risk of ill-treatment would 
constitute a violation of Article 6 by the UK. This means that the ECtHR expanded its 
adjudication on extradition to include not only Article 3 violations but also Article 6 
violations, thus finding extraterritoriality in more factual circumstances.  
                                                 
179 Banković (n 3) para 68. 
180 Miller, ‘Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (n 24) 1243.  
181  ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(Council of Europe, February 2016) available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Extra-
territorial_jurisdiction_ENG.pdf> last accessed 13 June 2016.  
182 Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK App No 8139/09 (ECtHR, 17 January 2012).  
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Extraordinary rendition is also considered by the ECtHR. An extraordinary rendition 
program is ‘a euphemism created to describe the irregular transfers of individuals 
across borders for the purposes of their detention and interrogation in conditions that 
constitute multiple violations of human rights, including the right to be free from 
torture’.183 It is an extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to 
another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal 
system.184 There is discrepancy over whether extraordinary rendition is a territorial or 
extraterritorial matter.185 Extraordinary rendition decisions appear to be as much about 
Member States facilitating a global network of disappearances and torture, as it is 
about the thought process of putting them onto a plane. The ECtHR wants to expand 
accountability and any complicity states have in those programmes. They should be 
characterised as extraterritoriality decisions. 
In El Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Macedonian authorities 
allegedly, and in secret, arrested, held incommunicado, questioned and ill-treated a 
Lebanese-born German national. 186  The victim was then handed over at Skopje 
Airport to CIA agents who then transferred him to Afghanistan, where he was detained 
and ill-treated for over four months.  The ECtHR found Macedonia responsible for 
putting the applicant into the custody of the US authorities and his transfer to 
Afghanistan.187 The ECtHR found that ‘Macedonia was not (only) responsible for the 
act of handing over El-Masri [at the airport]’, 188   in line with Soering, but also 
                                                 
183 Rumy Grozdonova, ‘The United Kingdom and Diplomatic Assurances: A Minimalist Approach 
towards the Anti-Torture Norm’ (2015) I Crim L Rev 15 517-543. See further Silvia Borelli, ‘Rendition, 
Torture and Intelligence Cooperation’, in Hans Born et al (eds), International Intelligence Cooperation 
and Accountability (Routledge, London, 2011) 98. 
184 El Masri (n 5) paras 218-221.  
185 Milanovic, Extraterritrial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 7) 9. The fact of extraterritorial 
non-refoulement has been acknowledged in the context of extraordinary rendition. See further Margaret 
L Satterthwaite, ‘Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law’ (2007) 75 Geo 
Wash L Rev 1333.  
186 El Masri (n 5). 
187 Ibid para 223. 
188 André Nollkaemper, ‘The ECtHR Finds Macedonia Responsible in Connection with Torture by the 
CIA, but on What Basis?’ (EJIL: talk! 24 December 2012) available at 
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responsible for violating Article 5 during the entire period of his detention in Kabul,189 
‘imputing’ the detention to Macedonia.190 While ‘all of this seems a connection of 
unfinished and not systemically developed thoughts’191 it has significance for the 
jurisdiction question. Macedonia was held directly responsible for the detention of an 
individual by a different international actor abroad. In Al Nashiri v Poland192 and 
Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland193 the ECtHR confirmed that Poland was hosting a 
CIA black site for torturing detainees despite efforts of Poland and the US to cover up 
the truth.194 Similar to El Masri, Poland was responsible for its actions and omissions 
in respect of the applicants’ detention and transfer under Article 8; their transfer to 
places where they risked torture; 195  and their unfair trial by the US military 
commission;196 as well as the threat of being subject to the death penalty in the case 
of Al Nashiri.197 The fact that they were held responsible for what would happen when 
they were transferred, including the death penalty, torture and unfair trial, all 
corroborate the idea that the ECtHR is filling accountability gaps in relation to CIA 
operations through holding Member States accountable for their complicity. 
State involvement in the enforcement of UNSCR obligations in another territory 
should, from the perspective of traditional Article 1 jurisdiction tests, be scrutinised in 
terms of whether those decisions meet the relevant jurisdiction thresholds. Instead, 
                                                 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-ecthr-finds-macedonia-responsible-in-connection-with-torture-by-the-
cia-but-on-what-basis/> last accessed 13 June 2016.   
189 El Masri (n 5) para 240. 
190 Ibid para 235. See Othman (Abu Qatada) (n 184) para 233. 
191  Nollkaemper, ‘The ECtHR Finds Macedonia Responsible in Connection with Torture by the CIA, 
but on What Basis?’ (n 190).  
192 Al Nashiri v Poland (2015) 60 EHRR 16.  
193 Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland (2015) 60 EHRR 16   
194 Martin Scheinin, ‘The ECtHR finds the US Guilty of Torture’ (EJIL: talk! 28 July 2014) available 
at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-ecthr-finds-the-us-guilty-of-torture-as-an-indispensable-third-party/ 
July 28, 2014> last accessed 13 June 2016. 
195 Al Nashiri (n 194) para 454. 
196 Ibid para 456. 
197  The 2016 decision of Nasr and Ghali v Italy App No 44883/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2016) 
concerned the CIA’s extraordinary rendition of an Egyptian national with the participation of Italian 
authorities. The effective remedy under Article 13 included an obligation on Italy to hold those who 
undertook the extraordinary rendition responsible and punish them.  
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UNSCR decisions are routinely accepted as admissible with no real consideration of 
the jurisdiction question. In Nada v Switzerland, the applicant was an Italian and 
Egyptian national living in Campione d’Italia, a small Italian enclave surrounded by 
Swiss territory.198 In 2001, Nada’s name was placed on the UNSC list of individuals 
allegedly linked to al-Qaeda and subjected to sanctions prescribed under UNSCR 1267 
(1999) and 1333 (2000).199 Under the sanctions, Switzerland was obliged to prevent 
Nada from entering Swiss territory, which effectively restricted him to the small area 
of Campione d’Italia. Nada claimed a breach of Article 8 and Article 13. The ECtHR 
found that while the measure was attributable to the Sanctions Committee of the 
UNSC, the implementation of the sanction was attributable to Switzerland even where 
the language of a UNSCR left no apparent scope for Swiss discretion in the 
implementation of the measure. 200  The ECtHR stated that ‘“[j]urisdiction” under 
Article 1 is a threshold criterion for a Contracting State to be able to be held 
responsible for acts or omissions attributable to it which give rise to an allegation of 
infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention’,201 citing all of the 
relevant Article 1 jurisdiction jurisprudence. However, it did not apply this principle 
to the facts of the case. It did not engage upon an investigation into whether the 
jurisdiction threshold was met. The ‘non-obvious question’ of which test of 
jurisdiction applied was not considered.202 In Al Dulimi v Switzerland, Switzerland 
was obliged to implement measures to freeze Al-Dulimi’s assets, confiscate them and 
transfer them to the Development Fund for Iraq under UNSCR 1483.203  The applicant 
successfully claimed a breach of Article 6 for the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s refusal to 
analyse the merits of Al-Dulimi’s complaint and therefore pursued the confiscation of 
                                                 
198 Nada (n 5). 
199 UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267; UNSC Res 1333 (19 December 2000) 
UN Doc S/RES/1333.  
200 Ibid para 121. Erika de Wet, ‘From Kadi to Nada: Judicial Techniques Favouring Human Rights 
over United Nations Security Council Sanctions’ (2013) 12 Chinese JIL 787, 806.  
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their assets without any procedure complying with Article 6.204 The Chamber repeated 
paragraph 118 of Nada205 and proceeded to cite extraterritoriality case law,206 but it 
ultimately presumed extraterritorial application without further investigation. 207 
Therefore, the jurisdiction question was again skipped over and the main concern of 
to whom action should be attributed took precedent.  
Extradition decisions are extraterritorial in nature. The extraterritorial harm should be 
the impetus for liability, not the action that takes place within the Member State 
territory. This is compatible with the ECtHR’s ambition to fill the vacuum of 
accountability. The ECtHR is expanding this line of jurisprudence to CIA 
extraordinary rendition programmes, taking a bolder stance on holding states 
complicit in those clandestine operations. Decisions of this ilk have only emerged 
since 2012. The expansion of circumstances where the ECHR is engaged in holding 
Member States  accountable for what other actors do on other territories indicates an 
emerging presumption of extraterritoriality in this post-Al Skeini era. The ECtHR has 
also played a role in holding states accountable for the implementation of UNSCRs. 
The extraterritoriality question largely does not feature in the ECtHR’s reasoning, 
indicating a presumption of extraterritoriality.  
5.6. Conclusion 
 The ECtHR has progressively lowered the jurisdiction threshold by applying the state 
agent and control test to increasingly different factual circumstances, and the effective 
control over an area test not to the exclusion of the state agent authority and control 
test post-Al Skeini. Diplomatic and consular cases formed a consistent part of the 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence pre-Banković. Anomalous exceptions and the 
effective control over an area test also originated in this period. Banković limited the 
scope of extraterritoriality to ‘exceptional’ circumstances, and applied the control over 
the territory test to the exclusion of the state agent authority and control test. However, 
the ECtHR very quickly began to fill the accountability gap left open by Banković. 
Issa, Pad, Isaac and Andreou found that shooting and aerial bombing triggered the 
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application of the ECHR.  Al Skeini consolidated this development by stating that the 
state agent and authority and control test would indeed establish jurisdiction. Post-Al 
Skeini extraterritoriality jurisprudence began to drift away from the traditional, 
bifurcated state agent authority and control, and effective control over the territory 
tests.  
Pre-Banković the espace juridique principle did not apply. Cases were admissible from 
Jordan and Morocco with no consideration of a Council of Europe territorial space. 
The espace juridique principle was then adopted in the Banković decision. Again, the 
ECtHR quickly changed its course from Banković in Issa, Pad and Isaak. Al Skeini 
may be ambiguous in terms of whether espace juridique applies to the effective control 
test or not, but confirmed that it was dispensed with in relation to state agent authority 
and control. Post-Al Skeini, the trend for ignoring this principle has continued. 
Extraordinary rendition decisions also concern actions outside the espace juridique, 
such as the US and Afghanistan. Although Loizidou (preliminary objections) may be 
ambiguous, in the pre-Al Skeini decision of Ilascu, the ECtHR skipped the 
extraterritoriality question to consider attribution. Post-Al Skeini, the extraterritoriality 
jurisprudence skips the extraterritoriality question much more obviously and 
frequently in decisions such as Catan, Jaloud and Chiragov. Furthermore, 
extraterritoriality fails to be considered in judgments concerning the implementation 
of UNSCRs such as Nada and Al-Dulimi where the Article 1 jurisdiction question is 
far from obvious.  
An emerging presumption of extraterritoriality is visible at the ECtHR, and therefore 
it appears it is converging towards a global constitutionalist frame in respect of 
disregarding territorial delimitation of admissibility. The ECtHR enables victims of 
illegal conduct in armed conflict, on the high seas, extraordinary rendition procedures 
and UNSCR terrorist sanctions, to exercise political control in the form of compelling 
justifications for constituted power action in accordance with the legal framework of 
the Council of Europe, and with the potential for sanctions and mandatory action when 
the action is found to be illegal under the ECHR. Whether the ECtHR manages norm 
conflicts arising from extraterritoriality in conformity with the rule of law is yet to be 
established. 
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6. Detention in Armed Conflict 
6.1. Introduction 
 This chapter asks whether the ECtHR’s evolving method of managing norm conflicts 
arising from extraterritorial application of the ECHR can be explained from a global 
constitutionalist standpoint. Following the findings of Chapter 4, the rule of law 
requires the operation of the principle of systemic integration for managing 
extraterritorial norm conflicts.1 In adopting this interpretation technique, the ECtHR 
must provide an explicit, clear and consistent narrative, as well as a reasonable 
interpretation of the external international law. 2  This chapter asks whether the 
adoption of the principle of systemic integration by the ECtHR for determining the 
rules on detention in extraterritorial armed conflict is in conformity with the rule of 
law. IHL can be applicable in circumstances concerning armed conflict. The 
relationship between systemic integration and lex specialis, a judicial tool associated 
with aiding the interpretation of the relationship between IHRL and IHL, is examined. 
3  Whether systemic integration and lex specialis are incommensurable and whether 
applying both together can provide a clear and nuanced approach to detention in armed 
conflict is considered. This chapter also asks whether an extraterritorial derogation is 
required in order for IHL to apply. 4 A comparison of the ECtHR’s reasoning in Al 
                                                 
1 See further Chapter 4, Section 4.5. 
2 See further Chapter 4, Section 4.6. 
3 See e.g. International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law : Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law – Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13 2006) as corrected Un 
Doc/A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (August 11, 2006) (finalised by Martti Koskenniemi) 208 para 412; Joost 
Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (CUP 2003) 410; Jean d’Aspremont, 
‘Articulating International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: Conciliatory 
Interpretation under the Guise of Conflict of Norms-Resolution’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Panos 
Merkouris (eds), The European Convention on Human Rights and the UK Human Rights Act (BRILL 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 25-6; Orna Ben-Naftali and Yuval Shany, ‘Living in Denial: The Application 
of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories’ (2003) 37 Isr L Rev 17.57. 
4  Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (CUP 2014); Marko Milanovic, ‘Extraterritorial 
Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Armed Conflict’ in Nehal Bhuta (ed), The Frontiers of 
Human Rights (OUP 2016) 68.  
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Jedda and Hassan is conducted. 5 This is pursued through applying the requirements 
of the rule of law articulated in Chapter 4 Section 4.6, that that the ECtHR explains 
the rules it takes into account, and provides reasons for its final decision. The ECtHR 
also needs to be explicit in how it conceptualises the relationship between systemic 
integration, lex specialis, and extraterritorial derogations. 6  This is in order to 
determine whether the global constitutionalist model best captures the evolution of the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence concerning detention in armed conflict. 
6.2. The Operation of the Principle of Systemic Integration 
The principle of systemic integration is a global constitutionalist tool for resolving 
norm conflicts in global governance. Its relationship with lex specialis, an 
interpretation technique associated defining the relationship between human rights and 
IHL, needs to be assessed in order to answer how the ECtHR should regulate detention 
in armed conflict.  
                                                 
5 Al Jedda v UK (2011) 53 EHRR 23; Hassan v UK App No 29750/09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014).  
6  Jelena Pejic, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Al Jedda Judgment: the Oversight of 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2011) 93(883) IRRC 837, 843; Gabor Rona, ‘Is There a Way out of 
the Non-International Armed Conflict Detention Dilemma?’ (2015) 91 Int’l L Stud 32; Ryan Goodman, 
‘Authorisation versus Regulation of Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2015) 91 Int’l L 
Stud 155; Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369; Serdar Mohammed v 
Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843 paras 196-244. See further Jane Rooney, ‘A 
Legal Basis for Non-Arbitrary Detention: Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence’ PL 
(forthcoming 2016); UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 35: Article 9 Liberty and 
Security of Person, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/35 (December 16, 2014) available at 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f
GC%2f35&Lang=en> last accessed 13 June 2016. For analysis of Hassan see Cedric De Koker, 
‘Hassan v United Kingdom: The Interaction of Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law 
with regard to the Deprivation of Liberty in Armed Conflicts’ (2015) Utrecht J Int’l & Eur L 90; Aurel 
Sari and Noelle Quénivet, ‘Barking up the Wrong Tree: How Not to Save the British Armed Forces 
from Legal Defeat’ (Lawfare, 21 April 2015) available at <www.lawfareblog.com/2015/04/barking-
up-the-wrong-tree-how-not-to-save-the-british-armed-forces-from-legal-defeat/> last accessed 13 June 
2016; Eirik Bjorge, ‘What is Living and what is Dead in the European Convention on Human Rights? 
A Comment on Hassan v United Kingdom’ (QIL, 12 May 2015) available at <http://www.qil-
qdi.org/what-is-living-and-what-is-dead-in-the-european-convention-on-human-rights-a-comment-on-
hassan-v-united-kingdom/> last accessed 13 June 2016. 
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This section provides an examination of lex specialis, including whether it helps to 
balance competing norms and/or whether it definitively prioritises one over the other, 
and how each conception of lex specialis affects its relationship with systemic 
integration.7 Different constructions of the relationship between IHL and IHRL norms 
are explained and an assessment of how best to regulate that relationship. This is to 
set the context for deciding how the ECtHR can best regulate detention in armed 
conflicts when there are different legal regimes and norms pertaining to the situation.  
6.2.1.  Lex specialis, systemic integration and the relationship between 
IHL and IHRL 
De deux Loix, ou de deux Conventions, toutes choses d’ailleurs égales, on doit 
préférer celle qui est la moins générale, et qui approche le plus de l’affaire dont 
il s’agit. Parce que ce qui est spécial…il est ordonné plus précisément, & il 
paroît qu’on l’a voulu plus fortement.8  
The principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali holds that in the event of two 
conflicting norms the more specialised, or the one that ‘approaches nearer to the point 
in question’, applies over the more general rule. 9 ‘Special’ means a rule with more 
precisely delimited scope of application. The reasons for letting a more specific norm 
prevail include because it is more ‘effective’ or ‘precise’ and because it ‘reflects more 
closely, precisely and/or strongly the consent or expression of will of the states in 
question’.10 The principle of lex specialis has operated in many different contexts 
including between two provisions within a single instrument,11 between two different 
                                                 
7 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 3) 237-43.  
8 Emmerich de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux 
affaires des nations et des Souverains (2 vols, Londres, 1758), Tome I, Livre II, Ch. XVII, para 316, 
511. When there are two laws or two Conventions, all things being equal, one should choose the law 
that is less general, that is more relevant to the circumstances at hand. Because it is particular, it is 
considered more precise, and it reflects what was intended more strongly.  
9 Emmerich de Vattel, The Laws of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct 
and Affairs of Nation and Sovereigns, book II, ch XVII, paras 311, 316 (1793). 
10 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 3) 387. 
11 See e.g. Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v Chile) ILR 52 (1979) 141, paras 36, 38; Brannigan 
and McBride v UK (1993) 17 EHRR 539 para 76. 
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instruments,12 in choosing treaty standards over other sources of international law,13 
and between two non-treaty standards. 14  The lex specialis standard is prioritised 
because it is more to the point than a general rule; it is better able to take account of 
the particular circumstances at hand; and the need to comply is felt more acutely 
because there is greater clarity and definiteness, creating a ‘harder’ norm.15  
The ILC Fragmentation Report clarifies two ways in which lex specialis functions. 
First, it operates where the specific and general rule ‘point in the same direction’.16 In 
this instance, the specific rule is read and understood within the confines or against 
the background of the general.17 Second, lex specialis is applicable where there are 
two legal provisions that are both valid and applicable, are in no express hierarchical 
relationship, and provide incompatible direction on how to deal with the same set of 
facts. In this instance lex specialis is modification, overruling or a setting aside of the 
latter.18 There is a split between those who define this interpretation technique as only 
operating when the law points in the same direction on the one hand,19 and those who 
believe it only operates to override one obligation when two obligations point in 
opposite directions, on the other.20  
                                                 
12 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, PCIJ Series A No 2 (1924) 31 wherein the 1922 Mandate 
for Palestine was lex specialis to the 1923 Protocol XII of the Treaty of Lausanne for deciding the 
PCIJ’s jurisdiction; While lex specialis has been applied at the WTO in determining the relationship 
between covered treaties, there have been no cases of lex specialis references between a WTO and non-
WTO treaty. See ILC Fragmentation Report (n 3) 43 para 75 FN 87. 
13  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) (Merits) ICJ Reports 1986 137, para 274: In general, treaty rules being lex specialis, it would 
not be appropriate that a State should bring a claim based on a customary-law rule if it has by treaty 
already provided means for settlement of such a claim. 
14 Case concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Merits) ICJ Reports 
1960 44.  
15 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 3) 36 para 60. 
16 Ibid 49 para 88, 50 para 91. 
17 Ibid 35 para 56. 
18 Ibid 35 para 57. 
19 Anja Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System’ (2005) 74(1) Nordic 
Journal of International Law 46. 
20 Françoise Hampson, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body’ (2008) 90 (871) IRRC 549, 558-562.  
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The question of whether lex specialis operates in order to clarify or define more 
precisely a particular rule, or whether it prioritises one norm at the exclusion of another 
is often equated with the question of whether it operates as a harmonising tool in 
operation with the principle of systemic integration or as a tool of prioritisation 
operating outside of the latter.21 However, those two questions should not be conflated. 
Joost Pauwelyn makes a distinction between apparent conflicts and genuine conflicts. 
Apparent conflicts arise when two norms appear to point in different directions but 
can be resolved through harmonisation. 22  Genuine conflicts are when two norms 
cannot be harmonised and one norm needs to be prioritised over the other. 23 
Prioritisation rules include lex posterior, conflict clauses in treaties, Article 103 UN 
Charter and rules of jus cogens. 24  He labels the harmonisation of apparently 
conflicting norms as ‘avoiding’ norm conflicts; and prioritising one norm over the 
other as ‘resolving’ norm conflicts.25 For Martti Koskenniemi, conflict resolution and 
interpretation are indistinguishable from each other. 26  Interpretation does not 
intervene unless there is a conflict. Rules appear to be compatible or in conflict as a 
result of interpretation.27 Therefore, norms are not inherently apparent or genuine, 
according to Koskenniemi, and the techniques of norm conflict avoidance and 
resolution are synonymous with each other. Rules of harmonisation, including 
prioritisation, should be used to resolve the norm conflict: 
                                                 
21  Marko Milanovic, ‘A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship between International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ (2009) 14(3) J Conflict and Security L 459, 465-470. 
22  Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 3) 272. Harmonisation is the 
‘overarching objective on the way towards enhanced coherence of the international legal system’: Nele 
Matz Luck, ‘Harmonisation, Systemic Integration, and ‘Mutual Supportiveness’ (2006) 17 Finnish 
YBIL 39, 42. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Milanovic, ‘A Norm Conflict Perspective’ (n 21) 466. 
25 There is a third type of conflict distinguished from apparent and genuine conflicts: unresolvable 
conflicts. Unresolvable conflicts are conflicts whereby it is impossible to resolve the norm conflict for 
political reasons: adopting the traditional methods of resolving conflicts would give rise to a politically 
contested result which courts would not want to be put in the position of deciding. This is addressed 
further below.  
26 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 3) ibid 208 para 412. 
27 Ibid.  
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Sometimes it may be useful to stress the conflicting nature of two rules or sets 
of rules so as to point to the need for legislative intervention. Often, however, 
it seems more appropriate to play down that sense of conflict and to read the 
relevant materials from the perspective of their contribution to some generally 
shared ‘systemic’ objective. Whichever way one goes, the process of reasoning 
follows well-worn legal pathways: references to normal meaning, party will, 
legitimate expectations, good faith, and subsequent practice as well as the 
‘object and purpose’ and principle of effectiveness. If a definite priority (rather 
than a complete exclusion of norm for the sake of another) must be established, 
this may be achieved through lex specialis, lex posterior and jus 
cogens/obligations erga omnes and Article 103 UN Charter.28  
The set aside norm remains ‘in the background’, continuing to influence the 
interpretation and application of the norm to which priority has been given.29 The 
‘principle of systemic integration is the process surveyed all along this report whereby 
international obligations are interpreted by reference to their normative environment 
(system)’.30 Koskenniemi argues that lex specialis, lex posterior and rules in relation 
to status are implicit in the operation of Article 31(3)(c) and not separate from the 
processes of interpretation. Those interpretation techniques do not ‘predetermine’ 
what it means to ‘confront’ a norm or how they may ‘enter into “concurrence”’ with 
one another. This must be left to the interpreter.31 Koskenniemi therefore advocates 
that lex specialis operates within a process of systemic integration, a position that will 
be adopted here. Regardless of whether it is operating as a harmonising tool or 
prioritising one norm over another, it is still part of the process of systemic integration. 
Lex specialis is not an alternative to systemic integration but instead is a tool used 
within that process to balance competing norms.  
Negative implications associated with the operation of lex specialis and systemic 
integration are responded to when their relationship is conceived of in this way. For 
example, lex specialis is accused of being overly simplistic when it is considered as 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid 206 para 411. 
30 Ibid 208 para 413. 
31 Ibid 211 para 419. 
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an interpretation technique that only trumps one regime or one norm over another due 
to specificity or the character of a treaty, without further scrutiny of whether it amounts 
to a fair or legally sound result in the circumstances. Adopting the ILC Fragmentation 
Report approach means that lex specialis is just one tool that forms part of a wider 
process of systemic integration, and can be used in a more nuanced and flexible way. 
Likewise, in relation to the concern expressed in Chapter 4 Section 4.6 that taking into 
account international law necessarily undermines the provisions of the ECHR, if the 
ECHR provides more specific or relevant standards pertaining to the case at hand, lex 
specialis may operate to ensure that the ECHR norm is upheld. Lex specialis can also 
be used as a means of interpreting one particular aspect of a right in relation to another 
competing body of law when operating within the process of systemic integration, 
again ensuring opportunities are available in the future for providing a different and 
nuanced interpretation of a different factual circumstance. Systemic integration, 
lexically, can encapsulate many different interpretation techniques that taken 
separately provide clear guidance on norm conflicts, but taken together can provide a 
much more sophisticated artillery of tools for negotiating different norm conflicts. The 
certainty arising from the specific interpretation techniques married with their 
coexistence under the umbrella of systemic integration provides an appropriate 
balance between certainty and flexibility. 
The ICJ’s use of lex specialis in interpreting the relationship between IHL and IHRL 
in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion32  and the Wall opinion33  has been the 
subject of much debate. The four different positions can be summarised as follows: 
lex specialis operates so that IHL displaces IHRL as a body of law in armed conflict; 
it functions on a norm by norm basis, and IHRL may operate as the more special law 
depending on the circumstances; that this rule of interpretation enables one norm to be 
interpreted against the other; and that it has no significance in determining the 
relationship between IHL and IHRL but rather, that a much more loose harmonising 
process not contingent upon lex specialis is applicable. Decisions of the ICJ are 
evaluated to see how it manages the relationship between norms and whether its 
approach should be reconsidered.  
                                                 
32 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (1996) ICJ Reports 226.  
33 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (Advisory Opinion) (2004) ICJ Reports 136. 
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In the Advisory Opinion of Nuclear Weapons, opponents of the legality of nuclear 
weapons argued that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of 
Article 6 of the ICCPR, which protects the right to life.34 The proponents of legality 
of the use and threat of nuclear weapons argued that the ICCPR made no mention of 
war or weapons; that it was not envisaged as an instrument for regulating the legality 
of nuclear weapons; and that IHRL only applied in peacetime whereas IHL applied in 
hostilities.35 The ICJ found that the ICCPR did not cease in time of war, except by 
operation of Article 4 of the Covenant in which case ‘certain provisions may be 
derogated from in a time of national emergency.’36 No derogation from the respect for 
right to life was permitted under Article 4 ICCPR: 
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in 
hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then 
falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law 
applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of 
hostilities.37 
Nuclear Weapons was the first pronouncement by an international court that IHRL 
continued to apply in times of armed conflict.38 However, there was no consensus on 
what the opinion meant for the relationship between IHRL and IHL. Michael Dennis 
claims that Nuclear Weapons advocated unqualified supremacy of IHL over IHRL.39 
The ILC Fragmentation Report appears to adopt a similar reading of this opinion as it 
states that IHL was the lex specialis in this instance because ‘the rule itself identifies 
the conditions in which it is to apply, namely the presence of an “armed conflict”’.40 
It could be inferred from the ILC Fragmentation Report that Nuclear Weapons 
intended for IHL to displace IHRL as a body of law in armed conflict. However, the 
                                                 
34 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 3) 239, para 24. Article 6(1) states: ‘Every human being has the inherent 
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’ 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid 240 para 25. 
37Ibid. 
38 Theodore Meron, ‘The Humanisation of Humanitarian Law’ 94 AJIL (2000) 239, 240.  
39  Michael Dennis, ‘Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation’ (2005) 99 AJIL 119, 139, 141. 
40 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 3) 57 para 104. 
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better reading is that the ICJ focused on the relationship between specific IHL and 
IHRL norms,41 rather than the relationship between one body of law vis-à-vis another. 
The ICJ made specific statements relating to the right to life, leaving open the 
evaluation between IHL and IHRL norms in different circumstances. 
Louise Doswald-Beck considers that it was solely in the context of the right to life that 
IHL operated as a lex specialis, prioritising IHL over IHRL, but that given another 
issue the lex specialis could be IHRL.42 She uses the example of IHRL prevailing over 
IHL in relation to judicial guarantees whereas she provides the example of targeted 
killings as an issue in which IHL would prevail.43 Pauwelyn, argues that the ICJ used 
lex specialis as a tool of interpretation. While IHL interpreted the right to life without 
dismissing IHRL: the lex specialis and the lex generalis could be applied side by side, 
the former playing the greater role of the two.44 What is being set aside does not vanish, 
but only the specific aspect that is under assessment: ‘arbitrariness’. Orna Ben-Naftali 
and Yuval Shany agree with this interpretation insofar as lex specialis was used as a 
tool of interpretation, interpreting one norm in light of another norm. They state that 
the purposes and principles underlying IHL and IHRL are the same and could help to 
influence each other on a spectrum.45 Nancie Prud’homme and Dale Stephens interpret 
the decision as stating that lex specialis is not used to give priority to one discipline 
‘in total exclusion of the other’ and that IHL and IHRL are seen as complementary to 
one another, with IHRL influencing IHL as much as IHL influenced IHRL.46 It is not 
certain whether they see the actual operation of the lex specialis principle in Nuclear 
Weapons.  
                                                 
41 Heike Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship between Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) 11 J Conflict and Security L 265. 
42 Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (1997) 316 IRRC 35. 
43  Nancie Prud’homme, ‘Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a more Complex and Multi-faceted 
Relationship?’ (2007) 40(2) Isr L Rev 356, 374.  
44 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 3) 410. 
45 Ben-Naftali and Shany, ‘Living in Denial’ (n 3) 57. 
46 Prud’homme, ‘Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a more Complex and Multi-faceted Relationship?’ (n 
43) 375; Dale Stephens, ‘Human Rights and Armed Conflict – The Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case’ 4 Yale HR and Dev L J 1, 5. 
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The interpretation of Nuclear Weapons put forward by Pauwelyn, Ben Naftali and 
Shany while preferable, was not the one put forward by the ICJ. The former conceive 
of lex specialis as operating within a process of systemic integration, with the former 
serving to offer a more specific interpretation of a rule or ensuring that one norm is set 
aside in the specific circumstances. This is in line with the ILC Fragmentation Report’s 
understanding of the relationship between those two interpretative tools. In contrast is 
the understanding of lex specialis put forward by the ICJ, as a tool for prioritisation 
rather than nuanced interpretation in the specific circumstances. Lex specialis is an 
interpretation aid within a broader process of systemic integration, rather than a tool 
for hard and fast prioritisation. The ICJ closed off possibilities in mediating the 
relationship between IHRL and IHL. It did not consider whether, even in relation to 
the norm of the right to life, whether IHRL jurisprudence may have more detailed 
criteria to deal with an effective investigation into an alleged illegal killing, for 
example.  
The Wall advisory opinion raised the question of the relationship between IHL and 
IHRL again. The ICJ stated: 
As regards the relationship between [IHL] and [IHRL], there are thus three 
possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of [IHL]; others 
may be exclusively matters of [IHRL]; yet others may be matters of both these 
branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, the 
Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international 
law, namely [IHRL] and, as lex specialis, [IHL].47 
Prud’homme argues that the ICJ ‘appeared to be promoting the complementarity of 
[IHL] and [IHRL] suggesting that in some situations only one discipline will apply 
exclusively and in other circumstances both branches will apply concomitantly’.48 
However, she notes the fact that IHL was in the end labelled as the lex specialis.49 Jean 
d’Aspremont argues that in both cases the ICJ adopted a ‘conciliatory’ approach to 
                                                 
47 Construction of a Wall (n 33) para 106.  
48 Prud’homme ‘Lex specialis: Oversimplifying a more Complex and multi-faceted relationship?’ (n 
43) 377.  
49 Ibid.  
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IHL and IHRL. 50  The principle of lex specialis was used not to solve a conflict of 
norms, but to elect which rules should constitute the primary interpretative standard in 
the application of the principle of systemic integration.51 The ICJ, by endorsing an 
interpretation that reconciled them, stopped short of finding a conflict of norms which 
would have called for the application of a conflict of norms-solving mechanism.52 IHL 
constituted the standard of reference for conciliatory interpretation. 53  Therefore, 
d’Aspremont finds that lex specialis operated within a process of systemic integration, 
used to interpret one norm in light of the other, with IHL as the lex specialis. It is a 
compelling argument to say that the ICJ in Wall chose IHL as the lex specialis for 
interpreting IHRL norms in all circumstances and that d’Aspremont’s interpretation 
of the Wall case is a correct one.  
There is some support for the argument that IHL, operating as the lex specialis of the 
process of systemic integration but as a separate principle within it nonetheless, is a 
good approach. IHL is the lex specialis, and therefore the Court interprets applicable 
IHRL in light of IHL leading to systemic integration of IHRL and IHL. D’Aspremont 
states a few reasons why IHL should always be lex specialis in the systemic integration 
of the two concepts in armed conflict. First, if IHRL were to be elected the central 
interpretative yardstick for systemic integration of IHRL and IHL, this would render 
IHL totally irrelevant.54 However, this is not necessarily the case. As much as IHRL 
evolves as it takes into account other legal regimes, IHL must evolve in relation to 
other laws and different ways in which stakeholders feel legal regimes should interact. 
A ‘humanisation’ of IHL law could take place through consistent behaviour and belief 
by state actions that such a change had taken place through customary international 
law.55 Furthermore, IHRL can provide more detail on certain procedures that were not 
contemplated by IHL such as judicial guarantees as argued by Doswald-Beck and also 
Prud’homme. D’Aspremont’s second argument in favour of electing IHL as the lex 
                                                 
50 D’Aspremont, ‘Articulating International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’ (n 3) 
25-6. 
51 Ibid 26, 28. 
52 Ibid 28. 
53 Ibid 29. 
54 Ibid 31. 
55 Ibid. 
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specialis every time in armed conflict is that conducting systemic integration along 
the lines drawn by IHRL would give rise to regulations that do not correspond with 
the reality of armed conflicts or situations of hostilities where states generally feel less 
constrained in their use of coercive means.56 While the rules on killing and detention 
provided by IHL are particularly appropriate to situations of armed conflict there are 
certain scenarios in which IHRL provide more specific criteria, or a more developed 
line of jurisprudence and judicial reasoning, such as in relation to judicial guarantees.  
D’Aspremont also criticises the indeterminacy of using lex specialis to enable either 
IHRL or IHL to be elected as the lex specialis within a process of systemic integration. 
However, there is much support for the proposition that international law is 
indeterminate in its very nature and that this is important for the continued operation 
and development of international law.57 Conversely, there are those who argue that the 
lex specialis principle serves no purpose within the principle of systemic integration 
and that the principle of systemic integration can and should operate without lex 
specialis. One criticism is that with no hierarchy and no logical relations between the 
legal framework and norms, it is impossible to identify what is general and specific.58 
Second, ‘the vagueness of the lex specialis principle generates serious reservations as 
to its ability to stand as a sound theoretical model that clarifies the co-existence of the 
two disciplines and articulates their interplay’.59 Third, as Jörg Kammerhofer puts it: 
‘[i]s ‘special’ ‘true’ and ‘general’ ‘false’?60 In other words, does the fact that there is 
a more precise rule make it a ‘better’ rule than the more general standard? Choosing a 
specific rule over a more general rule may not always give rise to the most just result.  
                                                 
56 Ibid 32.  
57 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP 
2006). This point is addressed further in Section 7.4.2.  
58 Ibid; ILC Fragmentation Report (n 3) 60 para 111; Prud’homme, ‘Lex specialis: Oversimplifying a 
more Complex and multi-faceted relationship?’ (n 43) 382.  
59 Prud’homme, ‘Lex specialis: Oversimplifying a more Complex and multi-faceted relationship?’ (n 
43) 381.  
60  Jörg kammerhofer, ‘Unearthing Structural Uncertainty through Neo-Kelsenian Consistency: 
Conflicts of Norms in International Law’ 7 (2005) European Society of International Law Research 
Forum Paper available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1535942> last accessed 
12 October 2015.  
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However, the principle of lex specialis can serve some utility in justifying the choice 
of one norm over another. For example, in relation to the specific and unique 
circumstances of armed conflict, it is important that allowance is made for certain acts 
that are essential to the very nature of armed conflict such as detention for removing 
from the battlefield, and enabling state agents to kill other individuals intentionally. 
Applying lex specialis makes sense here, because it recognises that the particular, 
unique circumstances involve the application of a rule that is more fitting for those 
circumstances. It provides a well-known legal technique to justify electing one law 
over another because of its greater specificity and relevance. In relation to the criticism 
of the application of the lex specialis principle being vague, the alternative which is 
put forward by those commentators that are convinced of the utility of lex specialis is 
the principle of systemic integration, which is much more vague and substance-less 
than the principle of lex specialis.  
The criticism of vagueness cannot, in and of itself, justify not finding any utility in the 
principle of lex specialis when the alternative is a much more vague and complex 
principle. Furthermore, in relation to the truth or falseness of a rule, such a dichotomy 
cannot be stated to be synonymous with special and general. As has already been 
pointed out, the general and special rule need not be mutually exclusive but point in 
the same direction to one another, with one rule clarifying the application of the 
other.61 In this instance, lex specialis does not claim to be providing a true meaning 
instead of a false one, but rather a clarification of the general rule.  
Françoise Hampson has argued that lex specialis is designed to deal with vertical 
relationships between general and specific regimes contrary to Anja Lindroos.62 She 
states that IHL and IHRL involve a horizontal collision between two regimes, where 
one is not a more specific form of the other.63 However, firstly, it is best not to 
conceive of the lex specialis principle operating as between regimes but as between 
norms. Secondly, in relation to certain norms IHL or IHRL can provide better or more 
                                                 
61 Indeed, Anja Lindroos states that this is the only occasion on which lex specialis can operate. See 
further, Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts’ (n 19). 
62 Hampson, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ (n 
20) 558-562. 
63 Ibid.  
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up-to-date guidance on the regulation of a particular issue. Many recognise the 
complementarity of these regimes.64 Francoise Hampson and Noam Lubell recognise 
their complementarity in the Hassan Amicus Curiae brief where they stipulate how 
IHRL can aid in clarifying and developing IHL rules, and IHL rules can aid in 
developing and applying IHRL in armed conflict.65 
Prud’homme puts forward three criteria for deciding norm conflicts between different 
regimes:66 the type of conflict, the type of protected person and the type of right.67 
Whether the conflict is international or non-international; whether the person is a 
civilian or a member of the armed forces; and whether the right is derogable will 
influence which body of law is applicable in a given circumstance, and how that law 
is applied.68 Although this is a rudimentary scheme, it can be used as a platform for 
developing the relationship between IHL and IHRL in armed conflict.  
Hampson and Lubell have appeared to adopt a similar scheme and developed further 
criteria for the parallel application of IHL and IHRL, applying them along a 
spectrum.69 In addition to the type of armed conflict being relevant, the degree of 
intensity of a non-international armed conflict may be relevant70 and whether the 
armed conflict is proactive or reactive.71 Although Hampson and Lubell too see the 
lex specialis principle as an outdated one which has no role to play in a process of 
systemic integration, one criterion they include is whether there exists already a 
                                                 
64 See for example, Doswald-Beck, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the International Court of 
Justice’ (n 42). 
65 Françoise Hampson and Noam Lubell, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief – Hassan v UK, 29750/09’ (October 
2013) 3 available at <http://repository.essex.ac.uk/9690/1/hampson-lubell-amicus-ecthr-oct-2013.pdf> 
last accessed 13 January 2016.  
66 Prud’homme calls this a process of ‘harmonisation’ which has nothing to do with lex specialis. 
However, it is submitted here that by stating that one regime’s rule is more relevant than another 
according to different factors, she is implicitly invoking lex specialis as a rule of interpretation.  
67 Prud’homme, ‘Lex specialis: Oversimplifying a more Complex and Multi-faceted Relationship?’ (n 
43) 391. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Hampson and Lubell, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief’ (n 65) 9.  
70 Ibid 9.  
71 A relevant distinction in human rights law: McCann v UK (1996) 21 EHRR 97; Ergi v Turkey (2001) 
32 EHRR 18. 
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specific provision in one of those bodies of law regulating a particular situation and 
whether it is treaty or customary law.72 The fact that they point this out as a specific 
criterion to be taken into consideration is explicit evidence of the fact that they have 
not abandoned lex specialis entirely. As an example of how these different criteria 
may be used together to determine the rules on detention in armed conflict, they 
suggest that whether someone should be interned in armed conflict should be 
determined by rules closer on the spectrum to IHL, because of the relevance of status 
of the individual.73 In the middle of the spectrum between IHL and IHRL one should 
determine ‘periodicity of review, procedural rights, rights to information and to legal 
advice and rights of communication’.74 Physical and psychological damage should be 
determined by IHRL, because it is a non-derogable right.75 The Amicus Curiae brief 
therefore recommends the operation of lex specialis within a process of systemic 
integration which places more emphasis on IHRL or IHL depending upon which law 
can provide more authority or detail on the specific issue. 
Instead of stating that IHL necessarily overrides IHRL when it applies, the ECtHR 
should adopt a much more nuanced approach in order to be in line with a global 
constitutionalist approach. Lex specialis operates to harmonise two conflicting norms 
- and does not determine the relationship of one regime vis-à-vis another - within a 
process of systemic integration by both interpreting one norm in light of the other 
depending upon which norm is more specific, and also by prioritising one norm over 
the other. Applying this understanding of lex specialis as operating within the principle 
of systemic integration to the relationship between IHL and IHRL, depending upon 
which body of law places most emphasis on a particular issue, an IHL rule will be 
interpreted in light of an IHRL rule; an IHRL rule will be interpreted in light of an 
IHL rule; or one rule will be prioritised over the other.  
6.2.2.  Extraterritorial Derogations 
Whether or not an extraterritorial derogation under Article 15 should be required for 
lex specialis to operate in situations of detention in armed conflict is a matter of much 
                                                 
72 Hampson and Lubell, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief’ (n 65) 9. 
73 Ibid 19 para 54.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid. 
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speculation.76 Those who argue that a derogation is required argue that Article 5 does 
not admit of any further exceptions to liberty than are explicitly stated in the provision. 
Article 5 (1) (a)-(f) provides an exhaustive list of non-arbitrary detention in 
peacetime77 which prohibits internment.78 Because of this exhaustive list it is thought 
that Article 5 does not leave any room to be interpreted in light of IHL and allow 
further exceptions to the rule against detention.79 This is in contrast to Article 9(1) of 
the ICCPR which appears to leave space for interpretation and allow that provision to 
be interpreted in light of IHL.80 A derogation under Article 15 is required in order for 
Article 5 to admit of further exceptions to the rule against detention under the ECHR.81  
Milanovic argues that using lex specialis to interpret exceptions into Article 5 without 
a derogation would be ‘judicial vandalism’.82 For him, ‘lex specialis…must operate 
within the permissible bounds of interpretation’. 83  He provides an example of 
unresolvable rules in connection to judicial review of lawfulness of detention. 84 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR requires a review of the lawfulness of detention. However, 
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention relating to the detention of POWs85 and 
Article 43(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention relating to civilians,86 does not require 
such judicial review. For Milanovic, this is an unresolvable conflict when you do not 
                                                 
76 Milanovic, ‘A Norm Conflict Perspective’ (n 21) 475; Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, ‘Humanitarian Law, 
Human Rights Law and the bi-furcation of Armed Conflict’ (2015) ICLQ 293, 324-325; McLachlan, 
Foreign Relations Law (n 4) 334; Aurel Sari, ‘Derogations from the European Convention on Human 
Rights in Deployed Operations’ Written Evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee (4 
December 2013) para 14. 
77 Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 39. 
78 Lawless v Ireland (no 3) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 15.   
79 Serdar (HC) (n 6) para 279. 
80 Milanovic, ‘A Norm Conflict Perspective’ (n 21) 474-5. 
81 Ibid 
82 Ibid 475. 
83 Ibid 476. 
84 Ibid 477. 
85 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered 
into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135. 
86 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 
1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287. 
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issue a derogation. However, this entire argument is based on how far you can stretch 
an interpretation of a certain provision to mean a particular thing, or how far you can 
read in exceptions to a rule. This strikes at the core of fundamental debates on 
formalism and the determinacy or indeterminacy of international law.87 Milanovic 
does not consider fundamental issues relating to the determinacy and indeterminacy 
of law. He presumes that Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention cannot be read to 
include a judicial review procedure without further investigation. Koskenniemi argues 
that international law is radically indeterminate88 and it is in this context that there 
needs to be a flexible approach to norm conflict resolution.89 While there are many 
arguments in favour of the determinacy of law, Milanovic does not provide any 
analysis of what is a permissible interpretation to support his statement, and 
Koskenniemi’s analysis is persuasive. 90  According to Koskenniemi, international 
lawyers oscillate between verifying law’s content by reference to the concrete 
behaviour, will and interest of States (apology) and the need of normative standards 
and application of law regardless of state behaviour, will or interest (utopia).91 From 
his perspective this is beneficial because while state action should not be unfettered 
and solely according to their own will, nor should law enter into a fixed morality. The 
vacillation between those two purposes means that objective international legal 
argumentation is not fully achievable, and law is indeterminate. He demonstrates this 
legal argument across a range of empirical examples in judicial reasoning, thus 
producing a convincing account, against which Milanovic provides no rebuttal.  
 
                                                 
87 See e.g. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (n 57); Jason Beckett, ‘Rebel Without a Cause? 
Martti Koskenniemi and the Critical Legal Project’ (2006) German LJ 1045. Alexander Orakhelashvili, 
The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (OUP 2008); Jean d’Aspremont, 
Formalism and the Sources of International Law. A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (OUP, 
2011). 
88 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (n 57). 
89 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 3). 
90 For a defence of the determinate nature of law see: d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of 
International Law (n 87). Furthermore, the ECtHR does find that Article 5 can be interpreted without a 
derogation in its case law and there do not appear to be signs of judicial vandalism, but instead a well-
reasoned judgment on how the circumstances of armed conflict will influence the interpretation of 
Article 5 in those circumstances. 
91 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (n 57) 58, 219. 
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Campbell McLachlan argues it is politically unjustified for occupying powers to issue 
a derogation. Under Article 15, in order for a derogation to be applicable there must 
be a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ and the measures taken to 
address that emergency must be ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’. 
While the state is afforded a large margin of appreciation or degree of discretion for 
determining whether there exists an emergency, greater scrutiny is given as to whether 
the measures are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.92 Given that a 
derogation only arises in ‘an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency’, 93 
McLachlan argues that a derogation should not apply if the state has ‘elected’ to take 
part in military operations abroad. 94  The question of whether an extraterritorial 
derogation is possible remains unanswered. There is little judicial support for an 
interpretation of Article 15 that prescribes extraterritorial derogations. The state is 
afforded a wide margin of appreciation in determining the scope of ‘public 
emergency’,95 but ‘life of the nation’ is given a much more limited interpretation and 
it is doubted that this expands abroad. 96  Sometimes it is confined to a smaller 
geographical area, 97 within the state but its definition has not exceeded the territorial 
boundaries of a state. In conclusion, it is not necessary to derogate in order for article 
5 to be interpreted in light of the requirements of IHL. The ECtHR can engage in a 
process of systemic integration without a derogation, and from thus a global 
constitutionalist perspective.  
6.3. Al Jedda  
                                                 
92 See e.g. A v UK App No 3455/05 (ECtHR, 19 February 2009). 
93 Lawless v Ireland (n 78) para 28. 
94 McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (n 4) 334. 
95 See e.g. A v UK (n 92). For a critique of the wide margin of appreciation accorded to states in 
determining ‘public emergency’ see: Alan Greene, ‘Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The 
Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 12(10) German LJ 
1764. 
96  For the argument that there is judicial support that ‘life of the nation’ can be interpreted as 
encompassing beyond a state’s borders see: Marko Milanovic, ‘Extraterritorial Derogations’ (n 4) 68-
73. 
97 Sakik v Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 662 
 202 
 
This section examines whether the ECtHR provided an explicit, clear and consistent 
narrative, and a reasonable interpretation of the relevant international law in Al Jedda. 
The ECtHR’s interpretation of the relationship between IHL and IHRL is analysed. 
An investigation of whether the ECtHR’s interpretation of IHL constituted a 
misrepresentation of IHL rules on detention is undertaken. Third, the ECtHR’s 
outcome is assessed by analysing what a reasonable interpretation of IHL entails.  
Al Jedda concerned an individual with dual Iraqi and British nationality resident in the 
UK who, on a visit to Iraq, was arrested on suspicion of posing a security threat and 
brought to a detention facility in Basra run by the UK where he was interned in 
September 2004 until 30 December 2007.98 He challenged his detention in UK courts, 
stating that the detention was in violation of Article 5 of the ECHR.99 Al Jedda argued 
that there was a violation of Article 5 because the exhaustive list of grounds of 
permissible detention in Article 5(1) did not include internment or preventive 
detention where there was no intention to bring criminal charges within a reasonable 
time.100 The government argued that although Al Jedda’s detention was not listed 
under Article 5, there was no violation of Article 5(1) because the UK’s duties under 
that provision were displaced by the obligations created by UNSCR 1546; as a result 
of the operation of Article 103 of the UN Charter, which provides that UN Charter 
obligations prevail over other international agreements in the event of conflict, the 
obligations under the UNSCR 1546 prevailed over those under the ECHR.101  
The ECtHR found no conflict between the UK’s obligations under UNSCR 1546 and 
its obligations under Article 5(1) and therefore did not need to consider whether the 
                                                 
98 Al Jedda (n 5) paras 9-11.  
99 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58; [2008] 1 A.C. 
332; [2008] 2 WLR 31Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 758; [2011] QB 
773; [2011] 2 WLR 225. Both the Divisional Court in its judgment of 12 August 2005 and the Court of 
Appeal in its judgment of 29 March 2006 unanimously held that United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1546 explicitly authorised the Multinational Force to take all necessary measures to 
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. 
100 Al Jedda (n 5) para 100, citing Lawless (n 78) paras 13-14; Ireland v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 25 para 
196; Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR 333; Jecius v Lithuania, (2002) 35 EHRR 16 paras 47-52. 
101 Ibid para 87; UNSCR 1546 (2004) S/Res/1546 (2004). 
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former displaced the latter pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter.102 No conflict 
was established because UNSCR 1546 had for its purpose the ‘maintenance of 
international peace and security’ under Article 1(1), and ‘respect for human rights’ 
under Article 1(3). The ECtHR found a presumption that the UNSC did not intend to 
impose any obligations that breached human rights. If there was ‘any ambiguity’ in 
the terms of the UNSCR, the ECtHR had to interpret the UNSCR to be in harmony 
with the ECHR. The UNSCR would only be interpreted as conflicting with human 
rights standards where there was ‘clear and explicit language’ provided in the UNSCR 
for doing so.103 While the Al Jedda decision evidently raises questions about the 
approach taken by the ECtHR to norm conflicts between the ECHR and UNSCRs, this 
chapter will focus on the ECtHR’s treatment of IHL.104  
The ECtHR converged with a global constitutionalist approach insofar as it took IHL 
into account. However, it did not expressly reference Article 31(3)(c) which is 
contrary to the requirement of an explicit, clear and consistent narrative. Having 
reasoned that IHL did not apply, the ECtHR concluded that ‘where the provisions of 
Article 5(1) were not displaced and none of the grounds for detention set out in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (f) applied, the Court finds that the applicant’s detention constituted 
a violation of Article 5(1) of the Convention’.105 The ECtHR presumed that if IHL did 
regulate Al Jedda’s detention, that it would displace the limited prescribed 
circumstances for detention under Article 5. However, this is not necessarily the case. 
                                                 
102 Ibid para 101. 
103 Ibid. The ECtHR found that the language in para 10 of UNSCR 1511, stating that the MNF ‘shall 
have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and 
stability in Iraq’ (para 103), did not unambiguously indicate that the Security Council intended Member 
States within the MNF to use ‘indefinite internment without charge and without judicial guarantees’ 
(para 105). 
104 For scholarship on the ECtHR’s approach to interpreting norm conflicts between the ECHR and 
UNSCR see, for example: Fiona De Londras and Suzanne Kingston, ‘Rights, Security, and Conflicting 
International Obligations: Exploring Inter-Jurisdictional Judicial Dialogues in Europe’ (2010) 58 Am J 
Comp L 359; Erika de Wet, ‘From Kadi to Nada: Judicial Techniques Favouring Human Rights over 
United Nations Security Council Sanctions’ (2013) 12(4) Chinese JIL 787; Katja S Ziegler, 
‘Strengthening the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting International Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ 
from the Perspective of Human Rights’ (2009) 9(2) HRLR 288; Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The European Court 
of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’ (2010) 51(1) Harvard J Int’l L 1. 
105 Al Jedda (n 5) para 110 [emphasis added]. 
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lex specialis can place more or less emphasis on IHRL and IHL depending upon which 
law is more suited to regulating the issue. The ECtHR misconceived of the relationship 
between IHL and IHRL within a process of systemic integration.  
The ECtHR addressed three issues concerning the rules on IHL. It considered whether 
IHL imposed an ‘obligation’ of detention; whether IHL imposed ‘indefinite detention’ 
and it made the determination that internment was a ‘measure of last resort’ in IHL.  
In considering whether IHL provided a legal basis for detention in an IAC, the ECtHR 
firstly rejected the Government’s argument that UNSCR 1546 authorised the 
continued operation of the IHL “obligation” to use internment for the protection of 
inhabitants in the occupied territory at the end of occupation by the Multinational 
Forces in 30 June 2004.106 The ECtHR then asserted: 
However, even assuming that the effect of Resolution 1546 was to maintain, 
after the transfer of authority from the CPA to the interim government of Iraq, 
the position under [IHL] which had previously been applied, the Court does 
not find it established that [IHL] places an obligation on an Occupying Power 
to use indefinite internment without trial.107 
The ECtHR erred in asking whether IHL imposed an obligation on the state to detain. 
Rather it should have asked whether IHL had authorised the detention.108 The ECtHR 
reasoned that Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires an Occupying Power to 
take ‘all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order 
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country’. The ECtHR claimed that this obligation was interpreted by the ICJ in 
                                                 
106 Ibid para 107. It did not explain or justify further the underlying implication that IHL did not continue 
to apply in and of itself outside of occupation and relied on an alternative legal basis. This is addressed 
further in Section 7.3. Baroness Hale in the House of Lords decision had found that IHL was not 
applicable because the UK was no longer in belligerent occupation: R (on the application of Al-Jedda) 
(FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent) [2007] UKHL 58, 12 December 2007, 
para 128. 
107 Ibid para 107 [emphasis added]. 
108 Pejic, ‘Al-Jedda judgment’ (n 6) 847. 
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Congo109 as including a duty to protect ‘inhabitants of the occupied territory from 
violence, including violence by third parties’ but it did not impose an obligation on 
the Occupying Power to use internment. 110  It acknowledged that Uganda, as an 
Occupying Power, was under a duty to secure respect for IHRL rules including the 
ICCPR. There was no legal obligation on the UK to ‘place an individual whom its 
authorities considered to constitute a risk to the security of Iraq in indefinite detention 
without charge’.111  
Determining whether there is a legal basis for a certain activity is not synonymous 
with imposing an obligation but rather with determining whether a certain activity is 
authorised. At this juncture, the ECtHR should have considered whether the 
internment was authorised rather than obliged.112 Hampson and Lubell state that the 
ECtHR in Al Jedda ‘was not looking at IHL in its own right but as a source of possible 
rules which could be read into a Security Council resolution’.113 However, while the 
ECtHR did aim to establish whether IHL could be read into the UNSCR it also made 
a separate statement about IHL in its own right as demonstrated at paragraph 107 
quoted above, that IHL did not impose an obligation on states.  
Furthermore, Pejic points out that determining whether IHL imposes an ‘obligation’ 
for internment on Occupying Powers represents a misunderstanding of this body of 
law.114 Under IHL states can intern individuals if they wish to for security reasons. 
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention states that a prisoner of war (POW) is a 
combatant captured in an international armed conflict.115 Article 43(2) of Additional 
Protocol 1 provides that a combatant is a member of the armed forces who has ‘the 
                                                 
109 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) [2005] 
ICJ Reports 116, para 178. 
110 Al Jedda (n 5) para 107. 
111 Ibid para 109.  
112 Lord Bingham in the House of Lords had stated that Articles 43, 41, 42 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention had required an occupying power to protect the safety of the public obliging the occupying 
power to detain a person who posed a threat to the safety of the public or the occupying power. Al Jedda 
(UKHL) (n 105) para 178.  
113 Hampson and Lubell, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief’ (n 65).  
114 Pejic, ‘Al-Jedda Judgment’ (n 6).  
115 Third Geneva Convention (n 85) Article 4. 
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right to participate directly in hostilities’, 116 which means that they can use force 
against other direct participants in hostilities. It is in this context that Article 21 of the 
Third Geneva Convention authorises a detaining state to ‘subject [POWS] to 
internment’. 117  In contrast to POWs, civilians can only be interned when they 
participate directly in hostilities118 or pose a security threat to the detaining power.119 
Pejic finds that behaviour, such as that in Al Jedda, can meet the threshold of posing 
a serious security threat to the detaining power.120 Pejic points out, however, that states 
are also free not to intern if they feel this would be more advantageous in succeeding 
in the armed conflict, for example for logistical reasons or in order to ‘foster trust’.121 
Lord Carswell in the House of Lords acknowledged that Article 42 and 78 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention permitted rather than obliged detention of individuals for 
imperative reasons of security.122 Therefore, IHL creating an obligation to intern is at 
odds with the purpose of IHL as enabling states to determine whether they think it 
would be beneficial to intern an individual or not.  
Second, contrary to the ECtHR’s implication that IHL imposed ‘indefinite detention 
without charge’,123 Pejic notes that Article 132 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
Article 75(3) of Additional Protocol No. 1 provide that internment must end as soon 
as the reasons justifying it cease to exist.124 In relation to POWs, the detaining state 
                                                 
116 Additional Protocol I (AP I), Art 43 (2).  
117 Third Geneva Convention (n 85) Article 21.  
118 AP I, Art. 51(1); see further, Nils Melzer, ‘ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under IHL’, ICRC, Geneva, 2009, available at 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.> accessed 13 January 2016. 
119 A distinction is made between the threshold for permitting detention on occupied territory and on 
the territory of the detaining power under the Fourth Geneva Convention (n 86). Article 78 concerns 
occupied territory. A civilian can be detained for ‘imperative reasons of security under this provision’. 
Article 42(1) concerns detention on the detaining power’s territory and states that detention of civilians 
is permitted if it is “absolutely necessary” for security purposes.  
120 Pejic, ‘Al-Jedda Judgment’ (n 6) 845. 
121 Ibid 847. 
122 Al Jedda (UKHL) (n 99) para 130. However he did state that the UK should have as much power to 
detain the applicant as if he was not a protected person as long as proper procedural safeguards were in 
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123 Al Jedda (n 5) para 109. 
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does not have to provide review of the lawfulness of the detention for as long as the 
active hostilities are ongoing because enemy combatant status denotes that person as 
a security threat. If the status of the captured individual as a POW is under question, 
however, that person is protected by Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention until 
his or her status has been determined by a competent tribunal.125 A civilian interned 
in an international armed conflict ‘has the right to submit a request for review of the 
decision on internment (to challenge it), the review must be expeditiously conducted126 
either by a court or an administrative board, and periodic review is thereafter to be 
automatic, at least on a six-monthly basis’.127 Civilian internment must cease as soon 
as the reasons that necessitated it no longer exist,128 or in any event, ‘as soon as 
possible after the close of hostilities’.129 
The ECtHR stated that for civilians, Articles 27, 41 and 78 provide that internment – 
and assigned residence – was a ‘measure of last resort’ under IHL.130 This assertion 
has been criticised.131 As was already seen, for POWs, internment is part and parcel 
of the rules of armed conflict. As a result of Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol 1 
which states that a combatant can use force against other direct participants in 
hostilities, Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention authorises a detaining state to 
‘subject [POWS] to internment’.132 States can detain POWs in order to remove them 
from the conflict if they constitute a ‘security threat’. For civilians, the language of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention133 indicates that internment is the most ‘severe’ measure 
of control that a state can apply, not a measure of last resort.  
The ECtHR therefore misrepresented the rules of IHL in four ways. The ECtHR 
incorrectly asked whether IHL imposed an ‘obligation’ of detention rather than asking 
whether IHL authorised it; the ECtHR stated that IHL imposed ‘indefinite detention’; 
                                                 
125 Third Geneva Convention (n 85) Article 5.  
126 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 86) Articles 41 and 78. 
127 Jean Pictet (ed), Geneva Convention IV, Commentary, (ICRC, Geneva, 1958) 367. 
128 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 86), Article 132; AP I, Art. 75(3). 
129 Ibid Articles 46 and 133(1).  
130 Al Jedda (n 5) para 107. 
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133 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 86) Articles 41 and 78. 
 208 
 
the ECtHR found that internment was a ‘measure of last resort’ in IHL; and the ECtHR 
failed to acknowledge the distinct treatment of prisoners of war and civilians under 
IHL. The next section examines the ECtHR’s treatment of the relationship between 
IHRL and IHL, and whether the ECtHR arrived at the wrong outcome as a result of 
misrepresenting the rules of IHL. 
Pejic argues that the ECtHR was wrong in deciding that IHL did not provide a legal 
basis for detention because the ECtHR misrepresented the rules of IHL.134 If IHL had 
provided a legal basis for detention, then she presumes that IHL would have regulated 
detention in Al Jedda, and the detention would have been permissible under IHL. An 
examination of whether IHL should have regulated the circumstances in Al Jedda, 
leading to a different result, is next undertaken. This includes an analysis of a 
reasonable interpretation of IHL rules and their application to the facts of the case. 
The purpose of this section is to expose the deficiencies in the ECtHR’s reasoning and 
how those shortcomings lead to misguided criticism of the final outcome. 
The first step in the analysis should have been to determine whether Al Jedda 
concerned an international (IAC) 135 or non-international armed conflict (NIAC). 136 
IAC rules are extensive whereas NIAC rules are not.137 Occupation of Iraq began on 
1 May 2003 at the end of combat operations when the Coalition Provisional Authority 
was set up to function as an interim government of Iraq.138 Occupation began in May 
                                                 
134 Pejic, ‘Al-Jedda Judgment’ (n 6). 
135 Common Article 2; See Further ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International 
Humanitarian Law?’ ICRC Opinion Paper, March 2008 available at 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf> accessed 21 July 2016. 
IHL treaty law also establishes a distinction between non-international armed conflicts in the meaning 
of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and non-international armed conflicts falling 
within the definition provided in Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II. 
136 Common Article 3; See Further ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International 
Humanitarian Law?’ (n 135). IHL treaty law also establishes a distinction between NIACs in the 
meaning of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and NIACs falling within the 
definition provided in Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II. 
137 The Fourth and Third Geneva Conventions provide rules on IACs. Common Article 3 is the only 
provision of the Geneva Conventions explicitly applicable to NIACs with Additional Protocol II. 
138 CPA Regulation No 1, 16 May 2003, CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01. 
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2003 when combat operations ended.139 Common article 2 states that “The Convention 
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation…”140 IHL therefore remained 
applicable during the occupation. However, the occupation ended in June 2004 when 
the CPA handed over its authority to the interim Iraqi Government. In August 2004, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross published a document stating that 
pursuant to UNSCR 1546 stating the end of the foreign occupation, it ‘no longer 
consider[ed] the situation in Iraq to be that of an international armed conflict between 
the US-led coalition and the state of Iraq and covered by the Geneva Conventions of 
1949’.141 Instead: 
[the] hostilities in Iraq between armed fighters on one hand opposing the 
Multinational Force (MNF-I) and/or the newly established authorities on the 
other, amount to a non-international armed conflict. This means that all parties 
including MNF-I are bound by Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions, and by customary rules applicable to non-international armed 
conflicts.142 
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne notes that Al Jedda was interned in October 2004, when the 
occupation had ended and the conflict in Iraq was of a non-international character.143  
The next step is to determine whether this has a bearing on whether IHL or IHRL is 
applicable. The question as to whether IHL provides a legal basis for detention in a 
non-international armed conflict has been the subject of much debate.144 Art 43(2) 
Additional Protocol I in IACS explicitly authorizes combatants to engage in hostilities 
                                                 
139 President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended (The White House, May 
1, 2003) available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-
15.html> accessed 13 January 2016.   
140 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 86) Article 3 (2). 
141  ‘Iraq post 28 June 2004: protecting persons deprived of freedom remains a priority’ available at 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/63kkj8.htm> accessed 13 January 2016.   
142 Ibid. See also UNSC Res 1546 (8 June 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1546. 
143 Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, ‘The Copenhagen Principles on the Handling of Detainees’ (2013) J 
Conflict and Security L 1, 14. 
144 Especially recently in UK domestic court cases concerning detention in Afghanistan: Serdar (High 
Court) (n 4); Serdar (CA) (n 6); See further Rooney, ‘A Legal Basis for Non-Arbitrary Detention’ (n 
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in IACs and Art 21(1) Geneva Convention III provides explicit authority to intern 
combatants Arts 27(4), 42-3 and 78 Geneva Convention IV provides explicit authority 
to intern civilians. Conversely, IHL is silent on all of these issues in relation to NIACs, 
only regulating certain aspects of them. Those who argue that IHL does provide a legal 
basis for detention in NIACs argue, first, that the absence of a positive prohibition of 
non-arbitrary detention in IHL indicates that it does provide authority for detention.145 
Those who do not find this is the case state that although states are accorded a wide 
freedom of action in international law ‘the freedom [has to be] derived from a legal 
right and not from an assertion of unlimited will’.146 Second, it has been argued that 
there is implicit authority to detain in a NIAC derived from treaty law, specifically 
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3) and the 1977 
Additional Protocol II to the Conventions (APII).  
Additionally, some have considered that protections and express references to 
‘detention’ in Common Article 3 and in APII Articles 2, 4(1), 5(1) and (2) and (6) to 
those ‘deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related 
to the conflict’ and to ‘detention’ and ‘internment’, are evidence of an inherent power 
to detain. 147  Contrarily, the ICRC has provided that: ‘in the absence of specific 
provisions in Common Article 3 and [APII], additional authority related to the grounds 
for internment and the process to be followed needs to be obtained, in keeping with 
the principle of legality’.148 In the absence of explicit reference to the power to detain 
in Common Article 3 and APII, it was necessary to provide another legal basis for 
detention. As there are so many different types of NIACs, further regulation and 
investigation of the implications of enabling IHL to provide a legal basis for 
internment in relation to all of them is required before confirming it in the particular 
situation before the ECtHR.149 Furthermore, states have explicitly rejected an implied 
                                                 
145 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Volume I: Rules, (ICRC, CUP: 2005), Rule 99: “Arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited”.  
146 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, (9th edn, OUP 1992) 12. 
147 See Serdar (CA) (n 6) para 200.  
148 ICRC, ‘Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges’ (Opinion Paper, November 14) 
8 available at <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conflict-basic-rules-and-
challenges> accessed 13 June 2016. 
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power to detain in Common Article 3 and APII because under the principles of 
equality, equivalence and reciprocity insurgents would have been entitled to detain 
captured members of the government’s army. 150  No legal basis under IHL for 
internment in NIACs is found for customary international law as the relevant state 
practice and opinion juris is not established.151 
Although IHL does not provide a legal basis, IHL can still regulate detention in a 
NIAC.152 Just because a body of law is not a legal authority for a particular rule does 
not necessarily mean that it cannot be involved in the regulation of that act. Hill-
Cawthorne and Dapo Akande acknowledge the ability of a legal regime to regulate a 
practice while nevertheless failing to provide legal authority for it.153 Ryan Goodman 
gives an example: ‘[IHRL] restricts the grounds upon which a State may detain an 
individual’, however, ‘as a body of law, does not provide the source of authority to 
detain’.154 Principles and guidelines recommended for regulating detention in non-
international armed conflict include guidelines which provide a detailed and 
thoughtful analysis of the relationship between IHL, IHRL and the law of domestic 
states as applied in a NIAC.155 For example, Gabor Rona recommends the principles 
and guidelines developed in the Chatham House Initiative156 as a good ‘starting point’ 
for establishing agreement by enough states on a ‘uniform list of “floor” requirements’ 
for detention in a NIAC.157 It states that probably the only permissible ground for 
                                                 
150 Ibid paras 216, 178-181.  
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152 Both the High Court and Court of Appeal found that because IHL did not provide a legal basis for 
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155 Els Debuf, ‘Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-international 
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detention would be for ‘imperative reasons of security’ 158  and proffers concrete 
examples of where internment would be prohibited including for obtaining 
intelligence, where the person is used as a ‘bargaining chip’, and as a method of 
punishment.159 Therefore, IHL can still regulate non-international armed conflicts 
despite the fact that it may not provide a legal basis for them.  
Although IHL did not provide a legal basis for detention in Al Jedda, IHL could have 
operated to regulate detention in Al Jedda if it was found there was another legal basis 
for detention under a UNSCR or domestic law. In Al Jedda, the UK government had 
claimed that UNSCR 1546 had the effect of preserving the rights and obligations 
(including those relating to internment) that had applied to the UK and the US as 
occupying powers in Iraq.160 Brian J Bill concurs that UNSCR 1546 authorised or 
provided a legal basis for internment for imperative reasons of security.161 Although 
the authorisation was not in the actual resolution, it nevertheless included the 
authorisation ‘through [an] internal chain of references’.162 This ‘internal chain of 
references’ refers to para 10 of UNSCR 1546 as well as two letters annexed to UNSCR 
1546.163 UNSCR 1546. 
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stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi 
request for the continued presence of the multinational force and setting out its tasks…’ The first letter 
from Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq, Dr Allawi, states: ‘We seek a new resolution 
on the Multinational Force (MNF) mandate to contribute to maintaining security in Iraq, including 
through the tasks and arrangements set out in the letter from the Secretary of State Colin Powell to the 
President of the United Nations Security Council’. The letter from Secretary Powell states: ‘[T]he MNF 
stands ready to continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute to the maintenance of security 
and to ensure force protection. These include activities necessary to counter ongoing security threats 
posed by forces seeking to influence Iraq’s political future through violence. This will include combat 
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The ECtHR found that the language in para 10 of UNSCR 1511, stating that the MNF 
“shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the 
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq”,164 did not unambiguously indicate that 
the Security Council intended Member States within the MNF to use ‘indefinite 
internment without charge and without judicial guarantees’.165 It acknowledged that 
‘internment’ was listed in the US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s letter as an 
example of the tasks which the MNF would undertake. However, according to the 
ECtHR, the UNSCR left the choice of maintenance of security and stability to member 
States. Furthermore, the UNSCR stipulated that the forces had to act in accordance 
with international law and therefore, ‘[i]n the absence of clear provision to the contrary, 
the presumption must be that the Security Council intended States within the MNF to 
contribute towards the maintenance of security in Iraq while complying with 
obligations under IHRL’. 166  Additionally, the UN Secretary-General and UN 
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) objected to the use of internment by the 
MNF.167  
Based upon the above analysis it appears that IHL did not provide a legal basis for 
detention and did not regulate detention in the circumstances of Al Jedda. It was 
classified as a NIAC and IHL does not provide a legal basis for detention in a NIAC. 
However, IHL can regulate detention in a NIAC when there is another legal basis for 
detention available. It is questionable that the UNSCR provided a legal basis for 
detention and therefore Article 5, in its unqualified form, regulated detention. The 
analysis undertaken by the ECtHR was deficient insofar as it addressed none of these 
issues, leaving it open to criticism.                                                    
6.4. Hassan  
In discussing the Hassan judgment, this section considers whether the ECtHR took 
into account relevant international law in accordance with the principle of systemic 
                                                 
operations against members of these groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons 
of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraqi security’.  
164 Al Jedda (n 5) para 103. 
165 Al Jedda (n 5) para 105. 
166 Ibid.  
167 Ibid para 106.  
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integration, whether there was a nuanced interpretation of the relationship between 
IHL and IHRL; and whether the treatment of that relationship was justified in an 
explicitly clear and consistent narrative, with a reasonable interpretation of the law. Its 
approach to extraterritorial derogations is also examined. The ECtHR’s treatment of 
these issues is compared with Al Jedda to demonstrate that its later approach is more 
in conformity with a global constitutionalist frame. 
In Hassan, the applicant lived in Basrah, Iraq, and was a prominent member of the 
Ba’ath Party and Al-Quds Army, the army of the Ba’ath Party. 168 The UK was an 
occupying party in Basrah where he lived and started arresting high ranking members 
of the Ba’ath Party. Hassan went into hiding and left his brother, Tarek Resaan Hassan 
and cousin to protect the family home. 169 When UK forces came to arrest the applicant, 
they found Tarek Hassan armed at the house, arrested him and took him to Camp 
Bucca. 170  Although Camp Bucca was a US facility, the UK continued to detain 
individuals there, and controlled the detention and interrogation of prisoners in the 
compound for its Joint Forward Interrogation Team.171 The applicant alleged that his 
brother’s capture by UK forces and detention in Camp Bucca gave rise to breaches of 
his rights under Article 5(1), (2), (3), and (4).172 The ECtHR found that Article 1 
jurisdiction was established under the ‘state agent authority and control test’ because 
of the physical power and control exercised over Tarek Hassan from his arrest until he 
got off the bus that took him from the Camp.173  
The ECtHR acknowledged the four Geneva Conventions were applicable regardless 
of whether the situation in South East Iraq in late April and early May 2003 was one 
of occupation or active IAC. 174  It then gave consideration to the types of armed 
conflict and applicable law. The ECtHR stated that Article 31(3)(c) required the ECHR 
to be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it formed 
part, including the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions which were designed to 
                                                 
168 Hassan (n 5). 
169 Ibid para 10. 
170 Ibid para 11, 14.  
171 Ibid para 15.  
172 Ibid para 65. 
173 Ibid para 79. 
174 Ibid para 108 
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protect captured combatants and civilians who posed a security threat.175 Therefore, 
the principle of systemic integration was explicitly included in the ECtHR’s reasoning, 
unlike in Al Jedda, in accordance with the requirements of the rule of law, clarity and 
consistency. In terms of its interpretation of the relationship between IHRL and IHL, 
the ECtHR stated that in an IAC, the ‘safeguards under the Convention continue to 
apply, albeit interpreted against the background of the provisions of IHL’.176 Koker 
commends the reasoning of the ECtHR for explicitly setting forward its opinion on 
the relationship between IHL and IHRL in relation to both substantive and procedural 
requirements of detention and for relying explicitly on the principle of systemic 
integration. 177 This was a more nuanced approach to the relationship between IHL and 
IHRL than that provided in Al Jedda, and more in keeping with the ILC Fragmentation 
Report’s assessment of the relationship between lex specialis and systemic integration, 
which recommends their co-application to be tailored to the specific circumstances of 
the case. 
In determining the relationship between IHL and IHRL, the ECtHR found that rather 
than trying to read one of the grounds for detention listed under Article 5(1) as 
providing for internment, Article 5 could be interpreted as including internment as 
provided for by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. It ‘[did] not take the view 
that detention under the powers provided for in the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions [was] congruent with any of the categories set out in subparas (a) to 
(f)’.178 Security internment was not the same as suspicion of having committed an 
offence or risk of the commission of a criminal offence under Article 5(1)(c). This was 
because combatants, detained as POWs, enjoyed combatant privilege which allowed 
them to participate in hostilities without incurring criminal sanctions.179 
The ECtHR found that in circumstances where Tarek Hassan was found by British 
Troops, armed on the roof of his brother’s house, where other weapons and documents 
of a military intelligence value were retrieved, ‘the UK authorities had reason to 
                                                 
175 Ibid para 102. 
176 Ibid para 104.  
177 Koker, ‘Hassan v United Kingdom’ (n 6). 
178 Hassan (n 5) para 97. 
179 Ibid. 
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believe that he might either be a person who could be detained as a POW or whose 
internment was necessary for imperative reasons of security both of which provide 
legitimate grounds for capture and detention.180 Internment in peacetime does not fall 
within the scheme of deprivation of liberty under Article 5 without a derogation.181 
However, the ECtHR found that internment of POWS and detention of civilians who 
pose a threat to security were accepted features of IHL and Article 5 could be 
interpreted as permitting exercise of such broad powers. It continued: 
As with the grounds of permitted detention already set out in those 
subparagraphs, deprivation of liberty pursuant to powers under IHL must be 
“lawful” to preclude a violation of Article 5(1) therefore a detention must 
comply with rules of IHL and, most importantly, that it should be in keeping 
with the fundamental purpose of Article 5(1), which is to protect the individual 
from arbitrariness.182 
The Strasbourg court confirmed in Hassan that it was possible to provide grounds for 
non-arbitrary detention outside of the exhaustive list without derogating. This is in 
conformity with a global constitutionalist frame which does not require a derogation 
for IHL to be taken into account. The rule of law requires adoption of the principle of 
systemic integration, confirmed as an effective tool of interpretation. The ECHR 
system will therefore not be undermined by taking into account external international 
law but systemic integration will bolster the rule of law in global governance of which 
the Council of Europe forms part. A derogation is not required due to the global 
constitutionalist technique of systemic integration which aims to strengthen the global 
governance, not undermine its constituent parts. The ECtHR found that whether a 
derogation should be required should be determined by examining the ‘consistent 
practice’ of states, in accordance with Article 31(3)(b) VCLT. 183  The consistent 
practice of states was not to derogate from obligations under Article 5 in order to detain 
                                                 
180 Ibid para 109 citing Articles 4A and 21 Third Geneva Convention (n 85); Arts 42 and 78 Fourth 
Geneva Convention (n 86).  
181 See e.g. Brannigan (n 11); A v UK (n 92). 
182 Ibid para 105, citing Kurt v Turkey (1999) 27 EHRR 373 para 122, El Masri v Macedonia (2013) 57 
EHRR 25  para 230; Saadi v UK (2008) 47 EHRR 17 paras 67-74, ECHR 2008, and the cases cited 
therein). 
183 Ibid para 101. 
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persons on the basis of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions during IACs.184 
While this aspect of the decision has been criticised for a misapplication of Article 
31(3) (b), the decision that a derogation is not required for IHL to apply has garnered 
support.185  
The ECtHR found that Article 5(2) which obligates the state to inform the detainee 
promptly of the reasons for his arrest, and Article 5 (4) which obligates the state to 
take proceedings to determine the lawfulness of the detention speedily by a court, had 
to be interpreted in a manner which takes into account the context and applicable rules 
of IHL.186 The ECtHR noted that Articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
stated that internment ‘shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six 
months, by a competent body’.187 Whilst it may not have been ‘practicable’ for the 
legality of detention to be determined by an independent ‘Court’ under Article 5(4), 
the ‘competent body’ in Article 5(4) ‘should provide sufficient guarantees of 
impartiality and fair procedure to protect against arbitrariness’.188 The first review 
should take place shortly after the person is taken into detention, with subsequent 
reviews at frequent intervals, to ensure that any person who does not fall into one of 
the categories subject to internment under IHL is released without undue delay. This 
is an explicit and detailed appraisal of the law. The ECtHR interprets Article 5(4) in 
light of the requirements of IHL, striking a reasonable balance between each legal 
regimes’ rules, complementing each of their concerns. This is in keeping with the 
approach put forward by Hampson and Lubell in their Amicus Curiae brief for Hassan, 
who advocate placing more or less emphasis on IHRL or IHL depending upon which 
law can provide more authority or detail, or reflect contemporary understanding of 
how circumstances should be regulated. Under their model, ‘periodicity of review, 
procedural rights and rights to information’ fall in the middle of the spectrum between 
                                                 
184 Ibid paras 101, 103. 
185 Sari and Quénivet, ‘Barking up the Wrong Tree’ (n 6); Bjorge, ‘What is living and what is Dead’ (n 
6). 
186 Hassan (n 5) para 106. 
187 Ibid para 106. 
188 Ibid. 
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IHL and IHRL.189 The ECtHR appears to have tried to reach a middle ground in its 
reasoning.  
The clarity and reasonable interpretation of the law is an improvement upon the 
comparatively weak, inexplicit, and misrepresentative reasoning of Al Jedda. The 
informed and improved appraisal of international law is in conformity with the rule of 
law as the former confusion elicited by Al Jedda is erased. Rather than debates 
concerning blatant and unreasonable misunderstandings of the external legal regime, 
there is a more sophisticated conversation on how best to balance the two regimes in 
relation to the particular scenario at hand. The ECtHR’s approach is clear and explicit 
so that constituent and constituted powers have a clear legal framework: they know 
the reasons behind the decision and can defend themselves according to that reasoning. 
Applicants have a better idea of knowing whether their case will be successful, thus 
enabling them to make a more informed decision about applying in the first place. 
International courts and relevant stakeholders can respond to the reasoning, offering 
further guidance and deliberation on how best to strike the balance between the regime 
in this factual scenario and others.  
In relation to Article 5 (4) which obligates the state to take proceedings to determine 
the lawfulness of the detention speedily by a court, the ECtHR found that almost 
immediately following his admission to Camp Bucca, Tarek Hassan was subject to a 
screening process in the form of two interviews by US and UK military intelligence 
officers. This led to Hassan’s clearance for release since the officers established he 
was a civilian who did not pose a threat to security.190 The Court also found that 
evidence points to his having been physically released from Camp shortly 
thereafter.191 In relation to the Article 5(2) obligation to inform the detainee promptly 
of the reasons for his detention, the ECtHR stated that ‘[i]t would appear from the 
context and questions Tarek Hassan was asked during the two screening interviews 
that the reason for his detention would have been apparent to him’.192 Because he was 
released within a few days of being brought to the Camp it was unnecessary for the 
                                                 
189 Hampson and Lubell, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief’ (n 65) 19 para 54.  
190 Hassan (n 5) para 109. 
191 Ibid. 
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ECtHR to examine whether the screening process was an adequate safeguard to protect 
against arbitrary detention.193 There were therefore no violations of Arts 5(1), (2), (3), 
and (4).194  
Hassan represents an approach adopted by the ECtHR that is more in conformity with 
a global constitutionalist approach than that put forward by Al Jedda. This is because 
of its explicit reliance on the principle of systemic integration, no requirement of 
derogation, its nuanced examination of the relationship between IHL and IHRL in 
conformity with the recommendations provided by the University of Essex Amicus 
Curiae Brief; its reasonable interpretation of rules of IHL and clear and consistent 
narrative justifying the outcome in the decision. The global constitutionalist norm of 
the rule of law captures the ECtHR’s emerging approach to norm conflicts arising 
from extraterritorial application of the ECHR.  
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the global constitutionalist frame captures the ECtHR’s 
emerging approach to norm conflicts arising from the extraterritorial application of 
the ECHR. The approach adopted by the ECtHR in Hassan was much more in 
conformity with the rule of law from a global constitutionalist perspective than in Al 
Jedda. In order to be in conformity with the rule of law, the ECtHR needs to provide 
a clear and explicit narrative, and reasonable interpretation of the law. Lex specialis 
operates within a process of systemic integration so that the relationship between IHL 
and IHRL can be decided on a case by case basis in relation to the specific aspect of 
the norms under adjudication. Emphasis should be placed on IHRL or IHL depending 
upon which law can provide more authority or detail. Extraterritorial derogations are 
not required in order for IHL to be taken into account in the ECtHR’s reasoning 
because systemic integration is a means of bolstering, not undermining, individual 
regimes from a global constitutionalist perspective, wherein all special regimes form 
part of one larger international legal system. In Al Jedda, the ECtHR did not expressly 
invoke the principle of systemic integration; did not provide a nuanced appraisal of 
the relationship between IHL and IHRL; and did not provide a reasonable 
                                                 
193 Ibid para 110. 
194 Ibid para 111. 
 220 
 
interpretation of the rules on IHL. The ECtHR did not consider whether IHL applied 
outside occupation as a legal basis for, or means for regulating, detention and what 
this would factor for the application of IHRL. As a result, the outcome of the decision 
was subject to undue criticism, undermining the ultimate result.  
On the other hand, in Hassan the ECtHR engaged in an analysis of whether the case 
concerned an IAC or NIAC; whether IHL was applicable; provided a reasonable 
appraisal of the rules of IHL; and justified its outcome according to its understanding 
of the relationship between IHL and IHRL in the circumstances. Hassan is in 
conformity with a global constitutionalist frame. The ECtHR increasingly supports the 
rule of law by using the principle of systemic integration and providing an explicit, 
clear and consistent narrative, with a reasonable interpretation of the law regulating 
detention in armed conflict. The ECtHR found that Hassan’s detention was not 
‘arbitrary’ as the internment of POWS and detention of civilians who posed a threat 
to security were accepted features of IHL. Furthermore, the requirement of a ‘court’ 
under Article 5 (4) could instead be a ‘competent’ body in conformity with Articles 
43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The applicant was told of the charges 
against him shortly after the detention which satisfied the requirement of ‘promptly’ 
under Article 5(2), which were interpreted in light of the Articles 43 and 78. An 
explicit and clear frame of reference was provided in Hassan, with a reasonable 
interpretation of the external law (IHL), and reasons provided for the balance 
established in reference to the facts of that case. The clear frame enables constituent 
and constituted powers to mediate their relationship with one another in accordance 
with the rule of law. The clarity of reasoning enables other stakeholders and 
international courts to respond and engage, whether they are in agreement with the 
decision, feel it is particular to the ECtHR system, or whether they believe a different 
standard should be adopted. The decision helps to position the ECHR within an 
international legal system, defining the significance of its standards against, in this 
case, IHL rules on procedural and substantive matters relating to detention. The 
ECtHR’s rules are significant for regulating judicial review procedures, but may not 
have as much of a bearing on establishing the legal grounds for security detention in 
armed conflict. 
While the ECtHR’s emerging approach to extraterritoriality and detention in armed 
conflict converges with the global constitutionalist frame, it remains to be answered 
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whether this frame captures the conceptualisation of extraterritoriality adopted by the 
ECtHR. The ECtHR’s perception of the function of extraterritoriality in relation to 
other concepts of international law implicates both the norm of democratic 
accountability and the rule of law.  
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7. The Function of Extraterritoriality 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 7 queries the ECtHR’s conceptualisation of the function of extraterritoriality 
and recommends ways for ensuring a clear and consistent narrative and reasonable 
interpretation of international law in accordance with the rule of law.  Whether the 
ECtHR’s understanding of the relationship between on the one hand, extraterritoriality, 
and the international law concepts of state jurisdiction1 and attribution2 on the other, 
is reasonable and consistent is assessed.  Considering that the norm of democratic 
accountability recommends a presumption of extraterritoriality, this chapter asks 
whether skipping the extraterritoriality question in order to address attribution 
undermines the coherency of the international legal system. The concern that the 
application of the ECtHR’s effective control test in armed conflict is inconsistent with 
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, and results in an unavoidable violation of Article 
43, is addressed. 3  There is consideration of whether the effective control test’s 
                                                 
1 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2012) 456; Ian Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2003) 297; Michael Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in 
International Law’ 46 (1972-1973) BYBIL. 145; Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universality Jurisdiction: Clarifying 
the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 JICJ 735; SS Lotus Case (1927) PCIJ Ser A No 10, 92.  
2 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session’ (12 December 
2001) UN Doc A/56/10; ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970 vol II (ILC Articles 
on State Responsibility); James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP 2002); James Crawford, State 
Responsibility: the General Part (CUP 2013); James Crawford and others (eds), The Law of 
International Responsibility (OUP 2010); Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Merits), Judgment of 27 June 1986 paras 105-115. Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007 paras 391- 406; Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ 16 (June 21); Prosecutor v Tadić, IT-94-1, Trial 
Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997; Prosecutor v Tadić, IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 15 July 
1999. 
3  Adam Roberts, ‘What is Military Occupation?’ (1934) 55 BYBIL 249; Yoram Dinstein, The 
International Law of Belligerent Occupation (CUP 2009); Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of 
Occupation (PUP 2004);  
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condition, that the full panoply of ECHR obligations apply, conflicts with Article 43’s 
requirement that the laws of an occupied state remain intact. Finally, the chapter 
addresses whether the concept of extraterritoriality is utilised by the ECtHR in its 
emerging approach as a barrier to engaging with complex norm conflicts in opposition 
to a global constitutionalist frame. Ultimately, the aim is to ascertain whether a 
presumption of extraterritoriality, which promotes democratic accountability, in line 
with a global constitutionalist frame, can enhance the rule of law, by creating clarity 
and consistency in the global legal system.  
7.2. Article 1 Jurisdiction and Public International Law 
Jurisdiction 
Banković v Belgium concerned the bombing of a Radio Television Station in Belgrade 
by NATO.4 In order to determine the ‘ordinary meaning’ of jurisdiction under Article 
1, as was required by Article 31(3) of the VCLT, the ECtHR interpreted ‘within its 
jurisdiction’ in light of the ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties’ in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.5 The 
ECHR could not be ‘interpreted and applied in a vacuum’; and the ECHR should be 
read in harmony with other principles of international law;6 whilst being mindful of 
the fact that the ECHR had a special character as a human rights treaty.7 The ECtHR 
found that the ordinary meaning of jurisdiction from the standpoint of public 
international law was that the jurisdictional competence of a State was ‘primarily 
territorial’.8 
The ECtHR continued:  
While international law does not exclude a State’s exercise of jurisdiction 
extra-territorially, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction (including 
nationality, flag, diplomatic and consular relations, effect, protection, passive 
                                                 
4 See further Chapter 5.  
5 Banković v Belgium ECHR 2001-XII 333, paras 55, 57. 
6 Ibid citing Al-Adsani v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 273, para 60. 
7 Ibid para 57, Loizidou v Turkey (1997) 23 EHRR 513, paras 43 and 52. 
8 Ibid para 59. 
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personality and universality) are, as a general rule, defined and limited by the 
sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant States.9 
… 
The Court is of the view, therefore, that Article 1 of the Convention must be 
considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of 
jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special 
justification in the particular circumstances of each case.10 
The ECtHR then proceeded to set out specific factual incidences in which the ECHR 
could be applied abroad,11 and the effective control of the territory test. 12 A state 
would be held responsible under the entire breadth of the ECHR towards everyone 
within that territory over which it had the control when jurisdiction was established 
through the effective control of the territory test.13 In this way rights under the ECHR 
could not be ‘divided and tailored’.14 The ECtHR found in that case that the NATO 
states carrying out the bombing did not exercise sufficient ‘control over the territory’ 
to establish Article 1 jurisdiction. 
Martti Koskenniemi sees Banković as evidence of the ECtHR acknowledging the 
international normative environment within which it is operating rather than acting as 
a self-contained regime. For him, this is a positive development towards counteracting 
inconsistencies in international law.15  Angelika Nuβberger explains that reliance on 
the public international law conception of jurisdiction meant that the ECHR’s 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid para 61. 
11 Ibid paras 67-79, 73. 
12 Ibid para 74: ‘it has done so when the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant 
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers 
normally to be exercised by that Government’.  
13 Ibid para 75. 
14 Ibid. 
15 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law—Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission UN Doc. A/CN4/L682 (April 13, 2006), as corrected UN DocA/CN4/L682/Corr.1 
(August 11, 2006) (finalised by Martti Koskenniemi) 86-7 para 163-4. 
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territorial scope would be decided on a state by state basis, establishing each state’s 
‘jurisdiction’. She contrasts this reading of Article 1 with a dependence on the rules of 
the VCLT to determine the ECtHR’s territorial scope.. 16   While it is a positive 
development that the ECtHR expressly invokes Article 31(3)(c) to take into account 
international law, it does not appear that extraterritoriality serves the same function as 
jurisdiction. If the two concepts are entirely incongruent, it does not constitute a 
reasonable interpretation of international law to base the ECtHR’s approach to 
extraterritoriality on a public international law conception of jurisdiction.  
According to James Crawford, jurisdiction in international law ‘is an aspect of 
sovereignty: it refers to a state’s competence under international law to regulate the 
conduct of natural and juridical persons’.17 A state’s jurisdiction is an emanation or 
aspect of its sovereignty and right to regulate its own public order. Limitations on 
jurisdiction flow from the equal sovereignty of other states.18 ‘Jurisdiction’ describes 
a number of distinct powers: legislative jurisdiction, enforcement jurisdiction and 
adjudicatory jurisdiction.19 Legislative jurisdiction refers to the ability of a state to 
determine the laws that apply to an individual; enforcement jurisdiction refers to the 
ability of the state to enforce its laws in a given situation for example by imprisoning 
someone; and adjudicatory jurisdiction refers to the ability of a state to determine 
whether an entity has acted in conformity with the laws in force.20  
Marko Milanovic argues that the ECtHR in Banković did not expressly indicate 
whether the ECtHR was referring to legislative, adjudicative, or executive 
jurisdiction.21 The suggested bases of jurisdiction provided by the ECtHR are all 
examples of legislative jurisdiction.22 The nationality enables a state’s law to apply to 
                                                 
16 Angelika Nuβberger, ‘The Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’ in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2012) 65 CLP 241-68. 
17 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 1) 456.  
18 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (n 1) 297. 
19 Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (n 1); O’Keefe, ‘Universality Jurisdiction: Clarifying 
the Basic Concept’ (n 1) 736. 
20 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 1) 457-486. 
21 Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Practice and Policy 
(OUP 2011) 26-7. 
22 Ibid. See Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 1) 457- 466. 
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its nationals abroad. 23  According to the flag, diplomatic and consular relations 
principle a state’s law applies to a ship flying its flag, and in diplomatic and consular 
premises.24 A state can prohibit conduct which directly harms its nationals in limited 
circumstances under the passive personality principle,25 and apply its laws to punish 
those who may wish to harm a state’s vital interest under the protective principle.26 A 
state can apply its criminal laws to an individual who is considered a threat to the 
international community as a whole in accordance with the universality principle.27  
However, extraterritoriality at the ECtHR does not aim to ascertain when a state can 
exercise power over an individual. It aims to determine, in light of the fact that a state 
does exercise power (legislative, adjudicative or executive) over an individual – 
regardless of whether it is legal or illegal – whether that state has obligations under 
the ECHR in those circumstances. For Michal Gondek, jurisdiction in human rights 
treaties does not serve ‘to determine the legality of the exercise of state power, but to 
determine the applicability of a human rights treaty to a given state conduct’.28 The 
application of human rights treaties is not restricted to situations where exercise of 
jurisdiction is legal under the international law of jurisdiction: ‘a person may in certain 
circumstances be within the jurisdiction of a state party to a human rights treaty when 
he or she is outside state territory and an act of state affecting such a person would not 
pass a test of what is legal under international law of jurisdiction’.29 Furthermore, he 
points out the unjust results of conflating jurisdiction under human rights treaties with 
the public international law conception as the illegality of the exercise of jurisdiction 
over a person who was, for example, abducted should not prevent the applicability of 
human rights treaties.30 It is rather the attempt to exercise state authority and the fact 
of control over the person concerned, whether legal or illegal under international law, 
                                                 
23 SS Lotus Case (n 1) 92 (Judge Moore); Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 
(n 1) 459-460.  
24 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 1) 464. 
25 Ibid 461-2.  
26 Ibid 462-4; SS Lotus Case (n 1) 23. 
27 O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (n 1). 
28 Ibid.  
29 Michal Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2009) 56-7.  
30 Ibid citing López Burgos v Uruguay, Case No 52/79, Un Doc A/36/40, 176, HRC 29 July 1981. 
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that brings that person within the jurisdiction of the state party and thereby triggers the 
ECHR.31  
Extraterritoriality is not synonymous with enforcement jurisdiction.32 A state cannot 
exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in another territory unless it has the other state’s 
consent.33 Milanovic distinguishes the function of extraterritoriality from enforcement 
jurisdiction. The control over the territory test and control over an individual test rely 
on factual circumstances in order to be established. With regard to the control over the 
victim ground of Article 1 jurisdiction, the actions of a state agent who is violating the 
rights of an individual abroad cannot be conflated with the state exercising its 
enforcement jurisdiction. Enforcement jurisdiction involves enforcing a legal rule, 
which already exists – not ‘naked power’. 34  With regard to the control over the 
territory test, the ECtHR has held that Article 1 jurisdiction can be established when a 
state exercises a ‘public power’ such as a legislative, enforcement or adjudicatory 
function abroad – one of the functions, which is normally exercised by government. 
However, Article 1 jurisdiction is not established by the exercise of a public function 
per se, but rather because of the control over the territory or over a victim that that 
public power entails.35  
Article 1 jurisdiction does not serve the function of legislative or enforcement 
jurisdiction. The ECtHR cannot evolve the meaning of the public international law 
concept of jurisdiction according to the principle of systemic integration in order to 
make the latter useful for defining the scope of extraterritoriality. 36  This would 
                                                 
31 Ibid; Michal Gondek, Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Territorial Focus in the age of Globalisation?’ (2005) 52 NILR 349, 364. 
32 Sarah H Cleveland, ‘Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad’ (2010) 110(2) Colum 
L Rev 225. 
33 O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (n 1) 740. 
34 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 21) 29. 
35 It is ‘axiomatic’ that private acts should not, in principle be attributable to the state: Rosalyn Higgins, 
Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use It (OUP 1995) 153. The distinction between 
public and private is criticised for ignoring the symbiotic dependency between the two in Carole 
Pateman, ‘Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy’ in Carole Pateman (ed), The Disorder 
of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory (SUP 1990) 118.  
36 Robert J Currie and Hugh M Kindred, ‘Flux and Fragmentation in the International Law of State 
Jurisdiction: The Synecdochal Example of Canada’s Domestic Court Conflicts over Accountability for 
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probably entail a type of ‘reflexive’ jurisdiction which would not only ascertain when 
a state could exercise power but when a state could be held responsible for its exercise 
of power. If this definition of jurisdiction was to be adopted then the lexical 
significance of ‘jurisdiction’ would be lost, especially in relation to its relationship 
with sovereignty. Furthermore, the idea of the principle of systemic integration is to 
take into account ‘relevant’ law, not to contort irrelevant law. The ECtHR must avoid 
ruling by law instead of following the rule of law.  
Systemic integration of the public international law conception of jurisdiction leads to 
conceptual confusion as the function of extraterritoriality differs from the latter, which 
is therefore not international law ‘relevant to’ Article 1 jurisdiction under the ECHR. 
The failure of the ECtHR to overrule this aspect of Banković v Belgium wherein the 
ECtHR first invoked the public international law conception of jurisdiction does not 
conform with a global constitutionalist approach. 
7.3. Article 1 Jurisdiction and State Responsibility 
In Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that the ECtHR does at times conflate the jurisdiction 
test with attribution.37 The section contends that the ECtHR has not interpreted Article 
1 jurisdiction clearly and consistently with international law on state responsibility in 
decisions where it conflates Article 1 jurisdiction with attribution. The ECtHR has 
failed to explicitly acknowledge that in some decisions it does conflate Article 1 
jurisdiction with attribution, does not explicitly take into account the other ‘relevant 
rules’ of attribution under the law on state responsibility, and fails to distinguish and 
justify its own approach.  
Gondek and Milanovic argue that it is methodologically unsound under the Articles 
on State Responsibility (ASR)38 to conflate jurisdiction with attribution.39 First it is 
necessary to address misleading criticisms against the ECtHR’s conflation of 
                                                 
International Human Rights Violations’ in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper, (eds) The 
Practice of International and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (Hart 
2012).  
37 See Section 5.3.  
38 ILC, ‘Articles on State Responsibility’ (n 2). 
39  Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World (n 29) 164-8; Milanovic, 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 21) 51-2. 
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jurisdiction with attribution. Gondek states that it is not methodologically correct to 
conflate attribution and jurisdiction under human rights treaties.40 He considers that 
the rules on state responsibility deal only with ascertaining whether an ‘obligation has 
been violated and what should be the consequences of the violation’, rather than with 
‘defining the rule and the content of the obligation it imposes’, citing the ILC 
Rapporteur Roberto Ago.41  Rules of state responsibility are ‘secondary’ providing ‘the 
general conditions under international law for the state to be considered responsible 
for wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences flowing therefrom’.42 
Primary rules define the content of the international legal obligation breached. 43 
Gondek distinguishes state responsibility from jurisdiction: ‘[t]he issue whether a 
person is within the jurisdiction of a state within the meaning of human rights treaties 
is not a question of attributability of an act to a state, which belongs to secondary rules 
of state responsibility’.44  
Article 2 states that there is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the state under international law 
(Article 2(a)) and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State 
(Article 2(b)).45 Both Gondek and Milanovic state that jurisdiction under Article 1 of 
the ECHR establishes whether there has been a breach of obligations as jurisdiction 
establishes to whom substantive obligations are owed, therefore falling under Article 
2(b) of ASR.46 Sarah H Cleveland, however, argues that jurisdiction in international 
human rights treaties is closely linked to the international law concept of state 
responsibility: ‘it is the exercise of jurisdiction that gives rise to legal obligations under 
                                                 
40 Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World (n 29) 164. 
41 Ibid 163 citing ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970 vol II 306 para 66 (c). 
42 Ibid 164 citing Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (n 2) 
74. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Article 2 states: ‘There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an 
action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach 
of an international obligation of the State.’ 
46 Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World (n 29) 168; Milanovic, Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 21) 273. 
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the treaty’.47 She cites Nicaragua, Bosnian Genocide, and Namibia which use tests of 
state responsibility and attribution to elucidate the concept of jurisdiction in 
international human rights treaties.48 Cleveland acknowledges that jurisdiction is a 
separate question from establishing whether there has been a breach of an international 
obligation. The function of jurisdiction – establishing whether a treaty obligation is in 
operation at all - is much more closely aligned to state responsibility. Olivier De 
Schutter argues that the question of jurisdiction under international human rights 
treaties ‘precedes’ the two questions in Article 2.49 Jurisdiction is the preliminary 
threshold question before consideration of state responsibility.50 
Contrary to Gondek and Milanovic, jurisdiction does not appear to be determinative 
of whether an action or omission ‘constitutes a breach of an international obligation 
of the state’ and is not conclusive of the definition or the ‘content’ of an ECHR 
obligation.51 Extraterritoriality establishes whether the ECHR is in operation at all 
when a state acts abroad. The content of an ECHR obligation and whether there has 
been a breach of a right under the ECHR is determined by an adjudication upon the 
merits. Overall, there appears to be no consensus on what Article 2 of the ASR has to 
say about the relationship between jurisdiction and state responsibility. The lack of 
consensus on the interpretation of Article 2 may be evidence of the fact that Article 2 
does not have anything to say about that relationship.52 In any case, Article 2 does not 
conclusively preclude a conflation of attribution and jurisdiction under international 
human rights treaties. Therefore, it is not necessarily an unsound methodology to 
conflate attribution and jurisdiction under international law. There is even support for 
                                                 
47 Cleveland, ‘Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad’ (n 32) 233.  
48 Ibid 233-4 citing Nicaragua (n 2) paras 105-115; Bosnian Genocide Case (n 2) paras 391- 406; 
Namibia (n 2). 
49 Olivier De Schutter, ‘Globalisation and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2006) 6 Baltic YBIL 185, 189. 
50 Ibid 190. 
51 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970 vol II 306 para 66 (c). 
52 See ILC, Articles on State Responsibility (n 2) 34-6; Crawford, State Responsibility: the General 
Part (CUP 2013); Crawford et al (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (n 2). 
52See ILC, Articles on State Responsibility (n 2) 34. 
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the proposition that jurisdiction and state responsibility carry out the same function 
establishing whether legal obligations under a treaty arise in the first place.53 
Another misleading criticism is that a conflation of attribution and Article 1 
jurisdiction leads to conflicts with standards of attribution under the law of state 
responsibility prescribed by the ICJ and in the ASR. 54  This concern has arisen 
specifically in the context of states’ relationships with separatist groups in other 
countries, such as in relation to the TRNC and MRT decisions. Nicaragua, Bosnian 
Genocide Case,55 Tadić,56 and Loizidou v Turkey as well as specific articles of the 
ASR are relevant to this debate.57  
Article 4(1) ASR states that conduct of a state’s own organs is always attributable to 
states. 58  Furthermore, acts by a non-state actor performed under the ‘direction, 
instigation or control of state organs’ can also be attributed to the state.59 Attributing 
the actions of a non-state entity to a state does not merely arise from a factual causal 
link between those actions and the state, 60   but rather is determined by further 
provisions in the ASR and also in the adjudication of cases brought before relevant 
international courts. Nicaragua, the Bosnian Genocide Case and Tadić all provide 
guidance on how attribution should be understood under international law.  
In Nicaragua the ICJ sets out two tests for attributing the actions of a non-state entity 
to a state, a non-state entity being one which is not a de jure organ of the state. The 
first test requires the establishment of control over the particular conduct in question 
(complete dependence) and the second necessitates control over the entity (effective 
control).61 The ICJ considered whether the US could be held responsible for violations 
                                                 
53 Cleveland, ‘Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad’ (n 59) 233.  
54 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 4) 43-4.  
55 Nicaragua (n 2); Bosnian Genocide Case (n 2). 
56 Tadić (Trial Chamber (n 2); Tadić (Appeals Chamber) (n 2). 
57 Loizidou (preliminary objections) (n 62); Loizidou (merits) (n 70). 
58 ILC, Articles on State Responsibility (n 2) 40. 
59 Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (n 2) 91. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Nicaragua (n 2) paras 105-115; Bosnian Genocide Case (n 2) paras 391-406; Marko Milanovic, 
‘State Responsibility for Genocide’ (2006) 17(3) EJIL 553, 576.  For those who interpret the Nicaragua 
test as one test see: Antonio Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ 
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of IHL carried out by contras in Nicaragua.  The test applied was whether the 
relationship between the contras and the US Government was ‘so much one of 
dependence on the one side and control on the other’ that the contras should be equated 
with an organ of the state for legal purposes.62 The ICJ found that apart from the aid 
that was provided to the contras they were otherwise an ‘independent force’.63 In 
answering whether the provision of aid by the US to the contras was sufficient for 
declaring the contras to be acting on behalf of the US,64 the ICJ noted that when 
military aid was ceased contra activity continued.65 Therefore, although US support 
was ‘crucial’ to the contras’ conduct, their ‘complete dependence’ on US aid was not 
demonstrated.66 Although there was one stage where US support was crucial this was 
not evidenced in relation to the majority of acts that were carried out.67 Sufficient 
control was not found despite the fact that ‘political leaders of the contra force had 
been selected, installed and paid by the [US]’ and despite their participation in the 
‘organization, training and equipping of the force, the planning of operations, choosing 
of targets and the operational support provided’.68 The conclusion was that there was 
not sufficient evidence to determine the US’s involvement, and it was not clearly 
demonstrated that the contras had ‘no real autonomy’.69  
The ICJ then applied another test with a lower threshold of control: ‘effective control 
of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations 
were committed’.70 Sufficient control could be established if the US could be found to 
have exercised general ‘effective control’ of the military and paramilitary operations. 
                                                 
Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’ (2007) 18(4) EJIL 652; Theordor Meron, ‘Classification of Armed 
Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout’ (1998) 92 AJIL 236; Alison Elizabeth Chase, 
‘Legal Mechanisms of the International Community and the United States Concerning State 
Sponsorship of Terrorism’, (2004) 45 Virginia JIL 41. 
62 Nicaragua (n 2) para 109. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid para 110. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid para 111. 
68 Ibid para 112. 
69 Ibid paras 114-15. 
70 Ibid para 115. 
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Therefore, Nicaragua indicates that the ICJ will apply a test of ‘complete dependence’ 
when establishing whether a particular activity can be attributed to the respondent state, 
and a test of ‘effective control’ when establishing whether, more generally, the actions 
of a non-state entity can be attributed to the respondent state. Therefore, the standard 
of control required for attribution in Nicaragua was much higher than in the ECtHR 
decisions in Ilascu or Catan.71  
At the ICTY, the Trial Chamber in Tadić chose to determine whether there existed a 
state of IAC by asking whether forces of Bosnian Serbs had remained agents of FRY 
after the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Bosnia in May 1992.72 It used the law 
of state responsibility and the tests of control laid down in Nicaragua in order to 
determine whether there was an IAC. The Appeal Chamber of the ICTY disagreed 
with the test of control adopted in Nicaragua. It found that in order for the actions of 
an individual to be attributed to the state, the latter had to exercise ‘effective control’ 
over that individual, but it asserted that the degree of control could vary according to 
the factual circumstances of each case.73  A single, private individual would need 
specific instructions from the state for their actions to be attributable to the state but 
for a group, the state would need to exercise a different standard of control.74 It was 
sufficient for the group to be under the overall control of the state for attribution to be 
established. The Appeals Chamber found in Tadić that the state coordinating or 
helping in the general planning of the non-state actor’s military activity was sufficient 
control for attribution of conduct to the respondent state.75 The Appeal Chamber relied 
on Loizidou to justify a much lower threshold of control required for the attribution 
test, stating that in that case the ‘Court did not find it necessary to ascertain whether 
the Turkish authorities had exercised “detailed” control over the specific “policies and 
actions” of the authorities of the “TRNC”’.76 
Article 8 ASR adopted the Nicaragua test as the test of attribution of conduct of non-
state entities to a state. It attributed to a state conduct by persons or groups of persons 
                                                 
71 Ilascu v Moldova and Russia (2005) 40 EHRR 46; Catan v Moldova and Russia (2013) 57 EHRR 4. 
72 Tadić (Trial Chamber) (n 2). 
73 Tadić (Appeals Chamber) (n 2) paras 132-36. 
74 Ibid paras 131, 137. 
75 Ibid para 131. 
76 Ibid para 128.  
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acting ‘on the instructions’, or ‘under the direction’ or ‘under the control’ of the state. 
The Commentary to Article 8 distinguished Tadić from Nicaragua by stating that the 
question in Tadić was concerned with applicable rules of international law rather than 
state responsibility. 77  In the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ rejected the test in 
Tadić.78 In Bosnian Genocide, ICJ had to determine whether acts of genocide carried 
out at Srebrenica in the former Yugoslavia (FRY) by Bosnian Serb armed forces (VRS) 
were attributable to the FRY. Having established that members of VRS were not de 
jure organs of FRY and could not be likened to organs of the FRY because they did 
not have ‘complete dependence’ on it,79 it then considered whether the VRS could be 
considered as a de facto organ of FRY. The ICJ applied the ‘effective control’ test 
from Nicaragua.80 It did so because the Nicaragua test coincided with the standards 
required by the ILC in Article 8 ASR.81 Similar to the Commentary for Article 8, the 
ICJ rejected Tadić firstly because it did not apply the test to a situation which 
concerned state responsibility but rather in order to determine whether the conflict was 
international or not;82 and secondly, it broadened the scope of state responsibility 
because it went beyond the standards set out by the ILC in Article 8 of the ARS.83   
The ICJ and ILC’s explicit rejection of Tadić’s adoption of an attribution test based 
on Loizidou has been stated as evidence of the fact that the ECtHR’s Article 1 
jurisprudence cannot be interpreted as employing an attribution test because it would 
not be in conformity with international law.84 International law on state responsibility 
does not require a lower standard of control for attributing the actions of a non-state 
actor to a state. The ICJ and ILC’s rejection of Tadić does not necessarily entail a 
rejection of a lower standard of control for attribution in all other circumstances. 
Cassese has argued that if the ICTY had stated that it was applying a test in order to 
establish whether the armed conflict was an international one – and not necessarily 
                                                 
77 Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (n 2) 112.  
78 Bosnian Genocide Case (n 2).  
79 Ibid paras 386-394. 
80 Nicaragua (n 2) paras 105-15.  
81 Bosnian Genocide Case (n 2) para 398.  
82 Nicaragua (n 2) paras 103-5.  
83 Bosnian Genocide Case (n 2) para 406. 
84 Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (n 21) 43- 51. 
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dictating general rules on state responsibility – then that would be permissible.85 It 
must be examined whether a lower standard of control for attribution in the human 
rights context is permissible under international law. 
The ILC Fragmentation Report acknowledges that in conditions of ‘social complexity’ 
it is ‘pointless to insist on formal unity’ of international law. 86  However, it also 
recognises the tension that exists between different rules and standards in international 
law and attempts to suggest means of resolving those tensions by using techniques of 
judicial interpretation. 87  The Report considers the different tests of attribution 
prescribed in Nicaragua and Tadić.88 It notes two potential types of problems arising 
from this particular norm conflict. First, legal subjects may no longer be able to predict 
the standard which applies to them and to plan around those standards. Second, it 
potentially puts legal subjects in an unequal position in relation to each other because 
their rights, rather than depending on a coherent legal framework, depend upon which 
court has jurisdiction to hear the case or which forum is chosen by those party to the 
case.89 The two possible solutions it posits for solving this kind of conflict are first, 
that states adopt a new law that settles the conflict, or second, that institutions 
coordinate the conflict in the future.90  
Two methods for coordinating conflicting norms provided by the ILC Fragmentation 
Report may be of significance for the ECtHR’s adoption of a different attribution test 
to that prescribed by general international law. The ECtHR could distinguish its 
approach from that of the ICJ and ASR under lex specialis and by virtue of its 
‘regionalist’ character. Recalling from Chapter 6 that principle of lex specialis 
                                                 
85 Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in 
Bosnia’ (n 61) 651. 
86 Ibid 15 para 16. 
87 Ibid 15 para 18. 
88Ibid 32 para 50. The Fragmentation Report did concede in footnote 52 that ‘[t]his need not be the only 
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derogate legi generali means that special law derogates from general law, 91  lex 
specialis can provide an ‘elaboration, updating or technical specification’ of the 
general standard of a particular rule.92 The ILC Commentary to Article 55 of the ASR 
states that ‘[t]hese articles [including Article 8] do not apply where and to the extent 
that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content 
or implementation of the international responsibility of a state are governed by special 
rules of international law’.93 The articles have a ‘residual character’ in relation to the 
special rules.94 The ECtHR could therefore argue that it is operating with a lower 
standard of control for attributing action of a non-state entity to a state in order to 
improve human rights protection. 
The ILC Fragmentation Report recognises ‘regionalism’ as the ‘pursuit of 
geographical exceptions to universal international rules’. 95  Certain rules are only 
binding on states that are members of a particular region.96 It could be argued that the 
ECHR is an instrument of ‘European public order’ in which a unique set of standards 
applies because of the regional character of the ECHR, thus justifying a lower standard 
of control for establishing attribution than that required under general international 
law.97 It follows that the ECtHR is not necessarily prohibited under international law 
from taking a different approach to the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide Case and to 
Article 8 ASR, so long as the ECtHR explicitly distinguishes and justifies its own 
approach using established techniques of interpretation. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that the ECtHR increasingly conflates extraterritoriality with 
attribution. The conflation is in conformity with a global constitutionalist frame 
because it indicates a presumption of extraterritoriality. While the conflation is in 
conformity with democratic accountability, it may not be in conformity with the rule 
of law, giving rise to a lack of clarity and consistency in the international legal order. 
This section argues conflating attribution with extraterritoriality does not give rise to 
                                                 
91 Ibid 34 para 56. 
92 Ibid 35 para 56. 
93 ILC, Articles on State Responsibility (n 2) 140. 
94 Ibid 139.  
95 ILC Fragmentation Report (n 15) 108, para 211.  
96 Ibid.  
97 Banković (n 5) para 80. 
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lack of clarity for two reasons. First, Article 2 provides no direction on 
extraterritoriality and therefore does not support or contradict a reading of 
extraterritoriality that conflates the latter with attribution. Second, the resulting test of 
attribution by the ECtHR does not need to be in conformity with the ICJ or ASR tests, 
which consider different factual circumstances and apply different legal standards. 
The ECtHR can adopt a less stringent test of attribution. However, in order to be in 
conformity with the rule of law, the ECtHR must provide a reasonable interpretation 
of the law and explicitly justify distinguishing its approach from the ICJ and ASR. It 
is only through providing a clear and consistent narrative that constituent and 
constituted powers have a clear legal framework to point to and contest each other’s 
actions. Furthermore, it is the only means by which other international courts can 
apprehend the approach of the ECtHR. The ECtHR needs to maintain an explicit 
narrative on why it departs from general standards of international law, giving other 
international courts an opportunity to respond, contest the ECtHR’s approach or 
distinguish their own.  
7.4. Article 1 Jurisdiction: ‘effective control’ and the Law 
of Occupation 
There are two concerns relating to the relationship between the ECtHR’s effective 
control test and Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations. First, that the threshold 
of control under Article 42 and the ECHR require different degrees of control, and 
give rise to inconsistencies. Second, that the application of the ECtHR’s effective 
control test in armed conflict results in an unavoidable violation of Article 43. This 
section examines whether these concerns are a red herring and whether the status of 
the effective control test in the ECtHR’s emerging approach diminishes the chances 
of conflict. It shows that the rule of law is not threatened by unavoidable norm 
conflicts arising out of the parallel application of the ECtHR’s effective control test 
and Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations.  
Article 42 states that ‘[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed 
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory 
where such authority has been established and can be exercised’. 98 Common Article 
                                                 
98 Hague Regulations IV Article 42; Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions.  
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2 to the Geneva Conventions provides for the application of IHL ‘to all cases of partial 
or total occupation of the territory’.99 The factual circumstances required to establish 
occupation under Article 42 and Article 2 are a matter of contestation. 100  Much 
scholarship exists on the relationship between the ECHR’s effective control test and 
the control required to establish belligerent occupation. 101  Whereas the Article 1 
ECHR threshold triggers the ECHR, Article 42 initiates different duties and rights 
under the Geneva Conventions. 102  The exact degree of control over the territory 
required in both contexts is contested.103 In its previous jurisprudence, the ECtHR has 
tended to avoid any explicit statement about the relationship between the Article 1 
‘effective control’ test and belligerent occupation. That is, up until recently when it 
explicitly said there was no relationship between the two.104  
Wilde believes that a comparison between the territorial control test in the law of 
occupation and under Article 1 is important because: ‘the interplay between the 
approaches taken in each area of law on the question of what type of control is required 
mediates the extent to which the fields of activity covered by the two areas of law 
overlap’.105 The ability of this comparison to ‘mediate’ the two areas of law is never 
explained. He acknowledges that ‘a situation of territorial control by a foreign state 
might trigger that state’s obligations in the law of occupation, but might not also 
                                                 
99 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art 2, 12 th 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, 6 UST 3516.  
100  Roberts, ‘What is Military Occupation?’ (n 3) 3; Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of 
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trigger its obligations in human rights law’.106 He also acknowledges the ambiguities 
established in determining the law of occupation, particularly recognising the 
ambiguity over whether ‘occupation’ merely requires an invasion, or requires the 
invading party to ‘be in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the 
government of the territory’.107 While it is true that the debates on territorial control 
in the occupation debates ‘echo’ the debates on territorial control under the ECHR, he 
does not make clear the purpose of his inquiry. It is not clear whether he thinks that 
each test can help to clarify the other, whether he recommends that they adopt the 
same test, or whether it is merely descriptive, pointing out differences to no further 
end. It appears that the latter is what we are left with as he concludes, ‘taken together 
they demonstrate that the law in this area is as highly contested as it is 
underdeveloped’. 108  Although it is interesting to compare the Article 1 effective 
control test and the law of occupation, there is no relationship between the two, there 
is no reason why they should be in conformity with one another, and no problem arises 
if they apply in parallel, with different thresholds of control.  
There is a concern that the application of the ECtHR’s effective control test in armed 
conflict results in an unavoidable violation of Article 43. Article 43 states that the 
occupant ‘shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the 
laws in force in the country’. The relationship between belligerent occupation and the 
Article 1 effective control test was most hotly contested during the course of Al Skeini 
making its way through UK domestic courts.109 The ECtHR was yet to confirm the 
existence of the state agent authority and control test as a firm test of jurisdiction in 
the context of Article 2 right to life in the military context. 110  Therefore, in the 
domestic courts, Banković was the precedent at large, which required that when a state 
exercised ‘effective control’ over the territory, they had to secure the entire range of 
Convention rights to the entire population over which it had control in the foreign 
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1609, [2005] All ER (D) 337 (Dec). Lord Justice Sedley para 196. 
110 Al Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18 para 133. 
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territory.111 This could mean that the UK in Iraq theoretically would have had to ensure 
the right to marry112 or the right to free elections113 if it exercised control over the 
territory. In the context of military intervention abroad, the question arose in the UK 
domestic courts as to whether belligerent occupation constituted one of the 
circumstances under which effective control would be established under Article 1 
jurisdiction, with all of the legal consequences which would flow. It was in this context 
that the Court of Appeal and House of Lords found that the two tests of control did not 
bear any relationship towards one another. In the Court of Appeal decision of Al Skeini, 
Lord Justice Sedley stated that ‘[n]o doubt it is absurd to expect occupying forces in 
the near-chaos of Iraq to enforce the right to marry vouchsafed by Art. 12 or the 
equality of guarantees vouchsafed by Art. 14’.114 He continued: 
In my judgment it is quite impossible to hold that the UK, although an 
Occupying Power for the purposes of the Hague Regulations and [the] Geneva 
IV [Convention], was in effective control of Basra City for the purposes of [the 
European Court’s] jurisprudence at the material time. If it had been, it would 
have been obliged, pursuant to the Banković judgment, to secure to everyone 
in Basra City the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the [Convention]. One 
only has to state that proposition to see how utterly unreal it is…[A]s an 
Occupying Power it was bound to respect the laws in force in Iraq unless 
absolutely prevented (see Article 43 of the Hague Regulations).115 
In the House of Lords decision in Al Skeini, Lord Brown invoked Article 43 of the 
Hague Regulations which states that the occupant  ‘shall take all the measures in his 
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’. He continued:  
[T]he occupants’ obligation is to respect ‘the laws in force’, not to introduce 
laws and the means to enforce them (for example, courts and a justice system) 
                                                 
111 Banković (n 5) para 65. 
112 Article 12 ECHR. 
113 Article 3, Protocol 1. 
114 Al Skeini (CA) (n 109) Lord Justice Sedley para 196. 
115 R (on the application of Al Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, 
[2008] AC 153, para 124. 
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such as to satisfy the requirements of the Convention. Often (for example 
where Sharia law is in force) Convention rights would clearly be incompatible 
with the laws of the territory occupied.116 
Lord Brown found it was impossible to impose the ECHR, on the grounds that 
enforcing the entire panoply of rights required under the ECHR would require 
breaching Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and introducing and enforcing laws 
without respect for the laws in the country. 
Milanovic states that this situation gives rise to an unresolvable norm conflict.117 He 
paints a hypothetical picture of the UK becoming a belligerent occupant of a territory 
that is governed by Sharia Law which has as part of its Penal Code stoning as a 
punishment for adultery.118 Milanovic assumes that belligerent occupation triggers the 
ECHR under the effective control test, and that stoning would be at odds with, for 
example, Article 3 ECHR. He states that this gives rise to a norm conflict: Article 3 
requires the state to reform the Penal Code but Article 43 of the Hague Regulations 
prevents it from changing the law of the territorial state. Furthermore, Article 3 
conflicts with Article 64 GC IV which stipulates that: ‘[t]he penal laws of the occupied 
territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or 
suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its 
security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention’. He finds that in 
both instances one of the two obligations would have to be read down to resolve the 
norm conflict.119 He acknowledges that Article 43 is more susceptible to being read 
down because it only prohibits the occupant from altering the domestic law of the 
occupied territory unless it is ‘absolutely prevented’ from doing so. Preventing 
punishment by stoning under Article 3 could be considered as ‘absolutely prevent[ing]’ 
the occupying power from not changing the law.120 He states that on the other hand, 
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Article 64 can only be read down forcibly, because it is less malleable and must be 
kept in force unless there is a security threat or it hampers the application of GC IV. 
For him, stoning for adultery is not a security threat or a hampering of the application 
of the GC IV and Article 64 remains in force. He insists that Article 3 inherently cannot 
be read down under the ECHR. Therefore, an unresolvable norm conflict arises.  
Three arguments can be raised against the supposition that an unresolvable norm 
conflict arises. First, it was never confirmed whether the ECHR’s effective control 
over the territory test was synonymous with belligerent occupation. Any decisions that 
were made in relation to the two seem to indicate that Article 1 effective control 
requires more control than belligerent occupation. 121  Second, in relation to 
Milanovic’s discomfort with watering down the requirements of Article 3, one norm 
can unceremoniously trump another if reasons are set out by the ECtHR.122  The same 
applies in this situation.123 The ECtHR’s effective control test was never used to get 
rid of the death penalty in Iraq. It is rarely used to impose the entire panoply of rights 
protection on a state acting abroad,124 and is most often used in inter-state cases where 
there are systemic violations of many of the ECHR rights.125  
The ECtHR’s emerging approach to the effective control test diminishes chances of 
conflict. Al Skeini confirms two tests of control for establishing jurisdiction: effective 
control over a territory and state agent authority and control over an individual.126 The 
only cases cited in Al Skeini in support of the effective control over a territory category 
were the ‘attribution’ effective control cases including Loizidou v Turkey, Cyprus v 
                                                 
121 Al Skeini (HL) (n 115).  
122 However, arguably article 64 could be read down to avoid the norm conflict: stoning for adultery 
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Turkey and Ilascu v Moldova and Russia.127 Furthermore, the state agent authority and 
control test supplied the rationale for a multitude of factual scenarios including control 
over boats, aircraft, buildings and, shooting by British military personnel in the course 
of security patrols established jurisdiction. The positive obligations rationale of 
effective control over a territory test adopted in Banković, is not explicitly mentioned 
in Al Skeini. Al Skeini appears to dismiss Banković’s interpretation of the test, that 
requires a state to secure the entire breadth of the ECHR when acting abroad. It seems 
to have diminished in significance as a test of extraterritoriality. Instead, the state agent 
authority and control test now seems to cover many circumstances arising in the 
extraterritorial context. This limits chances of conflict between the effective control 
test and Article 43. Although the effective control test continues to be used in inter-
state cases, it has less significance in the individual application context.128  
Since the Al Skeini decision, the EHCR’s effective control test is not used in the 
military context, including in the cases of Hassan and Jaloud where the state agent 
authority and control test has been applied. 129  The ECtHR has traditionally been 
ambiguous in relation to its understanding of the relationship between the Article 1 
effective control test and belligerent occupation. In Al Skeini, in finding Article 1 
jurisdiction for the use of force against individuals, the ECtHR stated that the CPA 
was ‘to exercise powers of government temporarily’130 and that the CPA provided 
security in Iraq including the maintenance of civil law and order.131 It continued: 
[F]ollowing the removal from power of the Ba’ath regime and until the 
accession of the interim Iraqi government, the United Kingdom (together with 
the United States of America) assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of the 
public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government… In these 
exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that the United 
Kingdom…exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the 
                                                 
127 Paragraph 70 from Banković which merely provides the reasoning of Loizidou and Cyprus v Turkey 
without further comment.  
128 See e.g. Georgia v Russia (n 125).  
129 Hassan v UK App No 2970/09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014); Jaloud (n 104).  
130 Al Skeini (n 115) para 144. 
131 Ibid para 145-8. 
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course of such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link 
between the deceased and the United Kingdom.132 
This passage could be interpreted as saying that the UK’s occupation was necessary 
for establishing jurisdiction alongside the state authority and control test in this 
instance. However, Jaloud v Netherlands put the ambiguity of the relationship 
between UK occupation and jurisdiction to rest. In Jaloud, the ECtHR stated that the 
effective control test had nothing to do with the law of occupation.133 In that case, the 
Government had argued that the Netherlands was not an ‘occupying power’ under IHL 
and that the US and UK were ‘occupying powers’ under UNSCR 1483.134 The UK 
which was a third party to the decision, argued that Jaloud should be distinguished 
from Al Skeini by stating that:  ‘in the latter case the [UK] was recognised as an 
‘occupying power’ within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Rules and therefore 
had the attendant duty under Article 43 to exercise the powers normally belonging to 
the State’. 135  The ECtHR decided, ‘the status of ‘occupying power’ within the 
meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, [was] not per se determinative’ and 
there was no need ‘to have recourse to it in finding that the responsibility of Turkey 
was engaged in respect of events in northern Cyprus’.136 
It added that, UNSCR 1438, ‘while reaffirming “the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Iraq”’ …called upon “all concerned”, regardless of Occupying Power 
status, to “comply fully with… the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague 
Regulations of 1907”’.137 
There is no mention of the ‘effective control over the territory’ test. The fact that there 
was an occupation was useful in the Al Skeini case which concerned the ‘state agent 
authority and control’ test. It constituted important background information for 
assessing the context in which the British soldiers carried out the use of force in that 
case. In Jaloud, the ECtHR was concerned with attributing action rather than 
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determining whether Article 1 jurisdiction was established.  In this case, occupation 
was not used to determine whether the Netherlands had met the state agent authority 
and control test. The ECtHR referred to UNSCR 1438 to show that the Article 1 
jurisdiction test was entirely separate from belligerent occupation. This is all due to 
the fact that the ‘state agent authority and control’ test which divides and tailors rights, 
is the approach predominantly taken by the ECtHR in the military intervention context. 
The ‘effective control over the territory’ test which requires that a state secure all rights 
under the ECHR all of the time when it has control over a territory is less prevalent.  
Conflicts between the effective control over the territory test and Article 43 are 
unlikely to arise if the principle of systemic integration is in operation because relevant 
law, external to the ECHR, should be taken into account. This includes the domestic 
law of extraterritorial state and IHL. No cases to date give rise to a conflict between 
Article 43 and the effective control test. Furthermore, the effective control test is 
becoming less prevalent in Article 1 jurisdiction, arising predominantly in inter-state 
cases, and addressing systemic violations of numerous ECHR rights. No conflict 
therefore arises between the ECHR and Article 43, and it should not constitute a rule 
of law justification for limiting admissibility to the ECtHR.  
7.5. Article 1 Jurisdiction as a Barrier to Norm Conflict 
Resolution 
Using the Article 1 threshold to avoid the resolution of norm conflicts runs counter to 
global constitutionalism. The ECtHR is increasingly turning against this approach. 
Vassilis Tzevelekos argues that the ECtHR in Banković interprets ‘jurisdiction’ as 
having only ‘exceptional’ extraterritorial application in order to avoid adjudicating 
upon circumstances which involved complex norm conflicts.138 One could also argue 
it is unintentionally avoiding resolution of the ‘norm conflict’ issues. In the interests 
of the defragmentation of international law, the ECtHR should not set up a procedural 
barrier to adjudicating and enforcing the rights it was given the responsibility to 
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enforce. The ECtHR should seek to expressly situate the ECHR within the global legal 
system. 
Tzevelekos argues that in Banković, the ECtHR was mainly attempting to justify its 
own ‘volonté’ to abstain artfully from exercising jurisdiction over an extremely 
technical and highly politicised case.139 In Banković the ECtHR ‘skilfully avoided 
shedding light’ on the issue of state responsibility for human rights violations 
committed by international organisations by playing the ‘extraterritoriality game’.140 
Milanovic similarly acknowledges that the Banković decision enabled the ECtHR to 
not have to engage in complex political questions which entailed the application of 
other international law.141 Koskenniemi and Leino similarly recognise Banković as a 
case which enabled the ECtHR to abstain from resolving complex questions of norm 
conflicts. 
However, the ECtHR has since lowered the jurisdiction threshold and enabled 
questions of complex norm conflicts to be adjudicated upon. Tzevelekos 
acknowledges that jurisdiction is not an obstacle to deciding upon complex questions 
of attribution in the Behrami case, representing a departure from the Banković 
decision.142 Although the way in which the ECtHR took into account international law 
in that case has been criticised, 143 it nonetheless took the first step in engaging with 
the wider normative environment to determine to whom actions should be attributed 
and did not use jurisdiction as a barrier to deciding such questions. The Al Skeini case, 
which confirmed a state agent authority and control test and a control over the territory 
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test144 paved the way for the ECtHR to engage in further norm conflict resolution.  As 
illustrated in Hassan, the ECtHR looks at the resolution of norm conflicts between the 
ECHR and IHL.145  Banković’s high threshold for jurisdiction created a barrier to 
engaging in such norm conflict questions. The lowering of the jurisdiction threshold 
means that those questions of norm conflict are addressed. This indicates that the 
ECtHR is increasingly willing to adjudicate upon cases that involve complex norm 
conflicts and contribute to supporting the rule of law by resolving potential 
incoherencies in the international legal system.  
This approach demonstrates convergence with both the global constitutionalist norm 
of democratic accountability and the rule of law. As the ECtHR lowers its jurisdiction 
threshold, it moves towards a presumption of extraterritoriality, which in turn 
decreases the obstacles constituent powers face in accessing the ECtHR to challenge 
constituted power action. As the ECtHR moves towards a presumption of 
extraterritoriality, it adjudicates upon the merits, resolving norm conflicts, explicitly 
positioning the ECHR within the global legal system and enhancing the rule of law. 
Therefore, the two branches of constitutionalism reinforce each other, converging the 
ECtHR’s approach with that advocated by a global constitutionalist frame.  
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7.6. Conclusion 
The ECtHR does not interpret Article 1 jurisdiction clearly and consistently with the 
public international law conception of jurisdiction.146 In order to ensure clarity and 
consistency, the ECtHR should stop purporting to rely on jurisdiction when it does not 
- and cannot - because of the unrelated functions of the rules of extraterritoriality and 
state jurisdiction.147  A conflation of extraterritoriality and attribution is an indicator 
of the presumption of extraterritoriality and therefore supports the norm of democratic 
accountability, allowing constituent powers to challenge constituted powers. 
Conflating article 1 jurisdiction and attribution is in and of itself not a threat to the 
coherency of the international legal system. What is a threat, is the ECtHR’s reluctance 
to explicitly state when it conflates the two concepts. Providing a different standard of 
attribution than that prescribed by the ASR and ICJ judgments does not undermine the 
unity of the international legal system as long as the ECtHR provides a clear and 
explicit narrative of what it is doing and why. The ECtHR needs to acknowledge when 
it conflates jurisdiction and attribution; acknowledge the ASR and ICJ judgements; 
and justify distinguishing its approach using established interpretation techniques. 
This is so that the constituency of the Council of Europe knows what law regulates the 
constituency. Furthermore, international actors and other adjudicatory mechanisms 
providing a different interpretation of those standards can identify, criticise, adopt or 
distinguish the standard applied by the ECtHR.  
No conflict arises between the ECHR and Article 42 Hague Regulations from the legal 
consequences of the ‘effective control over the territory’ test. The threat of imposing 
all of the obligations in relation to everyone on the state acting abroad has never 
materialised and never will if the principle of systemic integration is put into operation. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful that the effective control over an area test is used outside 
the context of inter-state cases where systematic and expansive rights-violations are 
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carried out. In relation to the Article 1 jurisdiction threshold being used as a barrier to 
resolving norm conflicts, there is evidence to suggest that the ECtHR has done this in 
the past, for example in Banković. However, the ECtHR is progressively displaying a 
willingness to engage in complex and contentious norm conflicts between IHRL and 
IHL, rather than avoiding their adjudication. This means that the ECtHR will more 
likely presume extraterritoriality in conformity with the norm of democratic 
accountability and engage in norm conflicts which is an important aspect of upholding 
the rule of law in global governance. The ECtHR needs to be explicit about the 
function of extraterritoriality in order to conform with the global constitutionalist 
frame. It needs to distinguish extraterritoriality from jurisdiction and attribution, and 
recognise when it conflates extraterritoriality with attribution. The ECtHR’s 
willingness to lower the threshold and engage in norm conflict resolution represents a 
convergence with the global constitutionalist frame. A presumption of 
extraterritoriality is therefore not only in conformity with democratic accountability, 
but also the rule of law. The ECtHR needs to explicitly clarify the concept of 
extraterritoriality, but otherwise its approach can be captured by its convergence with 
the global constitutionalist frame. 
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis asked what approach the ECtHR should take to extraterritoriality from a 
global constitutionalist perspective. A global constitutionalist frame was chosen as a 
result of its potential ability to contextualise extraterritoriality at the ECtHR within a 
complex global governance system, enabling for its political and legal (in)significance 
– the paradox of extraterritoriality - to be articulated. The thesis sought to provide a 
normative frame for extraterritoriality that situated it within a global context. The 
global context, rather than regional or domestic frame, was adopted because this 
perspective was considered as potentially fruitful for answering crucial questions. In 
particular, from this context it could be discovered why victims of global atrocity 
apply to a regional human rights court, of limited state membership, restricted capacity, 
criticised for its inefficiency and unable to have a significant influence on policies 
relating to the treatment of that individual. A normative framework could then capture 
the reason why victims apply despite the ECtHR’s limitations, and ensure that the 
value of the ECtHR is understood and emboldened. The legal significance of the 
ECHR in an international legal system was also questioned. The thesis sought to 
elucidate the ECHR’s legal significance. From a global governance perspective, this 
was not only for the benefit of states bound by the system and who sought admissibility 
to the ECtHR. International organisations and courts administering other specialist 
regimes within the international legal order could also benefit from the clarification of 
the relationship between specialist regimes, so as to ensure clarity and consistency in 
the international legal order as a whole, and create deliberation between each network.  
Existing theories of extraterritoriality cannot account for the paradox of 
extraterritoriality. Those who place emphasis on the universality of human rights 
whilst simultaneously imposing restraints on their application, produce a contradiction 
in terms. Furthermore, they provide no rigorous theoretical justification for their 
reliance upon universality. Those that do provide a normative basis for a model of 
extraterritoriality rely on the historical condition of human rights as essentially 
territorially bound. When they provide reflection on the de-territorialised nature of 
global governance, they do not consider exploiting the human rights discourse to 
provide a response to extraterritorial exertions of power. Rather their re-imagination 
of human rights in a de-territorialised world is one of hegemony and imperialistic 
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endeavours. A higher level of abstraction is required to understand the ECtHR as a 
liberal, counter-hegemonic means of counteracting some of the most flagrant denials 
of justice that arise from the de-territorialisation of power and the persistent 
territorialisation of accountability. 
This thesis turns to a global constitutionalist frame for a theoretical underpinning of 
extraterritoriality and to relate the poignancy of arbitrary delineations of accountability 
based upon territory in a changing global context. The global constitutionalist frame 
responds to phenomena that form hallmarks of the deterioration of the Westphalian 
legal order including globalisation, institutionalisation and fragmentation.  This frame 
eschews the idea states are the only actors that get to decide who is included in 
governance systems in a Post-Westphalian world. Especially in governance orders 
specifically designed for the protection of other actors, such as individuals protected 
by the Council of Europe system. From a global constitutionalist perspective, an 
interpretation of Article 1 of the ECHR in accordance with the rules of the VCLT 
cannot provide a normatively sound approach to extraterritoriality Post-Westphalia. 
Global constitutionalism is a theoretical avenue through which to assess legitimate 
forms of governance. A consensual understanding of the international legal order is 
left behind, and a principled approach to a multifarious and diverse global governance 
system is created. The central principle of this system is that it is governed by and for 
the benefit of a constituent body. The combination of norms of the rule of law and 
democracy identifies the parameters of the constituency.  
Applying the global constitutionalist perspective to the Council of Europe, delimiting 
admissibility to the ECtHR through geographical location and arbitrary tests of control 
is no longer sustainable. Instead, individuals who are directly affected in ways that 
implicate the ECHR and Member States of the ECHR who defend their actions in 
accordance with this legal framework, form part of the constituency of the Council of 
Europe. The norm of democratic accountability is in operation when constituent 
powers exercise political control over constituted powers at the ECtHR, in the form of 
compelling justifications for the latter’s actions, with the potential for sanctions and 
mandatory action. Therefore, the norm of democratic accountability translates into a 
presumption of extraterritoriality as a doctrinal indicator of a global constitutionalist 
frame at the ECtHR, which overcomes the geographical delimitation of admissibility.  
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The rule of law corroborates and complements the norm of democratic accountability, 
providing an explicit, clear and consistent legal framework which links constituent 
and constituted powers. Through this legal framework, constituents can challenge 
constituted power action and the latter can defend itself against allegations of 
violations of the law.  As part of a process of fragmentation, the ECtHR strengthens 
the rule of law, by contributing to an increase in constraints on constituted power 
through legal adjudication, accountability, sanctions and mandated action. The global 
constitutionalist response to the inconsistencies and lack of clarity that arise from 
fragmentation is to adopt the principle of systemic integration. This judicial 
interpretation technique not only serves a coordinative function between legal regimes, 
but also situates the ECHR within its global legal context.  The ECtHR can contribute 
to a reciprocal dialogue with other international courts in providing authoritative 
interpretations of the law. In order to ensure the reflexivity of this process, the ECtHR 
needs to be explicit in relation to its interpretation and application of external 
international law. It cannot provide an interpretation which is so at odds with common 
understandings of that international law norm or concept, that it leads to 
incontrovertible inconsistencies in the global legal order. Instead there needs to be a 
reasonable interpretation, enabling international adjudicatory bodies to take into 
account, adopt or distinguish the decision made by the former court.  The global 
constitutionalist frame thereby requires a presumption of extraterritoriality, the 
adoption of the principle of systemic integration and an explicit, clear and consistent 
narrative, as well as a reasonable interpretation of the law for resolving norm conflicts 
arising from extraterritorial application of the ECHR. 
The ECtHR’s emerging approach to extraterritoriality can be captured by a global 
constitutionalist frame, with further clarification needed in its conceptualisation of the 
function of extraterritoriality.  A convergence with the global constitutionalist frame 
through an emerging presumption of extraterritoriality is visible at the ECtHR in three 
ways. First, the multifarious ways in which the state agent authority and control test 
and effective control over the territory test are used to establish jurisdiction indicate a 
lowering of the jurisdiction threshold. The ECtHR’s increasing creativeness with those 
two tests evidences control over a territory being diminished from a test requiring 
something akin to occupation, and not fulfilled through activities such as bombing a 
territory, to a test establishing jurisdiction through control over a boat. The state agent 
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authority and control test had humble beginnings in diplomatic and consular cases, but 
has expanded to shots fired by a soldier, or being pulled onto a plane. It has also 
contributed to the diminishing influence of the test requiring the higher threshold, the 
effective control test, lowering the jurisdiction threshold further. Second, the 
presumption of extraterritoriality is evidenced through the increasing conflation of 
Article 1 jurisdiction with attribution, representing an effective skipping of the 
extraterritoriality question. The ECtHR has expanded the conflation of these two 
concepts from the factual scenario of attributing ECHR violations of a separatist 
regime to an extraterritorial state, to cases seeking to ascertain to whom a shot fired 
by a single soldier should be attributed in the context of a multi-national military 
operation during a transitional period of belligerent occupation. The focus on who 
carries the burden of responsibility, rather than whether sufficient control is exercised 
by the respondent state to establish jurisdiction in the first place, means that a concept 
of extraterritoriality is becoming less pertinent in the ECtHR’s reasoning. Third, the 
ECtHR increasingly does not rely on the traditional extraterritoriality tests at all in 
cases which deal with state action abroad, representing a fully formed presumption of 
extraterritoriality. The extraterritorial effect of decisions relating to extraordinary 
rendition and extradition are undeniable. The ECtHR enables victims of illegal 
conduct in armed conflict, on the high seas, extraordinary rendition procedures and 
UNSCR terrorist sanctions, to exercise political control in the form of compelling 
justifications for constituted power action in accordance with the legal framework of 
the Council of Europe, and with the potential for sanctions and mandatory action when 
the action is found to be illegal under the ECHR.  
The ECtHR’s emerging approach to managing norm conflicts arising from the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR converges with a global constitutionalist 
frame. The ECtHR’s analysis of detention in armed conflict in Al Jedda, misconceived 
of IHL obligations, failing to ask whether IHL authorised detention, falsely stating that 
it imposed indefinite detention and that detention was a measure of last resort under 
IHL, and failing to distinguish between POWs and civilians. It also failed to recognise 
that Al Jedda concerned a NIAC and that IHL could not authorise detention in these 
circumstances anyway. While the result reached in that decision was accurate 
according to a proper assessment of the law, the ECtHR undermined its own reasoning 
by not providing a reasonable interpretation of the relevant rules. It incorrectly 
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assumed that IHL prevailed over the ECHR. They can influence each other just as 
much as one norm can trump the other. Their relationship with one another must be 
conceived on a case by case basis according to which legal regime provides the most 
authoritative or detailed guidance on a specific issue.  
In contrast, the ECtHR did converge with a global constitutionalist approach in 
Hassan. It interpreted the substantive and procedural requirements of Article 5 by 
taking into account IHL to conclude that the individual posed a sufficient threat to be 
detained in the first place as a POW or civilian that constituted a security threat. 
Furthermore, a competent body would suffice to carry out a review of the individual’s 
detention and the ECtHR thought he had been informed promptly of the case brought 
against him because of the two interviews he faced when he entered the detaining 
facility. While someone may disagree with this finding, the balance that the ECtHR 
made between IHL and ECHR norms, or the outcome reached, the ECtHR provided 
an explicit explanation of its reasoning to which applicants in the future and 
international courts engaging with the reasoning of the ECtHR, can respond.  
The ECtHR’s conception of extraterritoriality does not fully conform with the global 
constitutionalist frame. The ECtHR’s reliance on the public international law 
conception of jurisdiction serves to obfuscate rather than elucidate the function of 
extraterritoriality. Extraterritoriality at the ECtHR does not aim to ascertain when a 
state can exercise power in another territory, but to provide some parallel mechanism 
of accountability when the state has already engaged in any legal or illegal activity 
abroad which has affected specific people. While the ECtHR conflates Article 1 
jurisdiction with attribution, which is a doctrinal indicator of the presumption of 
extraterritoriality, it has no self-awareness that it does so. One of the reasons for this 
is because it does not articulate the function of extraterritoriality which is an arbitrary 
delimitation of accountability based solely upon geographical location, having nothing 
to do with to whom an action should be attributed. The ECtHR needs to explicitly 
acknowledge when it conflates those two concepts. It also needs to acknowledge 
international law standards of attribution and distinguish its approach, as well as 
justify the standards it applies.  There is no international law obligation on the ECtHR, 
and it is not crucial for the incoherency of the international legal order, that the ECtHR 
adopt the same rules of attribution established by the ICJ, the ASR or the ICTY. The 
ECtHR does have to contribute to improving the clarity and consistency of a 
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decentralised, reflexive, changing narrative on the authoritative interpretation of 
international law standards and concepts so as to strengthen the rule of law.  
In terms of the two outstanding issues, no conflict arises in relation to Articles 42 and 
43 of the Hague Regulations and the ECHR. The threat of requiring states to secure 
the entire panoply of ECHR rights to everyone in a foreign territory has never 
materialised and never will if the principle of systemic integration is put into operation. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful that the ‘effective control over an area’ test will be used in 
cases other than inter-state cases where systematic and expansive rights-violations are 
carried out. There is evidence to suggest that the ECtHR has used Article 1 jurisdiction 
as a barrier to resolving norm conflicts. For example many commentators note that 
this was one of the functions of the high threshold in Banković. As the ECtHR 
presumes extraterritoriality, it increasingly engages in complex and contentious norm 
conflicts between IHRL and IHL, rather than avoiding their adjudication. Again, this 
is necessary for the stability of the rule of law in relation to both accountability of 
constituted power action and the provision of a clear legal framework through which 
constituted and constituent powers can regulate their relationship in accordance with 
the rule of law.  
The global constitutionalist frame has helped to unravel the paradox of 
extraterritoriality as it captures and aims to strengthen the value in the 
extraterritoriality at the ECtHR, despite its limitations, as well as to articulate the 
importance of the ECHR when applied in situations where other international law is 
relevant. Extraterritoriality at the ECtHR is important to victims of global atrocity 
because of the disparity of power between actors, and the inability of victims to hold 
powerful states accountable for actions that severely curtail their autonomy and 
equality in ways spanning way beyond the remit of the ECHR. The ECtHR forms a 
necessary accountability link between those actors where before there was a vacuum. 
This accountability vacuum existed despite the fact of a palpable and damaging 
relationship between victims and Council of Europe Member States in the latter’s 
exertion of power beyond its territory. The ECtHR is a forum of democratic 
accountability. Victims of global atrocities can question the respondent state on their 
conformity with ECHR obligations, impose sanctions on states or seek mandatory 
action in relation to the rights violation, perhaps even receive compensation. In this 
way, victims exercise a form of retroactive control over the Member State’s actions. 
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A global constitutionalist frame recognises the worth of the ECtHR to victims of 
global atrocities despite its limited capacity and seeks to set aside arbitrary barriers for 
admissibility to the ECtHR, thus recommending a presumption of extraterritoriality. 
A global constitutionalist frame seeks to define the legal status of the ECHR in 
situations where other international legal standards pertain to the situation. This frame 
recognises the worth in articulating the ECHR’s position in the international legal 
system, both to its own constituency and other constituencies elsewhere within the 
global governance system. The solution provided is both concrete and flexible. The 
principle of systemic integration embodies various interpretation techniques that 
recommend concrete solutions to norm conflicts. Taken together, a much more 
nuanced approach is provided by systemic integration. The ECHR can be prioritised 
by the ECtHR over a conflicting international law norm when it provides a justification 
for its decision. In this way, other special regimes and stakeholders can respond to the 
ECtHR’s interpretation. The ECtHR has a significant role to play in shaping the way 
in which rules apply to particular factual circumstances but it is limited insofar as it 
must provide a reasonable interpretation of external law and reasons for the way in 
which it balances norms. This is so that a clear legal framework is in place for its own 
constituency. The rule of law is a norm upon which the other norms of 
constitutionalism are reliant, and therefore it is in the ECtHR’s interest to adopt the 
global constitutionalist recommendations proposed.  
The global constitutionalist approach to extraterritoriality is not as utopian as it first 
appears. The ECtHR has progressively made extraterritoriality the norm rather than 
the exception. This needs to be highlighted in response to the concern that a 
presumption of extraterritoriality may be untenable. Both constituted and constituent 
powers already engage in the process of global constitutionalisation within the Council 
of Europe in cases concerning extraordinary rendition, armed conflict and 
interdictions on the high seas. Extraterritoriality’s significance as an issue of 
contestation is becoming almost obsolete. So the question as to what happens next 
must begin on the understanding that the ECtHR is already operating on a presumption 
of extraterritoriality.  
The presumption of extraterritoriality can be rebutted. Rules on how to rebut the 
presumption should be developed. This is related to the question of whether the 
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applicant meets the substantive admissibility criteria but could also relate to judicially 
developed admissibility criteria such as attribution,1 and other more contemporary 
tools of accountability in international law, such as causation2 and reasonableness.3 
This should not undermine the core normative justification for a presumption of 
extraterritoriality, that territory can no longer function as an arbitrary delineation of 
accountability. Rules for rebuttal actually cement the presumption, refocusing efforts 
towards thinking of why states should not be held responsible, rather than why they 
should.  
While a presumption of extraterritoriality is an advancement in securing democratic 
accountability in global governance, there needs to be recognition of the fact that other 
mechanisms have failed at providing some form of relief or justice to individual 
applicants. There needs to be an exploration of the mechanisms in place that constitute 
the first port of call for applicants to the ECtHR. The ECtHR’s decisions do mandate 
respondent states to make specific amendments to their internal investigatory 
procedures in relation to, for example, the alleged illegal killing of individuals in 
armed conflict, to improve autonomy of decision-making from the chain of command, 
and transparency. But there needs to be analysis of those mechanisms divorced from 
ECHR standards, specifically looking at the oversight that they provide on military 
activity and why they are insufficient for individuals seeking admissibility to the 
ECtHR.   
Time will reveal what challenges are in store for the ECtHR in defining the ECHR in 
armed conflict. IHL permits the intentional death of collateral innocent civilians on 
the battlefield whereas the ECHR only allows a violation of the right to life in limited 
circumstances. Although a significant decision relating to bombing has not made its 
way to the ECtHR since Banković, the emerging presumption of extraterritoriality 
could be instrumental in ensuring admissibility of this type of case. This could mean 
that, under the question of extraterritoriality, cases concerning drone warfare would 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Larson, Kjetil M Larsen, Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The Ultimate Authority 
and Control Test’ (2008) 19(3) EJIL 509. 
2 Ilias Plakokefalos, Causation in the law of State Responsibility and the Problem of Overdetermination: 
In Search of Clarity (2015) 26(2) EJIL 471. 
3 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction: Towards a Reasonableness Test (CUP 2013). 
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be admissible. Contemporary multinational use of force is marked by aerial bombings 
because of the reluctance to risk the lives of soldiers, and make war unpalatable for 
parliamentarians, who have surreptitiously positioned themselves as bellwethers of 
legitimate warfare, at least in the UK. The presumption of extraterritoriality may mean 
that those decisions are admissible.   The ECtHR may be in a position to condemn 
illegal acts under IHL, for example, the intentional bombing of a hospital or a school. 
A global constitutionalist frame requires the ECtHR to adjudicate upon these 
circumstances in the global governance system in which it finds itself.  
This analysis would benefit from an appraisal of the relationship between the ECHR 
and other international tribunals for systematising the relationship between different 
forums. The ECtHR’s popularity is most definitely directly linked to the lack of 
appropriate accountability mechanisms in place for meeting the disproportionate 
violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights. However, there needs to be an 
inquiry of whether there are other features of the ECtHR, in comparison with other 
international tribunals, that make it more palatable. This could be in relation to the 
efficiency of other international tribunals, the lack of knowledge on the part of legal 
representation of alternative mechanisms for dealing with such issues, the lack of 
familiarity with a certain international adjudicatory mechanism, or the rhetorical value 
of a statement from the ECtHR. International courts need to not only work together in 
creating clarity and consistency in the international legal system for the rule of law, 
but also provide a coordinated response to the lack of accountability in a global 
governance system for supporting the norm of democratic accountability. This means 
that an ECHR lawyer needs to engage with the IHL or international criminal law 
scholar not only in relation to questions concerning the substance of the legal norms 
pertaining to those regimes, but also institutional arrangements.  
One purpose of this thesis has been to provide a global constitutionalist framework 
that recognises that the ECtHR’s extraterritorial popularity is symptomatic of an 
uneven governance system, where powerful actors confidently extend their influence 
to foreign territories for their own ends, whether it be to exploit resources, or to pursue 
a misguided project of regime change, or for humanitarian endeavours. Changing that 
legal frame lies outside of analysis of how the ECtHR can optimise its global 
constitutionalist potential, but that does not mean that international dispute settlement 
should not be self-conscious of the uneven foundations upon which they have been 
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placed. This is not to say that the time spent on courts would be better spent on 
changing that foundation, devoid of the distraction of courts. However, there needs to 
be an evaluation of what role courts can play in changing the foundation upon which 
it rests. This is not merely the legal foundation. The law-making capacity or potential 
of courts is not addressed in this thesis because it raises questions of legitimacy and 
democratic accountability which are not easily defensible, need rigorous consideration, 
and caution. Recognition of the background governance system could embolden 
courts to push the limits of their authoritative interpretations, to make a more 
coordinated effort in creating a global judiciary that does create a powerful force in 
protecting weaker actors against the more powerful, and to dispense with archaic 
delimitations of accountability such as territory. This could be explored through the 
global constitutionalist norm of the separation of powers from the theoretical 
perspective, and ways of increasing cooperation and interconnectivity between courts 
on a practical level.  
In the face of new technology which not only eludes traditional paradigms of 
international law such as territory or state actors, but takes on an ethereal quality which 
at first brush appears to be beyond regulation, such as drone warfare, cyber warfare 
and 3D printers, there needs to be a movement, once and for all, which presumes 
extraterritorial accountability. Attribution, causation, and articulating the substantive 
damage that ensues from new technological developments in the context of global 
warfare, for example, should be the focus of attention of those who seek to fill legal 
loopholes in global governance. Ascertaining whose autonomy and equality is directly 
affected by these developments and identifying constituencies for which they form 
part in order to enhance mechanisms of democratic accountability should be a central 
focus. A presumption of extraterritorial accountability is the first step in filling 
legitimacy gaps in the global governance system, but many other legal vacuums wait 
beyond the periphery of this issue, which are as amenable to exploitation by powerful 
actors who wish to serve their own ends as extraterritoriality once was. Consolidating 
extraterritorial accountability is important for moving forward. This can be done 
through performing an acceptance of this norm, skipping the question of 
extraterritoriality, and asking the other big questions.  
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